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SECRET—GUARD

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

IRAQ

PART 11

January to December 1957

SECRET—GUARD

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IRAQ—PART II

VQ 1011/1

No. 1

IRAQ: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1956

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received February 12)

(No. 43. Confidential)
Sir,

*Bagdad,
February 8, 1957.*

Internal and General

When 1956 opened Nuri as-Said was still in power. He had been called from a sick bed in London in the summer of 1954 to become Prime Minister for the twelfth time at a moment of internal weakness and disturbance. During Iraq's twenty years of national life the average duration of Governments has been three months. For a Prime Minister to have remained in the saddle for fifteen months was unusual. At least eight former Prime Ministers, all of whom hoped to become so again, and the many younger politicians who aspired to the office, were manoeuvring restlessly for what each hoped would be their turn.

2. Since his serious operation in 1954 Nuri's own health appeared to be quietly improving. Like a great vintage claret he conveyed the impression that even after nearly seventy years he had much of his best still to give.

3. Behind Nuri was emerging slowly the figure of the young King Faisal II, now 22 years of age, and showing signs of possessing many of the qualities of his grandfather, Faisal I. Modest and quiet, something both of a sportsman and of an artist, he was developing an interesting knowledge and grasp of public affairs, and appeared to combine balanced judgment with steadiness of purpose and the power of firm decision. He is a staunch friend of Britain. By his side remained the Crown Prince, who as Regent had given loyalty and affection to his nephew whose interests and future he had done his best to promote. There were those who said that he was trying to cling too long to responsibility, but it is doubtful whether such a verdict can yet be justified. His warm feelings towards Britain are as wholehearted as those of the King.

4. Iraq, conscious of being a country of 6½ million people which could support at least 20 million, and with ample resources of land, water and oil, was beginning to shake off the feeling of being a small and poor country. Within some five years her annual revenue had increased from about £30 million sterling to about £130 million sterling. It was hoped that within a few years the production of oil would be doubled and her revenues proportionately increased. The benefits of the oil revenues were beginning to be felt in the lives of the ordinary people and whether in housing, education, health, flood control or irrigation, there was a sense of progress and expanding horizons, and of considerable pride in the manner in which the formidable tasks were being tackled. At the same time there was acute division of opinion between the younger intellectuals who considered that progress was too slow, and in particular that the somewhat feudal influence of the tribes, with their own law and their grip on land, must be made to give way more rapidly to more modern ideas, and on the other hand, the more conservative elements who argued that progress could only be made within a framework of stability; that stability still depended upon the support of the Monarchy by the army and the tribes; and that to be over-hasty in undermining tribal structure and traditions before there was something adequate to put in their place would only lead to chaos. Both schools of thought were in agreement that Iraq needed an assurance of internal stability while development proceeded; they differed on whether stability could best be secured by quick and radical or by slow and gradual political and social reform.

5. Nuri himself, the real father of development in Iraq, believed in pushing ahead as fast as possible with the work of the Development Board. Whatever other calls there might be on his time he never

missed presiding over its weekly meetings. As he has frequently remarked to me, he considers that the programme it is undertaking amounts to a practical form of socialism. But he believes equally that Iraq has not yet reached a state of political maturity in which the country can distinguish between liberty and licence. While moving fast on development he favoured moving slowly although steadily in political evolution. Having broken relations with all Communist countries, he dealt rigorously with Communist and other agitators; and while permitting freedom of speech and discussion, both inside and outside Parliament, maintained restrictions on the Press, on the right of association, and on the formation of political parties. His aim at the beginning of 1956 was to work towards a two-party system on the British model rather than a group system as in France and Syria, and gradually to relax controls and disciplines with this objective in view.

6. While in 1955 the record of his Government in internal legislation had been modest although progressive in its way, he went further in 1956. He embarked upon a reorganisation of the civil service on British lines with substantial increases of pay for civil servants, the army, the police and pensioners; put through a law, together with enforcement machinery, to combat corruption; passed the first effective social security law in the Middle East; undertook reforms in the banking system; introduced a new tax law and a new Customs schedule; and gave a major impulsion in the field of housing. Further he secured the passage of a revised and expanded Five-Year Development programme based largely upon the report of Lord Salter. On the vexed question of the taxation of land, he prepared a measure for introduction in the autumn, but as the sittings of Parliament after opening in December were suspended, the measure was held over.

7. Nuri had made minor Cabinet changes in December of 1955. The new Government thus constituted was still in power at the end of 1956. Ideas of forming a new Government on a wider basis, if possible with the inclusion of Salah Jabr, perhaps accompanied by the formation of a Government party and an Opposition party and of the holding of elections, all of which Nuri had been thinking about for the autumn, came to nothing as the result of the Suez crisis.

Foreign Affairs

8. When in 1953 the Shah was compelled to leave Iran and it appeared possible that Iraq would be faced with a Communist or near-Communist Iran on her frontier, Nuri, together with most responsible Iraqis, made up their mind (in so far as they had not done so before) that Communism represented the greatest of the dangers to Iraq and to her development; that the safety of Iraq against Communist subversion in time of peace or Communist attack in war could not be ensured either by Iraq alone or by the Arab League as a whole; that neutrality would afford no protection; and that the best hope for the future of Iraq and the entire Middle East lay in close co-operation with Britain and the United States. Nuri had devoted his life to the cause of Arab independence and unity, and he wanted to carry the whole of the Arab and the Moslem world with him in this policy. But he felt that Iraq, more exposed geographically to Communist Russia, could not afford to wait for joint and simultaneous action with all other Arab countries if the latter were more hesitant, preferred neutrality, or even desired Communist help. He had therefore in 1955 negotiated the Bagdad Pact, beginning with Turkey and then the United Kingdom as a nucleus. By the end of 1955 Iran and Pakistan had acceded. To his acute disappointment the United States had failed to respond to their joint invitation to membership. No other Arab country had joined in or followed his initiative, although he had done his best to persuade them to do so, including especially Egypt. To those who objected that by taking this lead Iraq was dividing the Arab world, he replied that the division already existed. The Arab League had proved to be nothing but a futile talking shop. Had Iraq failed to adopt the policy which her own security demanded and which, by building a shield for the rest of the Arab world against Communist Russia, was providing for their security also, the result might have been the preservation of a show of Arab unity; but it would have been a unity based on a mistaken policy of neutrality or of co-operation with the Communists which would within a short period have destroyed the Arab world altogether.

9. In the case of Egypt, Nuri became increasingly convinced that Nasser had committed himself to Communist Russia in 1952 or 1953 and had embarked with Communist help on a policy of gaining first the

leadership and then the control of the oil-producing countries in the Arab world on whose revenues he wished to lay his hands for the benefit of Egypt. He believed this to be the explanation of the increasingly bitter attacks on Iraq and the Bagdad Pact throughout 1955 and 1956 when Egypt never ceased to appeal to the people of Iraq to rise and murder himself and the Crown Prince.

10. Throughout the year Nuri did his utmost to improve the relations of Iraq with the Lebanon and Jordan. He wished to do the same with Syria, but was driven to conclude that the flow of Saudi money into Syria which was used to support Nasser and the Communists, made progress virtually impossible. He accordingly tried to establish better relations with Saudi Arabia and in spite of the reluctance of the Crown Prince to meet King Saud, was able to arrange for King Faisal and King Saud to meet at Damman in September. In parallel he urged the Americans to impress on Saud the dangers of his association with Nasser and of his mistaken policy in Syria, and to threaten to interrupt the flow of American dollars to Saudi Arabia unless Saud changed his policy. He was bitterly disappointed at what he considered the failure of the United States Government to help or even to show an understanding of the situation.

11. Meanwhile he did his best to build up the Bagdad Pact and to strengthen the growing relationship of Iraq with Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. He further devoted much attention to relations with Morocco and Tunis. He arranged for King Faisal and the Crown Prince to visit Morocco in May, went himself to Morocco in July, and arranged for Dr. Jamali and others to visit Tunis and Libya as well. He also began to build up links with the Sudan. While therefore he was being accused by Egypt and others of dividing the Arab countries, it may be said that he was trying to bring in the Moslem world to redress the unbalance in the Arab world, and eventually to unite both in a policy of friendship with the West and of opposition of Communism.

12. Until the end of October relations between Iraq and Britain became progressively closer. Traditional contacts and friendships were being extended and built into a firmer basis of goodwill and confidence. A mark of this was the State Visit of King Faisal, accompanied by the Crown Prince and Nuri, to London in July.

Suez and after

13. Before the visit ended Nasser announced that as a result of the withdrawal of the offer of aid from the United States and Britain in financing the Aswan Dam project he was nationalising the Suez Canal. Nuri considered that this unilateral action was a breach of faith and accordingly bad and dangerous in itself; and that it was part of the concerted plan between Nasser and the Communists to establish Nasser as the leader of Arab nationalism and thus to give him a grip over all Arab countries. He did not believe that it was to the interest of the Arab world that Nasser's tactics should succeed. He urged that his action should be resisted and his pretensions deflated. Otherwise forces might be let loose throughout the Middle East which it would be impossible to control. But he warned that if action were at any stage to be taken against Nasser it must not be in conjunction with or to the benefit of Israel. He left London reassured that this warning would be heeded. The President of Pakistan told him subsequently that he had given a similar warning and had received similar assurances. Her Majesty's Government's message to President Chamoun on the 6th of September served to confirm this understanding. Nuri returned to Bagdad at the end of July determined to hold the internal situation firm while the Suez question was being settled. He had to reckon with the strong nationalist appeal of Nasser's action; but provided Israel were kept out of the matter he was confident that troubles could be dealt with and that the whole situation in the Arab world would thereafter improve again.

14. When Israel attacked Egypt on the 29th of October Nuri confidently expected that Her Majesty's Government would consult Iraq and their partners in the Bagdad Pact before taking any action. The Anglo-French ultimatum to both sides of the 30th of October came as a shock to him, but he still thought that Anglo-French action would be a police action against both sides. It was with stupefaction and a sense of personal betrayal that he came to understand as the days went by that Her Majesty's Government intended to take no action against the invader but only against the invaded (much as he desired to see Nasser brought down). Indeed the action of Her Majesty's Government, because it was linked with action by Israel, placed him personally, as well as the King and Crown Prince and all those in Iraq who had so

actively pursued a policy of friendship with Her Majesty's Government, not only in the gravest political difficulty but in danger of their lives, and imperilled the continued existence of the régime and the monarchy. Yet with a courage and a steadfastness beyond praise he set himself resolutely to hold the position. During some of the most critical days he agreed to leave Bagdad for Tehran, where the four Moslem members of the Bagdad Pact held a meeting; and even before he left had worked out a plan in his mind under which, when the cease fire came in Egypt, it should be as far as possible in response to an appeal from the fellow members of Britain in the Bagdad Pact. In this way the Moslem members could claim credit for a major part in putting an end to fighting, the Pact might be saved, and Britain's position *vis-à-vis* the Arab world made easier.

15. Although this idea was in fact carried through, Nuri returned to Bagdad to find the situation extremely tense, and many members of his Cabinet gloomy, sullen and wavering. To ease the strain the Government decided to break off diplomatic relations with France and not to participate in any Bagdad Pact meetings at which Britain was represented until further notice. It was, in fact, touch and go whether Iraq would withdraw from the Bagdad Pact unless Britain did so, and whether relations with Britain would be broken off.

16. Under incitement from Cairo broadcasts and from Communist sources, demonstrations against the Government, and against Israel, France and Britain, took place in Bagdad, Mosul and Najaf early in November. The Government had introduced a state of emergency and the Army was made ready to support the police. Nuri and the Minister of the Interior, strongly backed by the Palace and by the Chief of the General Staff, took an inflexibly firm line, but extreme nationalist leaders including Kamil Chadirchi, Hussein Jamil, Faiq Samarraï and others tried to exploit the situation and sporadic agitation, especially through the students, continued for some weeks. Nuri found it necessary both to close the schools and to prorogue Parliament for a month from the 1st of December. There was talk of a change of Government but the King was unwavering in support of Nuri and the Crown Prince hardly less so. The year therefore ended with Nuri still in power, but with the ground heaving under his feet. He was himself determined to maintain law and order, and

to preserve both the connection with Britain and the Bagdad Pact, and in this he received every possible help from Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. The President of Pakistan, the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and Turkey and the Foreign Minister of Iran all visited Bagdad in November to bolster up the morale of the Iraq Government and to shore up its position. But whether Nuri would succeed in his aim it was still impossible to predict. The outcome depended more than anything else upon the ability and willingness of Her Majesty's Government to prove that they were not in league with Israel against the interests of the Arabs.

17. Soon after the Anglo-French action against Egypt on the 31st of October the Syrian Government destroyed portions of the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline, thereby interrupting the flow of oil from Iraq through Syria to the Mediterranean and the revenues due to Iraq therefrom. Fortunately the Development Board had over £70 million of unspent funds and the general economy of the country, with a note issue backed by 100 per cent. of gold and currency, was strong. It was a striking tribute to the soundness of the position that no marked effect upon the national life had ensued by the end of the year, and that it was estimated that no interruption of the Development Programme need be foreseen even if the flow of oil were not resumed during the first half of 1957.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Ankara, Bahrain, Beirut, Tehran and Tel Aviv, to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces and to Her Majesty's Consular Officers in Iraq.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

Enclosure

Calendar of Events, 1956

- January**
6-12 First Meeting of Bagdad Pact Economic Committee.
11 Egyptian Military Attaché recalled and Mohammad Isa arrested.
14-17 Security Chiefs of Turkey, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq met in Bagdad.
19 Iraqi-Jordanian representation raised to Embassy level.
Jan. 21- Second Meeting of Bagdad Pact Military Committee.
Feb. 4

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January

- 25 Chamber of Deputies passed 1956-57 Budget.
28 Secretary-General of the United Nations visited Iraq.

February

- 5 Jordanian Prime Minister visited Iraq.
8-23 Iranian Parliamentary Delegation visited Iraq.

March

- 4-15 Arab League Postal Union Conference held in Bagdad.
6 Iraqi-Greek Trade Pact announced.
8-18 Turkish Parliamentary Delegation visited Iraq.
10 Mr. Selwyn Lloyd visited Bagdad.
14 Iraqi loan of I.D. 1 million to Jordan approved.
Meeting of Their Majesties King Faisal and King Hussein on frontier.
Mar. 29- Syrian Parliamentary Delegation visited Apr. 10 Iraq.

April

- 2 *Development Week*: His Majesty King Faisal inaugurated Wadi Tharthar Flood Control Project.
5 His Majesty King Faisal opened Ramadi Barrage.
6 Iraqi-Nationalist Chinese representation raised to Embassy level.
8 Prime Minister opened Hilla-Najaf road, Kufa and Tuwairij-Hindiya bridges.
7-11 Foreign Minister attended Arab League Political Committee meetings in Cairo.
12-14 Sir Walter Monckton visited Bagdad.
16-19 Bagdad Pact Ministerial Council meeting in Tehran.
18 Development Board allocated I.D. 1 million for peaceful uses of atomic energy.
Iraqi Delegation returned from International Parliamentary Union meeting in Yugoslavia.
United States joined Bagdad Pact Economic Committee.
19 Iraqi Delegation left for Arab Engineers' Conference in Amman.
23 Contract for Nasiriya Bridge awarded to Messrs. Dorman Long.
26 Iraqi-Greek Trade Agreement signed.

May

- 1-8 Nationalist Chinese Trade Mission visited Bagdad.
2 His Majesty the King inaugurated Bagdad Television.
4 Iraqi-Indian and Iraqi-Spanish Cultural Agreements, and Iraqi-Dutch Civil Aviation Agreement ratified.
9 Contract for Sugar Plant awarded to German firm.
12 Iraqi Delegation departed for Arab Social Seminar in Amman.
14-22 Pakistani Parliamentary Delegation visited Iraq.
15 Royal Iraqi Air Force Silver Jubilee display.
17 His Majesty King Faisal and His Royal Highness Prince Abdul Ilah left for Spain and Morocco.
Foreign Minister left for Arab League Council Meeting in Damascus.
22 Prince Norodom Sihanuk of Cambodia visited Bagdad.

May

- 28 Parliament passed Civil and Judicial Services Law.
30 Parliament passed Income Tax Law.
"Atoms for Peace" Exhibition opened in Bagdad.
31 His Majesty King Faisal and His Royal Highness Prince Abdul Ilah returned from Spain and Morocco.
May 31- Algerian Delegation visited Iraq.
June 19

June

- 4 Anti-Corruption Law passed.
10-16 Ruler of Kuwait visited Bagdad.
12-17 Major-General Ali Abu Nuwar visited Bagdad.
14 Parliament went into recess.
15 His Royal Highness Crown Prince betrothed to Miss Huyam al Habib.
16 Iraqi Military Mission left for Cairo Celebrations.
18 Prime Minister left for visit to Europe and Morocco.
20-24 Turkish Civil Aviation Mission visited Bagdad.
26 Dr. Jamali left on special mission to Morocco, Tunisia and Libya.

July

- 2 Iraqi-Indonesian Treaty of Friendship approved.
2-6 Prime Minister and Dr. Jamali visited Morocco.
9 Application by Opposition politicians to form a National Congress Party rejected by Government.
11-13 His Majesty the King and His Royal Highness the Crown Prince visited Jordan.
16-19 State Visit by His Majesty the King and His Royal Highness the Crown Prince to the United Kingdom.
21-28 Sudanese Judicial Mission visited Iraq.
25 His Royal Highness Prince Zaid arrived from the United Kingdom to act as Regent.
Public Prosecutor and nine judges dismissed.

August

- 1 Bagdad Pact Deputies met on flood relief for Iran.
5 Prime Minister returned from Europe.
Communiqué issued on Iraq's policy over Suez.
9 Iraq nominated herself for Security Council.
9-10 Syrian Prime Minister visited Bagdad.
10 Tawfiq Suwaidi led Iraqi Delegation to Arab League meeting on Suez.
16 Arab General Strike partially observed by shops closing in Bagdad.
22 His Majesty the King and His Royal Highness the Crown Prince return from Europe.
23-27 Lebanese Military Mission under Colonel Emile al Bustani visited Iraq.
26-28 His Royal Highness Prince Zaid visited His Majesty King Saud.

September

- 1-7 Strike in Mosul.
4 Iraqi Military Mission left for Arab defence talks in Riyadh.
10 Emergency Ordinance passed.

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September

- 13 Iraqi-West German representation raised to Embassy level.
- 13-15 Abdullah Bakr and Abdulla Damaluji visited Riyadh.
- 14 His Majesty King Hussein visited Habbaniya.
- 16 Iraqi Military Mission left for Amman for talks under 1947 Treaty.
- 17 Tawfiq Suwaidi led Iraqi Delegation for Arab League Political Committee.
- Sept. 17- His Royal Highness Prince Mikasa of Oct. 11 Japan visited Iraq.

September

- 20 His Majesty the King met His Majesty King Saud at Damman.
- 28 Contract signed for Hilton hotel in Bagdad.
- Sept. 27- Jordanian Foreign Minister attended talks Oct. 2 in Bagdad.

September

- 29-30 Shaikh Abdulla al Mubarak of Kuwait visited Bagdad.

October

- 1 Bagdad's new medium-wave transmitter in operation.
- 7 Iraqi-Saudi representation raised to Embassy level.
- 12-17 Greek Goodwill Mission led by M. Papadakis visited Iraq.
- 15-19 Bagdad Pact Counter-Subversion Committee met in Tehran.
- 28-31 West German Parliamentary Delegation visited Iraq.

November

- 1 Iraq protested to United Kingdom and France about action in Suez.
- Martial Law declared.
- 3 Schools in Bagdad closed.
- Prime Minister and Foreign Minister left for Moslem four-Power meeting in Tehran.

November

- 3 I.P.C. pipeline sabotaged in Syria; oil flow cut off.
- Iraqi troops entered Jordan.
- 9 Iraq announced breaking-off of diplomatic relations with France and exclusion of the United Kingdom from Pact Council meetings.
- 10 His Majesty the King flew to Beirut for Arab Heads of States meeting.
- 13 Iraq Government issued Note calling for eradication of Israel.
- 17 Bagdad Primary Schools reopened.
- 17-23 Moslem four-Power meeting held in Bagdad, attended by President and Prime Minister of Pakistan, Prime Minister of Turkey and Foreign Minister of Iran.
- 19 Bagdad Secondary and Intermediate Schools reopened.
- Thirty-five Government officials suspended by Purge Committee.
- 21 Student demonstrations in Bagdad. Sixty police and nine civilians injured. Secondary and Intermediate Schools reclosed.
- 22 French Ambassador and staff left Iraq.

December

- 1 Parliament reassembled to hear the King's speech and was prorogued for one month.
- 2 Social Security Law came into effect.
- 8 Withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Jordan announced.
- 13 Twenty-three more officials suspended by Purge Committee.
- Iraq accepted invitation to 3rd Meeting of Moslem Powers.
- 16 Prime Minister broadcast to nation on Communism and Zionism.
- 20 Curfew imposed at T.1 and K.3 pumping stations.
- Kamil al Chardinchi sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

VQ 1104/14

No. 2

IRAQ DEVELOPMENT WEEK—MARCH 23-30, 1957

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received April 16)(No. 99 E. Confidential)
Sir,Bagdad.
April 12, 1957.

In my despatch No. 101 E. of the 17th of April, 1956, I described Iraq's Development Week held in April last year to inaugurate the first major schemes to come to realisation in the country's Development Programme. I now have the honour to report that a further Development Week was celebrated from the 23rd to the 30th of March this year.

2. As in the previous year, the projects covered by the recent Development Week were impressive. The most notable were the two new Bagdad bridges, the cement factory at Sarchinar and the Cotton Textile Factory at Mosul. Other main projects included the inauguration of the Saqlawiya and Abu Ghraib drainage pumping stations, the Bagdad-Mahmudiya road, the Bagdad-Fallujah road, the Greater Musayyib Irrigation project, Barmarni Airport and the Tasluja-Dokan road. In addition, foundation stones were laid for the new Iraqi Museum, a housing scheme in Bagdad, the Central Area electricity system, a sugar factory at Mosul and the Dokan Dam. Altogether it is estimated that the projects brought to realisation in this Development Week cost about £26 million. I enclose a memorandum⁽¹⁾ which sets out in detail the programme for the inauguration of the various projects and notes the part played by British contractors.

3. Development Week now looks likely to be an annual feature of life in Iraq. The success which attended last year's celebrations no doubt encouraged the Iraq Government to attempt a more ambitious and impressive programme this year. There was nothing to show as immense or as costly as the Wadi Tharthar and Ramadi Barrages which dominated last year's programme but the projects chosen for inauguration were so well presented that Development Week was a more popular event and aroused far more interest among the population and in the foreign press than it did last year. The Iraqis seem at last to have realised the importance of good public

relations and they were willing to spend money to ensure that their numerous guests were well looked after. The ceremonies were attended by a large and distinguished corps of reporters from Europe and the United States, many of whom, seeing Iraq for the first time, were surprised by the nature and scope of the country's present economic development and its future potentialities.

4. The most spectacular of the week's events was perhaps the opening by King Faisal of Bagdad's two new bridges over the Tigris. The vast new square at the eastern end of the Queen Aliyah Bridge was surrounded by tens of thousands of spectators packed against the barriers; on nearby buildings every vantage point was occupied. The crowd was in holiday mood and cheered the arrival of the Iraqi Prime Minister, a happening which surprised those visitors who had pictured him as a hated tyrant; the police and security forces were scarcely in evidence. After the King had formally opened the bridge the crowd broke loose and carried barricades and police before them like corks on a wave. The Royal car was surrounded by jubilant cheering crowds and could proceed only with difficulty while the mass of the population stormed straight for the bridge in an effort to be first across it.

5. The enthusiasm which was so apparent at this first ceremony of Development Week was repeated on many subsequent occasions. Wherever the King was due to appear crowds came from afar. One might have wished that he had sometimes given his people a better chance of seeing him because on some occasions it was a lengthy wait for a fleeting glimpse. But on the whole the arrangements of the programme in and around Bagdad worked impressively well and one had a feeling of interest and pride in achievement far greater than I could detect last year. In the latter part of the week the guests travelled to the North of Iraq to continue the programme. Reports which I have received from Her Majesty's Consular Officers at Kirkuk and Mosul state

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

that despite organisational deficiencies, uncertain weather and the chronic inability of the authorities to keep to a time-table, there was great interest and enthusiasm among the local inhabitants. Some 200,000 people thronged the streets of Mosul to see the King and to take part in the day's celebrations there.

6. Looking back on Development Week 1957 everyone is agreed that it has been an outstanding success. The Iraq Government had perhaps a slightly less imposing hand to play, in terms of new projects, than they had in 1956 but they played it with infinitely more skill and confidence. As a result they have had good Press coverage, both in the country and abroad, and they have opened the eyes of many who had been led to believe that Iraq was helpless under a ruthless despotism. I should regard as being among the most noticeable features of the week the average and poorer Iraqi's awareness of what the Government is doing with the oil revenue to improve the standard of living. The long-awaited results of planning and spending are now becoming visible, and Iraqis are taking interest and pride in their country's development. There is also a tendency to look forward hopefully to better things: several of the ceremonies such as the laying of foundation stones at the Bagdad West housing scheme and the

Central Area electricity power house denoted beginnings which will soon lead to further improvements in the standard of living. The Minister of Development illustrated this attitude in speaking to a member of my staff about the recent Development Week. He said, "This is nothing, wait till you see 1960."

7. Finally, it was encouraging to see the King in closer contact with his people and to observe the warmth of the welcome which he received everywhere; his good-natured charm captivated the crowds and I hope that his success with them may tempt him more out into the open with a resulting increase in his influence throughout the country. For Nuri, the real father of Development in Iraq, the Week was something of a popular triumph, and a vindication of policy.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Tehran, the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces at Nicosia, the Head of the Development Division at Beirut and to the Commercial Relations and Exports Department of the Board of Trade.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

VQ 10325/7

No. 3

SAUDI-IRAQI RELATIONS

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received May 15)

(No. 116. Secret—Guard)
Sir,

Baghdad,
May 10, 1957.

I have the honour, in connexion with the forthcoming visit of King Saud to Iraq, to submit a brief account of recent Saudi-Iraqi relations.

2. For hundreds of years there have been links between Iraq and Nejd both because the old pilgrim route from the east to Mecca set off from Nejed and because the major nomadic tribes, especially the Shammar and the Aniza, have migrated through the southern Iraqi desert into Nejd for the winter. The delights of Basra have also represented a traditional attraction to the Bedouin of the Arabian desert. Since foundation of the Kingdom of Iraq, however, these ties have become less. Undoubtedly the dynastic feud between the Hashemites, the hereditary Sherifs of Mecca, and the conquering Saudi dynasty, has been the main cause of estrangement. But at the same time the Grand Nomads have tended to settle in Iraq and to winter in Arabia no more, while the use of the pilgrim route from Nejed has been discouraged by both Governments because of its dangers and of the desire of the Saudi Government to channel the arrival of pilgrims to the Holy Land through a limited number of points of entry.

3. The Hashemite claims to the throne of the Hejaz have not been pressed in recent years but equally they have never been formally renounced, and it seems unlikely that the present Crown Prince of Iraq, whose father King Ali was titular King of the Hejaz, will for sentimental reasons readily forego them. At the same time it is believed that King Saud, by nature suspicious, regards Amir Abdul Ilah's failure to abdicate his rights as a menace to his dynasty. Since the early 1940's there has also been apparent a difference of opinion between the Iraqi and Saudi Governments over the question of Syria. The late King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud viewed with misgiving the hankerings of the Iraq Government and particularly of Nuri Pasha (cf. his letter to Mr. R. G. Casey), for the realisation of the "Fertile Crescent" to include Iraq, Syria and Jordan, which would establish his Hashemite rivals in strength on his northern frontier. He consequently made a point of seeking the friendship of leading Syrian nationalist politicians and in particular of the present Syrian President, Shukri al Quwatly, and tried by his liberality to politicians and his payments to the Press to stir up the opposition of Syrian public opinion to Iraq, to the Fertile Crescent and to the person of the late King Abdullah. His son continued this policy and in more recent years Saudi opposition to the Baghdad Pact has stemmed not only from the Pact's supposedly "divisive" effect in the Arab world, but also from the fear that it may result in Iraqi, and thence Hashemite, leadership of the Arabs. Saudi accession to the Egyptian-Syrian alliance was the practical expression of this fear, taken together with the fear of Israel.

4. Against the background of this mostly tacit antagonism—for in public and in the Arab League the Iraqi and Saudi Governments generally have made much of their Arab "brotherhood"—there have been certain minor irritants involving the person of the present King of Saudi Arabia which, given his autocratic position, have played a part in further estranging the two countries. The ceremonies at the accession of King Faisal in May 1953 led to much bitterness because Prince Saud (as he then was) and his entourage felt that as Crown Prince he should have been given preferential treatment to His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester, who represented Her Majesty The Queen. This resentment was increased rather than otherwise by the Saudi Minister in Baghdad who both during and after the visit distributed largesse to the Press and to persons who were known to be out of favour with the Iraq Government or with the Palace, e.g., the former Prime Minister, Muzahim al Pachachi. From that point onwards relations with the Saudi Minister in Baghdad remained markedly strained and in December 1954 as a result of a *contretemps* when the Minister alleged that King Faisal had refused to receive him, and the Iraqis that he had been discourteous to the King, the Iraq Government requested his recall. This did not, however, come about and only months later was Sayid Abdullah Khayyal posted, with pointed publicity, as Saudi Ambassador to

Washington. Moreover, at the death of King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud in November 1953 the Iraqi monarch and Government conspicuously failed to send a delegation to Riyadh to express their condolences or to congratulate King Saud on his accession.

5. Relations thereafter remained bad. Neither side did much to improve them save for a certain self-interested co-operation in oil affairs at a junior level. On the contrary, the Saudi Government are known to have spent large sums of money on anti-Iraqi propaganda in the Syrian, Lebanese and Jordanian and even the Iraqi Press; as a result, enterprising Pressmen from Damascus and Beirut visited Baghdad in the hope of persuading the Iraqis to reply in kind and went home not always without a modest token of success. The Saudi Arabian Government likewise consistently supported Egypt at a time when the Egypt publicity machine was attacking Iraq and Nuri Pasha's Government—indeed at the height of these attacks in August 1956, King Saud made a present of 10 million dollars to Jamal Abdul Nasser. The diplomatic missions of the two countries remained Legations and in the hands of junior *Chargés d'Affaires*.

6. When King Saud made his gift of 10 million dollars, however, the wheel was already beginning to turn and the payment may be seen in retrospect as buying time. For some months, as alarm at the trends apparent in Egypt grew, attempts were made, particularly by the United States Government, to bring King Saud to recognise the danger of Communist penetration in the Middle East and to meet King Faisal. Nuri Pasha cautiously encouraged the idea, subject to making it clear that Iraq was not weakening in her policy of support for the Baghdad Pact or seeking terms from Saudis, let alone Saud's Egyptian ally. He, therefore, recommended that a meeting should be arranged through the intermediary of King Hussain and that a communiqué should be agreed in advance by the Saudis, giving a cautious approval of Iraq's motives in joining the Pact. Perhaps this was too much to expect. For, despite further and more palpable feelers in June 1956 the proposals hung fire.

7. The situation was, however, transformed by the manner in which Jamal Abdul Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal. Despite his alliance with King Saud, despite the fact that King Saud is said to have sent him a personal envoy a few days earlier, and despite the fact that nationalisation might directly affect Saudi Arabia's main source of revenue, the export of oil, Nasser did not consult King Saud. The opportunity therefore looked propitious for a Saudi-Iraqi rapprochement and on August 9 it was suggested to the Crown Prince of Iraq, who was in London for King Faisal's State visit, that a modest approach might be made to King Saud to co-operate in combatting Communism. Nuri Pasha agreed whole-heartedly with the idea when it was put to him a few days later because he himself was convinced that King Saud's attitude to Nasser was becoming increasingly reserved. Since the royal houses on both sides were the principal obstacle to an understanding it was clear that to be fruitful initial contact should be made by a member of the Iraqi royal family. It so happened that there was in Iraq at the time in the person of Amir Zaid (who was Regent in the absence of King Faisal) an ideal man to make the first move. A genial nature, a Hashemite combining the qualities of the desert Arab leader and the *grand seigneur*, the younger half-brother of King Ali and King Faisal I, and married to a commoner, he suffered from none of the disabilities which would, for example, have beset a visit by the Crown Prince or Nuri Pasha. After soundings in Riyadh by both the Americans and the Iraqis, he flew to Saudi Arabia on August 26, bearing a letter from King Faisal defining Iraqi policy as based on opposition to Communism and Zionism.

8. His visit was an undoubted success. King Saud responded warmly to King Faisal's letter and professed to take a more sympathetic view of the Baghdad Pact. A certain identity of views was established in respect of Nasser's conduct and his ambitions and the dangers of Communism to which Egyptian policy was exposing the Arab world. King Saud agreed that the future of his country lay with the West. Nuri was determined to follow up swiftly this promising opening but there were jokers in both packs. Amir Zaid had observed in Riyadh that Amir Abdullah Abdul Rahman, King Saud's uncle, and Yusuf Yasin, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to some extent his chief, Amir Faisal, were neither so critical of Nasser nor so apprehensive of Communism, nor so enthusiastic about bettering relations with Iraq as King Saud himself. On the Iraqi side, Prince Abdul Ilah found difficulty in swallowing his strong feelings about the Hejaz. The result was that though Iraq was to make yet another move towards a rapprochement, it was neither so clear nor so decisive as either side would have liked. After much prompting by

both Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government it was agreed that King Faisal should go on a cruise in the royal yacht and meet King Saud at Damman in the Persian Gulf. Nuri Pasha had hoped that the Crown Prince would take part in their meeting because he was certain that King Saud would not be reassured about Iraq's intentions unless Prince Abdul Ilah were there. King Saud for his part had openly said that he hoped that Nuri Pasha would be present. The Crown Prince, however, declined not only to accompany King Faisal but even to act as Regent in his absence and retired to the mountains. Nuri, doubtless with one eye on the Crown Prince, pleaded that the absence of the Foreign Minister from Iraq made it impossible for him to be absent and the Deputy Prime Minister went in his stead. The meeting, which took place on September 20, though useful was thus something of an anti-climax. The impression was confirmed in the Iraqis that King Saud was anxious to co-operate and to fight Communism, but his entourage were not so staunch and, according to the Iraqis, discussions with Prince Faisal and Yusuf Yasin on a plan for a joint propaganda campaign in Syria came to nothing in the face of the latter's bland assertion that Communism in Syria was negligible. The meeting was followed closely by a sudden visit of Nasser and Quwatly to Dhahran while shortly afterward the Suez operations intervened and other matters overlaid for some months the question of a further approach. Saudi broadcast attacks on Iraq and the Baghdad Pact were, however, discontinued from about this time.

9. One of the by-products of the Suez crisis was a decision by the four Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact that the Crown Prince of Iraq should visit Washington to represent to the United States Government the views of the Governments concerned and their need for strong American support, in view of the manner in which the Anglo-French descent on Port Said had shaken their positions. First Thanksgiving, then Christmas and then the Presidential inauguration led to the postponement of this visit until mid-January. It was then postponed once more until February because of King Saud's State visit to the United States. The last postponement, however, offered another opportunity for a meeting of the Crown Prince and King Saud and Nuri Pasha urged Prince Abdul Ilah to take it. The auspices were more favourable than could at one time have been expected since the meeting could take place on neutral ground in the Western camp and there would be no question of the Iraqi Crown Prince appearing to go cap-in-hand to his rival. Prince Abdul Ilah readily consented and meetings took place in Washington on February 6 and 7. They appear to have been surprisingly cordial and as a result the Crown Prince was confident that King Saud would view the Baghdad Pact with a more benevolent eye and that an atmosphere had been created in which further meetings between the members of the two royal houses would be possible and productive. He made no attempt to press King Saud to join the Pact and indeed the latter made it clear that he could no take sides in this matter. Undoubtedly, however, the fact that King Saud at the end of his visit to Washington made a statement expressing satisfaction with the Eisenhower doctrine (as explained to him by the President and Mr. Dulles) brought the Saudi-Arabian Government nearer to the stand of the Iraq Government and further from that of Egypt and Syria, who had been either lukewarm or disapproving of the Eisenhower doctrine and were later to refuse to receive President Eisenhower's special envoy, Mr. Richards. On the Crown Prince's return to Iraq in March, a formal invitation was sent to King Saud by the hand of Dr. Abdullah Damaluji to visit Baghdad in May. Saud accepted it. The visit was subsequently fixed for May 11. As this date approaches, the omens for its success appear increasingly favourable as the two countries develop their co-operation in support of King Hussain in his opposition to Left-wing elements in Jordan.

10. It will be apparent from the foregoing narrative that the main initiatives towards the improvement of relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia have come from the Iraqi side. This perhaps was just, as it was Iraqi negligence rather than Saudi sensibility which had brought relations to so low a point. The Iraq Government realise very acutely the importance which this visit can have for their relations not only with Saudi Arabia but with the rest of the Arab world as well. They have sustained for some two years with, on the whole, remarkable fortitude, a position in which they have stood in isolation—contrary to the feelings of the majority of their countrymen—from the rest of the Arab world. They now see an opportunity to bring over to their side one of the most important figures in the Middle East, thereby weakening the position both of Nasser and the Left wing in Syria. Against their success in this enterprise stand the background of dynastic

feuds, King Saud's feeling that he is pledged to Egypt and must keep his pledge, the counsels of his advisers who, both from sentiment and from personal interest, are favourable to Egypt and Syria. Drawing the two countries together are what Her Majesty's Ambassador in Amman has described as the "Monarchs' Trade Union", their mutual antagonism to Communism, their common status as oil producers and the conviction of their rulers that the future of the two countries is tied up with the West, both ideologically and economically. The factors in favour of co-operation though imponderable are certainly the stronger. But with an absolute monarch there are many small and even personal issues which may play a decisive part and the trepidation both of the Iraqi Court and the Iraqi Government on the eve of this visit is understandable.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

V 1195/80

No. 4

GIFT OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT TO IRAQ

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received May 27)

(No. 126. Confidential)

Baghdad,

May 23, 1957.

Sir,

During 1956, the Prime Minister of Iraq made known to me on more than one occasion his desire to begin the re-equipment of the fighter squadrons of the Royal Iraqi Air Force with swept-wing fighter aircraft, and Her Majesty's Government considered how best this reasonable ambition might be assisted.

2. At first the decision was made to lend to Iraq a number of Hunter fighter aircraft Mark IV for a period, to serve as a stopgap pending the availability of the later Hunter Mark VI of which it was hoped that the Iraq Government would purchase a number. However, as a result of a change of plans in the United Kingdom it was decided early in January 1957 that no Hunter IVs could be spared, whereas the Hunter VI would be available from new production earlier than had been expected. It was then decided that the best course was to present a small number of Hunter VIs to the Iraq Government as a gift.

3. In the circumstances of the time, the propaganda onslaught against Iraq from Cairo, Damascus and Moscow, the fact that both the Egyptian and Syrian Governments had been furnished with Russian swept-wing fighters and the budgetary difficulties of the Iraq Government caused by the destruction of the oil pipeline in Syria, I urged that the proposed gift should be as generous as we could afford to make it. In the event, I was authorised at the end of January to offer to the Iraqis a free gift of five Hunter VI aircraft (at an estimated cost of £550,000) delivered without cost, together with a supply of spare parts sufficient for three months flying and the loan of a servicing party from the Royal Air Force for two years (at an estimated cost of £60,000). The offer was gladly accepted by the Prime Minister of Iraq who hoped that it would later be possible to purchase 10 additional aircraft when the Iraqi financial situation had improved.

4. The first of the aircraft arrived at Habbaniya on April 17, the gift was announced in the House of Commons in reply to a Parliamentary question on the same day, and on April 18 the offer was formally made and accepted in letters exchanged between myself and the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs and released on the same day to the Press.

5. Meanwhile, in the expectation that the loan scheme would be carried through, a number of pilots of the Royal Iraqi Air Force were at the end of 1956 given a course of training in the United Kingdom in the handling of Hunter aircraft. However, a lengthy period elapsed after their return to Iraq before the arrival of the aircraft and it was therefore considered advisable that a short refresher course for those pilots who would fly the aircraft on arrival was required. As a result five pilots were sent to Cyprus for a three-day course with the Royal Air Force. On their return it was possible to arrange the formal handing-over of the aircraft and a ceremony was arranged to take place on the main airfield at Habbaniya on the morning of May 9.

6. I have the honour to inform you that the ceremony on that day was attended by General Nuri al Said as Minister of Defence, by the Chief of the Iraqi General Staff, by the Officer Commanding the Royal Iraqi Air Force, by the Service Attachés of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, by senior officers of the Iraqi Armed Forces, as well as by the Air Officer Commanding (Levant), the Senior Air Staff Officer, Middle East Air Forces, and by members of my own staff. The texts of a speech in which I announced the gift, and of the reply by Nuri, are enclosed⁽¹⁾ herein. Together we inspected the five aircraft, which were drawn up before us, as well as their pilots, the servicing party of 30 men of the Royal Air Force and the Iraqi ground staff.

7. The five aircraft thereupon took off and flew past in formation. The Iraqi pilots, who had already been commended by headquarters, Middle East Air Force.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

for the qualities they had shown during their refresher course in Cyprus, acquitted themselves well, and the performance of the aircraft was impressive.

8. It had been decided that we should afford maximum publicity to this gift, and I am glad to report that the operation was well covered by the Iraqi Press and radio from the date of the Exchange of Notes on April 18 until the handover ceremony on May 9. Correspondents of Reuter, the B.B.C. and the *Daily Express*, as well as British official photographers, attended the presentation ceremony. The handover itself was prominently reported in all eight Baghdad newspapers and on the wireless. The aircraft themselves, moreover, were shortly afterwards in evidence over Baghdad during the State visit of King Saud and participated in the military displays organised for his benefit at Moascar Rashid and Habbaniya.

9. I should like to take this opportunity of recording my appreciation of the co-operation in all the arrangements of Headquarters, Middle East Air Force, of the Royal Air Force Staging Post at Habbaniya, and of the air element of British Loan Personnel (Iraq). A number of last minute difficulties attended the handover of the aircraft but with their help, these were all surmounted. No hitch marred the inauguration of this further stage in the co-operation of the Royal Air Force and the Royal Iraqi Air Force, which will I hope ensure that the R.I.A.F. continue to fly British.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

VQ 10325/13

No. 5

STATE VISIT TO IRAQ OF KING SAUD OF SAUDI ARABIA

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received June 3)

(No. 140. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
Sir, *May 30, 1957.*

I have the honour to report that His Majesty King Saud of Saudi Arabia paid a State Visit to Iraq from the 11th to the 14th of May, 1957. His Majesty extended his visit unofficially until the 18th of May.

Background of Visit

2. In my despatch No. 116 (G.1038/8/57) of the 10th of May I gave an account of the efforts made by the Iraq Government over a long period to improve relations with King Saud. I will not rehearse them, except to say that the visit of King Saud to Bagdad was a further and, it is hoped here, a significant link in a chain of endeavour which began seriously with the visit of Amir Zaid to Riyadh in August 1956 and was followed by several journeys to Riyadh by Sayid Damaluji, by King Faisal's visit to Dammam where he met King Saud in September 1956, and by the conversations between the Crown Prince of Iraq and King Saud in Washington in January 1957.

3. Among the motives of the Iraq Government in making this sustained effort were the appreciation that the Royal Families of Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia have a common interest in opposing Communist subversion in the Middle East, an interest so strong as to require the composition of past differences between the Hashemite Family and the Rulers of Saudi Arabia; the desire, flowing from this, to open the eyes of Saud to the reality and danger of co-operation between Nasser and Communist Russia, not least in terms of the situation in Syria, and to try and detach Saud from Nasser; and the hope of securing at least the benevolent acquiescence of Saud in Iraq's membership of the Bagdad Pact, thereby diminishing the relative isolation of Iraq in the Arab world. If even modest progress could be made towards achieving these aims the effect on the situation in Jordan, Syria and the Lebanon would be valuable.

Visit

4. Although arrangements for the visit were begun well in advance, the programme

did not receive royal approval until after His Majesty's arrival in Bagdad, the time of which was equally in doubt until almost the last moment. The Iraqis had, however, taken the precaution of sending to Riyadh on the 9th of May a special delegation under the Foreign Minister to accompany His Majesty on the journey, and this ensured that the confusion which might otherwise have attended his arrival was reduced to the minimum. Just in time, the streets of Bagdad were decorated with Saudi and Iraqi flags and large triumphal arches were erected bearing illuminations and inscriptions of welcome. A considerable crowd collected at the airport to watch the arrival, and although the attitude of the crowd was, as usual on ceremonial occasions, somewhat restrained, there was plenty of evidence during the visit that the people of Bagdad had friendly feelings for their visitor.

5. King Saud's plane was escorted from the Iraq-Saudi frontier by two squadrons of Venoms of the Royal Iraqi Air Force, and after a prompt landing and an impressive ceremony at the airport, Their Majesties drove in state in an open landau to the Qasr al Zuhur where King Saud was accommodated. King Saud had expressed the wish to be free of his entourage, who were with some difficulty split up between the White House, the Green House and the leading hotels. Included in the party were the King's uncle, the Amir Musaid Abdul Rahman, his son, the Amir Muhammad (Governor of Riyadh), his cousin the Amir Muhammad Saud al Saud, the Amirs Fahad (Minister of Education) and Mishal Abdul Aziz (former Minister of Defence and Aviation) and the Amir Muhammad Turki Abdul Aziz (a nephew). Shaikh Muhammad Sarur al Sabbah (Minister of Finance) and Shaikh Abdullah al Tiraidi (Director of Oil Affairs) arrived the previous day. Also in attendance were Yusuf Yasin, Khalid Abu al Walid, Jamal al Hussaini, Muhammad Daghaithir, Abdullah al Tuwaijri, Abdul Rahmad al Hamidi and Rushdi Mulhis. The Iraqi tribal leader Abdullah as Sadun was also included in the Royal suite.

6. The first evening was taken up with a reception of Heads of Missions and a dinner party given by King Faisal at the Qasr al Rihab. On the second day King Saud received the Prime Minister, also former Prime Ministers, Members of Parliament and other notables, in the morning, and in the afternoon attended the races at the Mansour Club. A special race was run for the Saud Cup (presented by His Majesty) and the winning mare, Anifa, was given to the King by her owner, Shaikh Sfuq Ajdal Yawar of the Shammar tribe. This was the only event in the programme during which the public had a prolonged view of the King and there was no doubt from the cheers of the crowd that his appearance was welcome. That evening the Prime Minister gave a reception and dinner at the Amana Hall.

7. A military parade was planned for the morning of the third day, but had to be postponed because of rain. Instead the King received callers at the Qasr al Zuhur including a religious delegation composed of Shaikh Amjad al Zahawi, Sayid Abdul Rahmad Khider and Shaikh Muhammad Mahmoud al Sawaf, (all ardent Arab nationalists and members of the "Save Palestine" Society). The Prime Minister gave a lunch party for the King and his house and the Acting Mayor held a tea party in the afternoon. King Saud gave a return dinner to King Faisal in the evening.

8. The last day of the State Visit was devoted to a tour of military installations, lunch at the Staff College and talks with the Iraqi Foreign Minister. My American colleague was granted an audience in the afternoon.

9. A special delegation from the City Council also called to present a silver palm tree with gold date clusters. In reply to their address, King Saud, said, "The Arabs are one nation and if anything happens to harm Iraq in the morning, it would definitely harm other Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, in the evening. I believe that this is the feeling in Iraq. Unity between the Saudi and Hashemite families is essential for the good of the Arabs and will serve Arab interests." The day ended with a reception at the Saudi Embassy attended by some 2,000 people.

10. The unofficial half of the King's visit continued on much the same pattern, but without the vast evening parties. The military parade, postponed from the third day, which included a fly-past by the five

new Hawker Hunter aircraft present by Her Majesty's Government, took place on the 15th of May, and on the 16th the King was treated to an air display at Habbaniya which included the somewhat alarming feature of a rocket attack by Venoms on some old armoured cars only a quarter of a mile from the royal pavilion. Two Hawker Hunters ended the display by breaking the sound barrier.

11. It had originally been suggested that the four unofficial days would give the King the opportunity to see development, industrial and irrigation projects outside Baghdad. His Majesty, however, showed little interest in development sight-seeing, deciding only to move on to Basra for his last day. At his departure from Baghdad airport, the atmosphere was noticeably more relaxed and cordial than at his arrival. He was heard to remind King Faisal of the Arab proverb, "Those who see are much better than those who hear" and to have told the Prime Minister that the visit had left a deep impression on him. An invitation to King Faisal and the Crown Prince to return the visit has been accepted, but no date has been fixed.

12. The material results of the visit do not call for special comment. A cultural agreement providing for a substantial increase in Saudi students studying in Iraq was discussed, and a civil air pact (mainly to introduce better facilities during the pilgrimage season) has been initialled, as an economic agreement giving the two countries "most-favoured-nation" rights in trade. For the civil air pact and the economic agreement, the Saudis insisted that their agreements with Syria on these subjects should be taken as a basis of negotiation, despite the fact that the former is not in conformity with the International Civil Aviation Organisation's Code. Hand-some cases containing a ceremonial robe, head-dress, dagger or sword and a watch bearing King Saud's portrait were distributed to notables and senior Government officials. Three Cadillacs were presented to King Faisal and two to the Crown Prince. Cash disbursements to tribal leaders, police and Palace staff were on a relatively modest scale. This modesty was in conformity with Iraqi desires, though whether these desires were expressed to the Saudis, I do not know. When King Saud (then Crown Prince) visited Iraq in 1953, his lavish payments gave some offence to the Iraqi authorities since they smacked of subversion.

13. At the request of King Saud, nobody from this Embassy was invited to any of the functions. The Iraqi authorities were quite prepared for our inclusion but they were anxious that no embarrassments should cloud the visit, and having first consulted Her Majesty's Government and been assured that we had no feelings on the subject they fell in with the King's wishes. The presence of Centurion tanks and Hunter aircraft meant that Britain was not unrepresented at the military occasions.

14. The joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit, a translation of which was contained in my telegram No. 41 Saving is enclosed with this despatch.

15. At one stage during the visit it was confidently forecast that King Hussain would join the other two monarchs for discussions. When this report was denied in Amman, there was a certain feeling of disappointment, although in fact it is doubtful whether such a meeting would have produced any useful result. As I have reported, it was King Saud who prevented the meeting from taking place and not, as was publicly announced, the internal pre-occupations of King Hussain.

Results of the Visit

16. It is still too early to make any definite assessment of the results of the visit, which must be measured as time goes by. In my telegram No. 633 I reported Nuri's first impressions, which were that it had been reasonably satisfactory and encouraging. The Iraqis believe that Saud is now fully alive to the dangers of Nasser's policy and to his hostile intentions towards the régimes in Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. "I gave him forty million dollars and other help besides" he said "and in return he tried to assassinate me." In opening Saud's eyes the Egyptian plot against King Hussain of Jordan has, of course, played a major part. American advice during his visit to Washington has no doubt been most helpful also. The Iraqis were specially pleased at having, as they think, brought Saud to recognise that the Baghdad Pact is in no way harmful to Arab interests, and to the point of being prepared to accept Iraqi membership of it. They were gratified when King Saud stated his intention of making no further payments to Nasser, and when he said that he would support the President of the Lebanon in the electoral campaign. The Under-Secretary in the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs has described the latter as a real reversal of policy, since on the showing

of three months ago Saud could have been expected to support the Opposition to President Chamoun whereas now he was not only abandoning Hamid Frangie but throwing his weight on the other side. On the other hand, there was apparently a minimum of discussion of Syria. This seems to have been confined to Saud's decision to send a letter to President Kuwatly saying that he was prepared to help him financially and by any other means if he would assemble around himself the Rightist elements in Syria, including the Nationalists, the Populists and Independents, with a view to demolishing the Left, both Khalid Bikdash and Akram Haurani. But the edge was somewhat taken off the letter by the fact that it was entrusted to Yusuf Yasin.

17. As regards relations with Her Majesty's Government, Saud gave the impression of being far from unfriendly and of welcoming the idea of any help which Iraq could render in a compromise being reached over Buraimi. But there was no talk of resumption of relations in the immediate future.

18. King Saud's attitude on these matters was in keeping with the desire he expressed to detach himself from Nasser and to see the latter weakened. But he made it clear that, partly from an expressed fear of Nasser's propaganda machine and partly from an implied sense of nervousness of the force of the pro-Nasser influences surrounding him at Riyadh, that he wished to develop his new policy cautiously and slowly. The Iraqis feel that much will depend upon his resolution and success in imposing on other members of his family and on his advisers the new direction of policy. They judge, first, that he genuinely wishes to pursue this; and second, that he is in the process of turning away from the non-Saudi counselors of his father and of placing more and more reliance on the younger Saudi elements in his own family and in the Saudi administration. They hope that this tendency will have been encouraged and accelerated by the visit, but do not feel entirely confident of the outcome. Moreover, in the long run they have grave doubts of the cohesion and stability of Saudi Arabia, where little serious attempt is being made to achieve economic progress or social reform. If, however, they could succeed in aligning King Saud actively or half-actively with Iraq for some time to come, they would be reasonably pleased.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Beirut, Ankara, Tehran, Karachi, Khartoum, Tunis, Tripoli, Rabat, Bahrain, Washington, to Her Majesty's Consul

General at Benghazi and to the Head of the Political Office with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

Joint Iraqi/Saudi Communiqué issued on the 18th of May, 1957

In response to the invitation extended by His Majesty King Faisal II of Iraq, His Majesty King Saud of Saudi Arabia visited his brother King Faisal during the period from May 11 to 18, 1957.

(1) September 20, 1956, marked a new era in the friendly relations between the two Kings and their families as the Dammam meeting was the blessed step for a new era in the relations of the two countries which are bound by the strongest ties of neighbourhood in addition to national and historical bonds.

(2) The blessed meeting of Bagdad, following that of Dammam, was a great opportunity for the two Kings and the leaders of their two Governments to exchange views in a most cordial brotherly and frank atmosphere concerning matters of mutual interest to their two countries and peoples and to the Arab and Moslem world, inspired by a sincere desire to establish a new era based on friendship and to work for the good of the Arabs, Moslems and humanity.

(3) To this end the Saudi and the Iraqi viewpoints are agreed on the necessity of upholding the principles of the Arab League Charter, the Arab Collective Security Pact and the United Nations Charter, as well as the resolutions of the Bandung Conference, convinced as they are that a policy based on these principles would safeguard the Arab States and serve world peace, humanity and civilisation.

(4) The two parties have agreed to continue the implementation of treaties and agreements previously concluded between the two countries in spirit and letter.

(5) The two parties are determined to safeguard the independence of their two countries from whatever source, maintain their spiritual and Islamic legacy and oppose any foreign interference in the affairs of their own countries. They consider Zionism, destructive principles and imperialism a danger, threatening the Arab nation, and

that the Arab States and peoples must do their utmost to resist these dangers which threaten their existence, independence and sovereignty.

(6) The two parties are in complete agreement to do everything possible to unify the Arab ranks and consolidate relations among the Arab and Moslem peoples, fully convinced that such a step would be in their common interest and strength.

(7) As the Arab Palestine problem is a source of interest to the two Kings and their Government leaders because it continues to be troublesome in the Middle East and as the major interest of the two parties is that peace and stability be restored, the problem therefore must be settled in a way acceptable to the Arabs and the restoration of their complete rights in their country.

(8) The two parties announce that they deplore the methods of suppression used against the gallant Algerian nation and designed to deprive the Algerians of the right of self-determination. The two countries fully agreed to continue their complete support of the Algerians to achieve this end. They will also support any other Arab nation which struggles for freedom and independence.

(9) Full agreement is confirmed to safeguard Arab and Moslem rights in the Gulf of Aqaba which is a closed Arab gulf linked by Islamic Holy Shrines. It was decided to do the utmost to prevent any transgression by Israel in this Arab gulf.

(10) The two parties declared their agreement that no Arab State should interfere in matters of special concern to any other Arab State.

(11) The two parties reaffirmed their desire to strengthen their cultural and economic relations and stated that negotiations to conclude agreements have already started. An economic agreement between the two countries was initialled on May 16, 1957, as well as a Civil Aviation agreement.

(12) The two parties reaffirmed the continuation of their co-operation in co-ordinating policy concerning oil affairs.

(13) The two parties declared their agreement to continue their efforts to prevent supplying oil to the aggressor Israel from any Arab or Moslem sources.

(14) The two parties announced their collaboration to unify their efforts in the

United Nations and other international organisations for the support of Arab questions.

(15) The two Kings and their Government leaders agreed that the two Kings of the two sister countries will continue their consultations to achieve Arab and Moslem aims.

VQ 1015/23

No. 6

REVIEW OF PROGRESS IN THE REFORM OF THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT MACHINERY

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received June 18)

(No. 151. Confidential)
Sir,

*Baghdad,
June 11, 1957.*

In my despatch No. 182 of July 3, 1956, I reported the passage of the Anti-Corruption Law, one of Nuri As-Said's measures for the reform of the Government machinery of Iraq. The first birthday of that law provides a suitable occasion for a review of its effects, and I have the honour in this despatch to examine the results achieved so far.

2. The Committee set up to carry out the provisions of the law, which has come to be known as the "Purge Committee", took several months to produce its first list of victims. This was due in part to the seasonal summer lull, but also to the Committee's desire to ensure that the law was completely watertight. As the President pointed out to the Oriental Counsellor in September, it has not been uncommon, when Government succeeds Government in Iraq, for a Minister to reverse the decisions of his predecessor and to favour officials whom his predecessor disliked. He and the members of his Committee therefore decided that it was absolutely essential that there should be no loop-holes in either the law or the proceedings of the Committee, which would give an official an excuse to claim at a later date, through a friendly Minister, that his dismissal had been illegal or irregular. In fact, he was not wholly successful, as a special "Diwan" has recently had to be set up to decide whether retired officials can be investigated and interrogated. The question arose over the ex-Mutasarrif of Basra who retired hurriedly at the end of May at the early age of 50 ostensibly to avoid being purged.

3. The Committee got down seriously to work in the early autumn and Ministries were asked to supply dossiers of their officials and lists of those considered corrupt. The President made a point of tackling a number of senior officials first, using the powers under Article 4 (3) of the law to appoint officials to keep an eye on the activities of any particular suspect, and to employ "spies" to move among the public and discover what reputations individual officials enjoyed. In addition a sub-committee toured the country examining evidence and making enquiries on the spot. Although not empowered to act in cases of slackness or inefficiency, the Committee had the fairly wide definition of misconduct in Article 6 to assist them in collecting enough evidence to reach decisions.

4. The first list, containing 35 officials to be suspended from 2 to 5 years, was issued on November 19. A second list of 23 followed on December 13, a third of 49 on January 10 and a fourth of 101 on March 21. A fifth and even longer list has been predicted at intervals, but so far only odd names have emerged. Altogether about 220 officials have been named. The lists have shown a fairly even distribution between departments, with Finance and Customs leading, and Railways and Public Works close behind; the police have also suffered with 11 Commandants and 11 Assistant Commandants suspended. As between grades of official there has again been a fairly regular pattern, the majority being in the middle grades of Director and Superintendent, with a reasonable number of senior officials and rather less in the lower grades. The scope of the law was in any case limited to officials with monthly salaries of ID.27 and above. Three Directors General, one Inspector General, three Assistant Directors General, four Mutasarrifs and one Qaimaqam have been removed. The law provides for appeal only to the Council of Ministers, and this has caused considerable criticism from the officials concerned because they feel that the Council of Ministers, having set up the Committee, will be bound to support it and no Minister is in any case likely for political reasons to defend in the Cabinet an official believed dishonest. The officials maintain therefore, that they have not been given the same opportunity to defend themselves as they would have had in a Court of Law and that they should have the right to appeal to some higher impartial authority immune from political pressure which could review their cases in detail. A draft law amending the law to provide for such a committee, of which a translation is attached, has been approved by the Council of Ministers and is now before Parliament.

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5. There have of course been complaints that unfair treatment has been given to certain classes of official. It has been said that a higher proportion of Christians than Muslims have been affected (this is only true in the railways where Christians hold a number of posts in which there are better opportunities for corruption) and that pro-British sympathies have been punished. Although some senior officials friendly to us, notably the Directors General of Surveys (Dr. Ahmed Sousa), and of State Lands and Domains (Abdul Baqi Abdulla), the Assistant Director General of the Interior (Jamal Rifa'at), the Inspector General of Veterinary Services (Dr. Sadiq Jawad) and the Mutasarrif of Erbil (Abdul Halim Sinawi) have been included, all would have appeared on the list, quite independently of their connexions with us. The other main criticism is that the opportunity has been taken to work off a number of personal grudges. This is more difficult to disprove, particularly in view of the necessary secrecy of the Committee's proceedings. In any operation of this kind, the motives of the majority of those who give evidence against a Government official would not bear close examination. In any country the number who act purely in the public interest would be small and in an Arab country, practically infinitesimal. Nevertheless the general opinion seems to be that the Committee have not allowed themselves to be over-influenced by petty accusations. As the President remarked in discussing the disadvantages of accepting hearsay, although the Iraq people are liable to say almost anything about each other, it is generally true to say that if a consensus of people says that a certain person is a thief, he is in fact a thief, whereas even bitter personal opponents will very rarely impugn a man of dishonesty if he is in fact honest.

6. Opinions differ widely on whether the operation has been a success (at the time of drafting it has not been decided whether the Committee's life is to be extended beyond its initial year). Some hold that things have gone far enough and that with her acute shortage of trained officials, Iraq cannot afford to lose any more. Others object equally that if the purge continues, officials in senior posts will become even less willing than they are at present to take responsibility for fear of incurring suspicion. On the other side, there are many who think that the surface has only been scratched and that far more heads should have rolled. In between these extremes, the majority hold that the Committee has done its work well, and that even if it has not removed more than a small proportion of the corrupt, it has served to frighten the rest into being less corrupt—or at least less openly and automatically corrupt—than before. But it is generally agreed that the disease is not one which can be cured by unpleasant medicines, and that only if its causes are tackled systematically is there any hope of real improvement. The higher pay scales introduced last year in the Civil Service Law have done something to remove the fundamental temptation and reorganisation is, we hope, coming soon, but there is a long way to go before better Government servants and a more efficient machine will make it unnecessary to bribe in order to get things done or, at any rate, done faster.

I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Ankara and Tehran, to the United Kingdom High Commissioner at Karachi and to the Head of the Middle East Development Division, Beirut.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

Enclosure

(Translation from Al Zaman of May 22, 1957)

DRAFT LAW AMENDING THE LAW FOR PURGING THE STATE MACHINERY No. 66 OF 1956

Article 1

Article 6 of the Law for Purging the State Machinery No. 66 of 1956 will be considered as paragraph 1 and the two following paragraphs will be added thereto:

2.—(a) A Committee under the presidency of the President of the Purge Committee and with two Class I or Class II Judges and two Class I or Class II officials, other than Judges, as members, will be set up to consider appeals

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submitted to it by officials suspended or discharged in accordance with a decision of the Purge Committee.

(b) The Members of the Committee, who shall not be members of the Purge Committee, shall be appointed by a decision of the Council of Ministers.

(c) An official against whom a decision of suspension had been issued by the Purge Committee may appeal against such decision to the Committee in question within 20 days from the date of coming into force of this Law, if he was suspended before its coming into force. Officials suspended after that date may submit their appeal within 20 days from the date on which they are served with the Committee's decision.

(d) The Committee will examine the reasons for the decision against which an appeal is submitted. If the Committee is convinced that the reasons were adequate, it will decide to reject the appeal, but, if it is revealed to the Committee that the reasons were inadequate, it will recommend the official's reappointment.

(e) The cancellation of the decision against which an appeal had been made will not grant an official the right to claim a salary or any compensation due to his suspension.

3.—(a) A decision issued by the Purge Committee after the coming into force of this law will not be enforced before the expiry of the period of appeal.

(b) If an official submitted an appeal against the decision of the Purge Committee within the legally prescribed period and the Committee decided to cancel the decision of the Purge Committee, the official will continue in his appointment.

Article 2

This Law shall come into force from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette.

VQ 1015/34

No. 7

THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF NURI SAID

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received July 9)

(No. 176. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
Sir, *July 4, 1957.*

In my telegram No. 759 of the 17th of June, I reported that King Faisal had accepted the resignation of the Government of Nuri Said and asked Ali Jaudat to form a Government. I have the honour in the present despatch to review the achievements of Nuri Said's Government.

2. The Government of Dr. Fadhil Jamali resigned in April 1954, when it had become clear that it was faced with a deadlock in Parliament and a rising tide of agitation in the country. In the hope that the first of these obstacles could be resolved and the second thereby allayed, the Palace called upon Arshad al Umari to form a Government and to hold elections. Arshad Pasha did both. But having done them he considered that his task was fulfilled. For many years this ageing sybarite had spent the summer in Istanbul far from the heat and dust of Bagdad and the mere fact that he was Prime Minister seemed no good reason to change long-standing habits, particularly when it appeared that he, like his predecessor, would have nothing but trouble from the Parliament he had brought into being. In the towns all over the country the electoral campaign had furnished a golden opportunity for agitators to stir up nationalist passions and local animosities. These, despite the summer heat, refused to die down and internal security threatened to collapse. Evidently, in the Chamber and outside it, town and countryside would soon be at each other's throats. He therefore submitted his resignation without waiting to convene Parliament and incontinently departed for Turkey.

3. Although since the appointment of Dr. Jamali in September 1953 the Palace had been estranged from Nuri Pasha, it was now clear that he was the only man with sufficient authority to prevent a disaster. The Crown Prince summoned him therefore from his sick bed in London. The old man duly returned in defiance of doctors' orders and on the 3rd of August was appointed Prime Minister for the 12th time.

4. His first act was to arm himself with the means to check the mounting signs of disorder. In the space of a few days he enacted ordinances restricting association, abolishing political parties, banning public demonstrations, and curbing the Press. The Peace Partisans and Democratic Youth, who in association with the National Democratic and the Independence Parties had been largely responsible for the disorders, were placed without the law in the same way as their parent, the Communist Party, in 1938. Parliament was convened only to be dissolved the same day. New elections were held. About 80 per cent. of the old members returned, but there was a change in many of the urban constituencies where the election of candidates known to be favourable to Nuri was ensured. This has been one of the most controversial of Nuri's actions. Many people who would otherwise have wished him well have criticised the rigging of these elections in some constituencies and his failure to attempt to work with the June Parliament. His own reasoning on the matter was quite clear. The members of the so-called Popular Front (including the National Democrats, the *Istiqlal* and the Peace Partisans) and perhaps the ten or so members of Saleh Jabr's Popular Socialist Party formed a potential opposition of between 25 and 30 members. Unlike the majority of Nuri's supporters they were bound to be vocal. He calculated that they would effectively impede the work of the Chamber, either by filibuster or by appealing to the streets. This had happened before. He therefore decided that a new Chamber was necessary.

5. The internal situation swiftly returned to calm, perhaps a somewhat oppressive calm, and Nuri turned his attention to foreign policy. On his appointment as Prime Minister he had written a letter to King Faisal stating that the foreign policy of his Government rested on three points:

- (a) the termination of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and co-operation between Iraq and other States in conformity with the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations;

- (b) the strengthening of relations with the other Arab countries; and
- (c) the strengthening of relations with neighbour States and the improvement of co-operation between them and the Arab States to repel the dangers of Zionism.

6. It was to the first and third of these policies that he directed his attention first. He had inherited from the Government of Jamil Madafai a study by a special Cabinet Committee of means to terminate and replace the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, due to expire in October 1957. This Committee had recommended, *inter alia*, a regional pact under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and Nuri sought forthwith to clear the ground for the conclusion of such a pact by making contact with the Egyptian Government who had themselves recently concluded the Suez Canal Agreement with Her Majesty's Government. Nuri has always maintained that the results of his meeting with Major Salah Salim in Sarsank in August and with Colonel Nasser in Cairo in September were sufficiently encouraging for him to proceed vigorously with the organisation of the Pact. This may or may not be true, but it is certain that Salah Salim was disavowed by the Egyptian Government when he returned from Sarsank and what happened in Cairo was obscure. It may be that Colonel Nasser was encouraging, or it may be that even at that date Nuri realised that Colonel Nasser was going to drift irrevocably towards the Soviet bloc and that it was political wisdom for him to put the construction most favourable to his own settled designs on such non-committal remarks as Colonel Nasser made. Whatever the truth may be on this point, the Turkish Prime Minister's visit to Bagdad in January and the first steps towards the Iraqi-Turkish Pact which was signed on the 24th of February, 1955, met with a blast of opposition from Egypt which has never abated despite Nuri's contention that he had secured another ally for the Arabs against Israel by the exchange of letters attached to the Pact. The Iraqi-Turkish Pact provided under Article 5 for the accession of other States and for the conclusion of bilateral Special Agreements between those States. Even before it was signed Nuri had started to work for the accession of the United Kingdom to the Pact and the conclusion of a Special Agreement with Her Majesty's Government. The Special Agreement was duly signed on the 4th of April,

1955, and the United Kingdom acceded to the Pact on the 5th; on the 2nd of May the former Royal Air Force bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba were handed over to Iraqi command. During the course of the following autumn Pakistan and Iran acceded to the Pact and the first meeting of the Pact Council was held in Bagdad on the 21st of November. The first of Nuri's aims had thus been achieved.

7. Fulfilment of the second remained beyond his power. The attempt to break the isolation of Iraq from the other Arab States by inducing Jordan to enter the Bagdad Pact failed and subsequent approaches to Syria by the invitation of a Syrian Parliamentary delegation to Iraq revealed only a willingness on the part of the Syrian Deputies to enjoy Iraqi hospitality and to pocket Iraqi money but to do nothing in return. Thereafter, it was only with President Chamoun in the Lebanon and to a lesser extent with the emerging Arab States in North Africa, the Sudan, Libya, Morocco and Tunis, whose attention was not directed so exclusively to Israel, that Iraq was for a time able to maintain tolerably friendly relations. For eighteen months the Iraq Government and Nuri in particular were the target of daily abuse from Cairo, Damascus and to a lesser degree from Jerusalem and Mecca. No voice in the Arab world was raised in their defence. The nationalisation by Egypt of the Suez Canal brought, however, a turn of the tide. The damage to Saudi interests which the closure of the Canal caused, the dangers of Communism inherent in the Egyptian and Syrian acceptance of Soviet arms and the interference of both these countries, in particular Egypt, in the internal affairs of the other Arab States, drove King Saud to look for other friends. Nuri did not let the opportunity pass. First Prince Zaid and then King Faisal himself were induced to visit King Saud in the late summer of 1956 and relations were cemented by the State visit of King Saud to Bagdad in May of this year. In the wake of Saudi Arabia came Jordan, when the Arab Nationalists overreached themselves after the termination of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty in March of this year, and the Lebanese President, feeling himself less exposed, became increasingly friendly. The second of Nuri's aims was thus put in the way of fulfilment though the future must obviously depend, as Nuri himself recently said, on whether Egypt can be weaned away from its dependence on the Soviet bloc.

8. I have related in other reports the effect on Iraqi foreign policy of the Anglo-French intervention in Suez. Nuri's Government felt constrained to support the Egyptian case to the full. At the same time they found themselves as a Government increasingly estranged from Egypt and Syria by reason of the violence of Egyptian and Syrian propaganda against them and against the United Kingdom, their ally, and also by the damage done to their interests by the blocking of the Canal and the blowing up by the Syrian Army of the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline on the proceeds of whose operations the Iraqi economy depends. The conflict between these two trends drove the Iraq Government into the arms of her Muslim, non-Arab, partners in the Bagdad Pact. They, with a policy which, while condemning the Anglo-French intervention, nevertheless sought to maintain British participation in the Pact, were happily strong enough to give Nuri the support which helped him to weather the crisis and to emerge at the moment of his resignation stronger in his relations with the world at large and even with the Arab world than he had been for close on two years.

9. The preoccupation of Nuri's Government in late 1954 and early 1955 with foreign affairs resulted in inactivity in internal policy save where internal security was at stake. When, however, the Bagdad Pact had been safely launched, various useful measures were enacted. Among these were the law for the distribution of lands in Amara Liwa, No. 53 of 1955, which, while confirming existing tribal leaders in the ownership of part of the State property which they had farmed for many years, deprived them of a certain percentage to be distributed to the smaller cultivators. In March 1955 the new Five-Year Development Programme was approved and later legislation passed regularising the earlier nationalisation by ordinance of the Bagdad Electricity Services. A new Customs Tariff law was enacted. There followed a Social Security law and a new Civil Service law which raised the salaries and regulated the conditions of service of Government officials. A law was also passed setting up a committee to look into corruption in the civil service; by the end of its year's term of office in June 1957, this committee had suspended some hundreds of corrupt officials. The parliamentary support of the

tribal land-owning classes on which Nuri's Government largely depended put him in the peculiar position on the one hand of having to be careful not to antagonise this privileged class whereas, on the other hand, he was by general admission the only Prime Minister in sight capable of persuading these same people to abate some of their privileges in the general interest. This anomalous situation never finally resolved itself and, although in the Amara Liwa a curb was put on the power of the large tribal landowners in that area, the plans for a land-tax which were elaborated by his Minister of Finance, Khalil Kenna, were never eventually tabled in Parliament. Similarly the thorny problem of how to deal with improvements to land and the enhancement of land values which result from expenditure by the Development Board (*e.g.*, when otherwise unfertile lands of a landowner are rendered valuable by the fact that the State builds a canal through them) was never decided. These and other vexed questions remain to be tackled in the future. The future stability of the Iraqi State depends largely on their solution but they are a nettle which only a determined and strong Government can grasp. Thus, although on the internal front nothing fundamental was achieved, at least stability and prosperity were promoted in the face of considerable odds and a great deal of useful, if secondary, legislation was enacted. I enclose a list of the principal measures (internal and foreign) which were passed during the period of nearly three years of Nuri's Government.⁽¹⁾

10. It can fairly be said of this Government, as it has been said of previous Nuri Governments, that both in the foreign and in the internal field more has been achieved for the common good than under any other Prime Minister. Nuri himself would certainly regard this as ample justification for the packing of Parliament, the suspension of party politics and the other curtailments of civil liberties which his rule has imposed. There has been an increasing body of opinion, particularly in the mercantile classes, which would agree with him. In the colleges, however, among the intellectuals and among the out-of-work politicians, opposition to him was steadily growing, particularly since the public disorders occasioned by the Suez crisis and the firm measures which were taken by the police to deal with them. Recognition of this opposition and of the need to give it a measure

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

of satisfaction, quarrels within the Cabinet (particularly between the Ministers of Finance, Development and Economics) and the fatigue of carrying largely on his own shoulders the burden of the State for more than 2½ years, all induced Nuri to tender his resignation on his return from Karachi, with the full agreement of the Palace. The question was then posed whether a sufficient sop would be given to the opposition by a reshuffle of the Government, such as had taken place in May and December 1955, and the inclusion in it of some new faces, or whether a change of Prime Minister was necessary. I have reported in my telegram No. 778 of the 21st of June how this question was decided. Briefly, the older politicians whom King Faisal summoned to express their views were almost unanimous—as was to be anticipated, since they all had expectations—that a change of Prime Minister was desirable but that there should be no change of foreign policy. Accepting this advice, which he had asked for in writing, the King proceeded to invite Ali Jaudat Al Ayyubi, whose views on foreign policy were nearest to those of Nuri and whose personal regard for Nuri was the highest among those consulted, to form a new Government.

11. I have frequently been asked what it is that gives Nuri that hold over the Iraqi people which enables him to outlast any other Prime Minister and to secure the enactment of much major as well as minor legislation. For it is to him that Iraq owes the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty which gave this country its independence, the Bagdad Pact, and the Special Agreement with the United Kingdom of April 1955, the I.P.C. agreement of 1952 which gave it its revenues, and the Development Board. The answer must be looked for firstly in the personality of the man. Nuri, as he recently said of himself to the correspondent of *Time* magazine, is essentially a realist. Though he has shown from the outset that he believes in certain ideal aims and, among them, Arab independence and unity, he has never allowed emotion to blind him to reality and has thus neither been swept along and destroyed by popular movements like Dr. Musaddiq, nor been so dazzled by the ideal as to fail to recognise or to exploit the opportunity to register a minor advance when it offers. His unquestioning loyalty to the Hashemite House from the days of the Arab Revolt and of King Faisal I in Damascus has won him the confidence and support of the monarchy, though not always

without reservations, and his personal integrity, stability of purpose and firmness have gained public regard. With these as his primary stock-in-trade, he has accumulated by the very frequency of his tenure of office, both as Minister and as Prime Minister, a personal following, regard and affection in those sections of the community which are the basis of the Iraq State; first among the tribes, then in the army, then in the civil service. The Arab Revolt and his association with the first King of Iraq have placed him only second to the monarchy itself in the esteem of most of that large *bloc* of tribal leaders, often inarticulate but still preponderantly powerful in the provinces, who have been members of his Constitutional Unionist Party or who have supported him from among the ranks of independents. His early associations with the Iraq Army and his family ties with the popular Jaafar Pasha al Askari won him the regard of the army, in which, as Minister of Defence and Prime Minister, he has taken an intense personal interest. Senior and relatively junior officials throughout the country have enjoyed his patronage. Municipalities have seen that, once he is convinced that any demand they may make on him is justified, they can be sure that he will see it energetically executed. More recently in the mercantile community there has arisen a feeling of gratitude to him for the stability which favours their interest, but it is primarily from the throne, the tribes, the army and the civil service that he draws his strength.

12. Nuri's qualities have their corresponding weaknesses. The outstanding nature of his personality is such that he dwarfs not only his opponents, but his own Ministers, and when he is about there is no one who can stand up to him; nor has he done anything to train one or more potential successors to himself. The result is that Iraq, instead of evolving a system, has tended to rely on personal government where the Ministers are executives rather than policy-makers; and for the most part their departments bear the imprint not of the Minister, but of the Prime Minister above him. Nuri's eye is penetrating, but it is not all-seeing and, therefore, while the needs he recognises are promptly attended to, others may lie for years neglected. Moreover, his reliance on the support of the tribal chiefs and land-owning class restricts his freedom of action where reforms are concerned which might make for a more far-sighted agricultural policy and a

better-off and more contented Iraqi common man. To some extent this continued reliance on the Shaikhs is a sign that he is growing old; for, though the tribes can still make trouble, their nuisance value is as nothing compared with the threat to internal stability which they represented in the 1920's and early 30's. The fear of many is that Nuri will die and leave behind him no one capable of carrying his mantle and no system which will stand on its own feet without the leadership of a dominant personality.

13. But Nuri is not dead yet, either physically or politically. Despite his 69 years and a convenient deafness, he is active in body and mind. Although he is no reformer, he is a sincere patriot working according to his own lights for the betterment of all Iraqis, which he sees rather in the opening up of new lands and new

opportunities than in the breaking up and sharing out of old ones. The widespread recognition that he more than anyone else can respond to the needs of the country both in internal affairs and in foreign policy means that, barring accidents, he is virtually certain to be called upon again to serve as Prime Minister. And if the Egyptian Government, while remaining wedded to the Soviet *bloc*, were to regain some of the impetus that it has now lost in the hearts of Arab Nationalists, not only Iraq but the Western world as a whole may well need him.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's representatives at Washington, Beirut, Amman, Bahrain, POMEF, Karachi, Ankara and Tehran.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

VQ 10345/8

No. 8

DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1932

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received July 16)

(No. 177. Confidential—Guard)
Sir,

Baghdad,
July 11, 1957.

In my despatch No. 98 of April 12 I reported upon the results of the visit to Baghdad of Mr. James Richards, special envoy of President Eisenhower. It appears opportune in this connexion to try to give a survey of the development of ties between Iraq and the United States. Accordingly, I have the honour in the present despatch to submit a brief account of Iraqi-American relations up to the present date.

2. The United States recognised the Kingdom of Iraq in 1932 and established a Legation in Baghdad in the same year. Up to the Second World War relations between the two countries developed smoothly if slowly. On June 7, 1934, an Extradition Treaty was signed and on December 3, 1938, a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation embodying "most favoured nation" principles. Later an American Consulate was established at Basra, but it was only this year that one was opened in Kirkuk. The only points of friction, and they were on the whole minor, were disagreement over the division of finds by American archaeological missions in Iraq and over the action of the Iraqi Director-General of Education, who refused to extend to the students of the American schools in Iraq the deferment of conscription granted to students of Iraqi schools with the result that for a time there was a fall in the number of students at American schools.

3. Alongside this unsensational growth of official Iraqi-American ties and tending to consolidate them, there were developing in Iraq a number of unofficial American activities from which American influence and ideas began to reach the Iraqi public. The most important of these, though not sited in Iraq, has undoubtedly been the American University of Beirut. Before the First World War the University had played an important part in the growth of the ideas of Arab nationalism and separation from the Ottoman Empire. In the days between the two Wars, the American University of Beirut, staffed as it was by men and women with a missionary vocation in whom the anti-colonial feeling of the Founding Fathers still burned, became a focus for intellectual (and sometimes physical) opposition to the French and British mandatory régimes in the Levant and Iraq. There are to-day probably more than 1,000 former students of the American University of Beirut in Iraq. An *Alumni* Club exists in Baghdad, but owing to lack of funds it has no premises and its activities are confined to outdoor gatherings in Summer. Second in influence to the American University of Beirut has been the secondary school known as "Baghdad College", founded in Baghdad in 1932 and run by American Jesuit fathers. This has flourished and expanded and is now without doubt the most successful and sought after secondary school in Iraq. There is also an American girls' school founded in 1925 which has recently moved to more modern premises. The Seventh Day Adventist movement in Iraq, although ostensibly international, has in practice derived much of its support from the United States. Starting with a Church which was founded in Mosul in 1911, it now runs schools in Baghdad, Basra and Mosul and a well-equipped hospital (Dar-es-Salaam) in Baghdad with a nursing school attached. A missionary hospital—the Lansing Memorial Hospital—also exists in Amara.

4. The ideals expounded by these bodies and those brought back by the few Iraqi students who were able to study in America between the wars undoubtedly influenced Iraqi thinking. For the schools and colleges produced in the 1930s a number of students who have played parts in post-war Governments, for example, Dr. Fadhil Jamali (Leading Personalities in Iraq No. 49), Abdul Majid Mahmoud (Leading Personalities No. 17), Dr. Abdul Majid Abbas (Leading Personalities No. 15), Abdul Jabbar Chelabi (Leading Personalities No. 10), and Shaikh Baba Ali (Leading Personalities No. 43). Few of them, however, with the exception of Dr. Jamali, had made themselves felt in the years before the War and the ideas and the ideals which they may have learned from their American education found little

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practical expression before 1941. Mr. Knabenshue, the American Minister from 1939 to 1941, gave no encouragement to the anti-colonialists. He was convinced of the benefits of the British influence in Iraq and sought to do nothing which would diminish it or handicap it. It was indeed he who, in 1941 at the time of the Rashid Ali rebellion, gave shelter to 340 British subjects in the compound of the American Legation. In any case, though the anti-colonial bias of America had its appeal, the essential moderation of American idealism did not suit the mood of the young Iraqis of the times. The winds of German nationalism and anti-semitism and of German propaganda were blowing too strongly and Dr. Jamali and many other American-educated Iraqis were carried along with it, all the more enthusiastically because of the way in which the Palestine problem was developing.

5. The real impact of American policy on Iraq came towards the end of the war with the addition to the American Legation of the United States Information Service. I see, on re-reading the Annual Reports from this post, that one of my predecessors first noted a striking growth of United States interest and propaganda in Iraq in the course of the year 1944 when, following a visit by Mr. Wendell Willkie in the previous year, the Culbertson Trade Mission visited the country. Nevertheless, the shortage of dollars and the growing suspicion of the American support for Zionism in Palestine limited the fruits of this Mission. Increasing interest was demonstrated again in 1946 when the United States Legation became an Embassy. On January 20, 1949, President Truman made his declaration of policy which gave birth to the organisation for aid to under-developed countries, commonly known as Point IV, and a Technical Aid Agreement was signed between the United States Government and the Iraq Government on April 10, 1951. This increased significantly both American interest in Iraq and the number of American civilians residing here. A further increase came with the signature of the Military Aid Agreement by exchange of letters on April 21, 1954, which resulted in an American Military Assistance Advisory Group being set up in Baghdad. The Eisenhower doctrine does not seem likely to add to these agencies and Ambassador Richards stressed in his Press interview that any aid, including that to the Baghdad Pact, was likely to be channelled through the existing agencies.

6. These three agencies carry American ideas to all classes of the Iraqi people and into every corner of the country. There is no need to elaborate on the worth of the United States Information Service which provides news bulletins to the Press, runs mobile cinema units and has sub-offices in Kirkuk and Basra.

7. The work of the United States Operations Mission which is exclusively concerned with Point IV has been described in some detail in my despatch No. 97 of April 23, 1955. The principal projects in which it has participated or is participating are: the evaluation of agricultural and natural resources of Iraq; public administration; health and sanitation, particularly in rural areas; technical education; land development of State-owned lands (under the "Miri Sif" agreement signed between the Iraq Government and United States Government); road building and maintenance; and village life improvement. American citizens paid for, if only in part, by the United States Operations Mission are to be found in the various sections of the Development Board.

8. The Iraq Army has traditionally been trained and supplied from the United Kingdom, and up to 1948 a British Military Mission had worked in Iraq. This was done away with as a result of the Palestine conflict. One or two British officers, with ill-defined status, were retained and since 1954 have been expanded into the British Loaned Personnel (Iraq). The granting of American military assistance to other States in the area, e.g., Turkey, naturally aroused the interest of the Iraq Government in the possibility of obtaining military assistance for themselves. The American Service Attachés in Baghdad undoubtedly encouraged this, both with a view to keeping Iraq friendly to the West and in order to increase their own contacts with the Iraq Army and Air Force. Indeed their zeal frequently outran the interest which Washington was prepared to take in Iraq and there were times when my predecessor had occasion to draw attention to local attempts at "Empire building" by one or other of the American attachés and in particular the Air Attaché. By 1953 the likelihood that the Iraq Government would sign a military assistance agreement with the United States had to be faced by the United Kingdom. This opened up the prospect not only of a diminution of British influence in the Iraqi forces, but also of logistic complications which would ensue from the introduction of American equipment into an army which had not yet been able to digest all the equipment obtained from British sources. There was also the

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possibility that a steady market for British military equipment and particularly aircraft might thus be lost. An approach was accordingly made by Her Majesty's Ambassador in Washington to the United States Government and discussions were held which resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding being initialled in Washington February 26, 1954, which laid down certain principles which had the effect of defining, and thereby limiting, the fields in which the United States Government wished to see American equipment introduced, namely:

- (a) The desirability of avoiding dislocation of the existing re-equipment and expansion plans of the Iraqi forces and of minimising logistic difficulties.
- (b) The possibility of furthering the above objective by means of offshore purchases in the United Kingdom.
- (c) The desirability that there should be a readily identifiable United States contribution to the expansion of the Iraqi forces.

The resultant co-operation between British and American Service personnel in London, Washington and Baghdad has led to a practical co-ordination of the supply of military equipment to Iraq and much has been provided through offshore purchases, e.g., Centurion tanks and recoil-less rifles while the number of "identifiable" American items has been limited on the whole to massive gifts of transport (particularly Dodge trucks), radio sets, anti-aircraft guns and 8-in. howitzers.

9. As a result of these three types of activity the American Embassy in Iraq has a representative in practically every large and medium-sized centre throughout the country. The military Assistance Advisory Group are in a position to assess with some accuracy the potentialities of the Iraqi Armed Forces, though the training role played by British Loaned Personnel (Iraq) still brings the latter into even closer contact. The personnel of the United States Operations Mission, spread as they are throughout the country, are in a position to exert influence and to furnish their Embassy in Baghdad with information, in a manner which has been impossible to ourselves since the early 1930s when British personnel were still employed in key posts in the Provinces. Yet in practice the majority of the United States Operations Mission personnel have little inclination for or training in political activity observation and their influence in the political fields is, therefore, small. On the other hand by joining all the main committees of the Baghdad Pact, the United States Government has opened up a field of influence upon certain parts of the Iraqi administration, which is at least potentially important as an addition to its normal bilateral contacts.

10. The impact of the United States on the Iraqi Government and people is hard to gauge. Certainly it is very much greater than it was 20 years ago. There are some hundreds of Americans in Iraq to-day as compared with the handful to be found here in the 1930s and where in 1930, I am told, there were only 11 Iraqi students in America, there were in 1950 about 550, and to-day there are some 1,300, as compared with about 700 in the United Kingdom. The old idea that the United States was a Utopia has been dispelled to be replaced by the more healthy knowledge that America is a State, albeit a powerful one, like any other State with its able and less able and its privileged and less privileged citizens. It is true to say too that during the period 1944 to 1956, Iraqi gratification at America's interest, encouragement and help for their country was always abated by the conviction that America supported Zionism and Israel. While this conviction was shaken by the attitude of the Republican administration towards Israel during the Suez crisis in the autumn of 1956, the refusal of the United States Government to allow the Eisenhower doctrine to be turned in an anti-Israel direction and the same Government's attitude on certain specific questions, such as the freedom of passage of the Straits of Tiran, have done something to restore it.

11. In the widest possible field the essential liberties for which America stands, including anti-colonialism, appeal to the individualist trait in the Iraqi and indeed the Arab character—though the Iraq Government have always tempered and will be likely to continue to temper the ideals of freedom with the restraints needed for the government of a backward, emotional people. On the other hand, the qualities of enterprise, self-discipline and co-operation which are inherent in the American habits of large-scale business and mass production are less understood and less appreciated, and American technological prowess leaves the majority of Iraqis admiring but bewildered.

12. Gratitude is not a virtue of Governments or peoples and Arab Governments and peoples in particular take outside aid for granted, or dismiss it as the product of self-interest on the part of the giver. But the Iraq Government of to-day subscribe wholeheartedly to the idea that freedom can only be maintained by warding off the dangers of Communism and of Soviet domination. They are thus sincerely grateful to the American Government for helping them to do this, and in particular in bearing the financial burden of equipping the Iraqi Army. They were as keenly interested as the other Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact in persuading the United States Government to join the Pact, and as glad to welcome them into the main committees. Nevertheless their gratitude does not stop them from asking for more or making invidious and often inaccurate comparisons with the arms aid received by Egypt and Syria from the Soviet bloc.

13. The particular criticism of the United States which one hears in Iraqi Government and political circles is one which is heard in other parts of the world, namely misgiving at the inexperience of the United States Government in the conduct of international affairs and the consequent belief that America will never have a dependable policy in this part of the world. The Americans as Government and as individuals, the criticism runs, are obsessed by the desire to secure a newer and ever larger circle of friends and are for ever sacrificing their true friends in their effort to do so. Thus Iraqi officials were and remain sharply critical of the "soft" American attitude to Egypt before the intervention in the Suez Canal and believe that it contributed incalculably to Nasser's stranglehold on Egypt and on parts of the Arab world at the expense of Iraq and the Baghdad Pact in the Middle East and at the expense of the United Kingdom and France generally (though the Iraqis have little sympathy for the latter).

14. The activities of the United States Operations Mission, while generally welcome to the Iraqi authorities, also find critics among politicians and officials. What comes under the fire of men brought up in and sympathetic to the British tradition of administration is the waste of money and manpower inherent in America and particularly the large (by Iraqi standards) salaries paid to American technicians often of mediocre ability, the number of them required to sustain a modest programme and the fact that they are readier to advise than to perform. The fact that these Americans are not under the full control of the Iraqi authorities also arouses some opposition, though it may well increase their probity and efficiency.

15. I shall not attempt to generalise about the attitude of the Iraqi public, as opposed to the Government and officials, towards the United States as a whole. Probably the average Iraqi finds individual Americans more accessible than individual Englishmen and regards the methods whereby American aid is dispensed as an amiable and generous foible which is on a par with the open-handedness which makes the American family in Baghdad pay much more to its servants than anyone else. More politically minded people see in it a sort of conscience money paid by the United States Government to compensate the Arabs for their support of Israel. There is a genuine admiration for American wealth, power and technical prowess.

16. In this despatch I have looked back. Looking forward now I would expect United States influence in Iraq steadily to increase. With the swelling tide of students returning from American Universities, American methods are likely to become even more prevalent in the Civil Service and in the schools and colleges. This will in all probability have its effect in commerce too. It is inevitable that Iraq should try to become more and more self-sufficient in administrative and technical fields, and there will be a growing movement to dispense with foreign mentors and foreign missions be they British, American or other. Whether this movement will be successful may be open to doubt, at any rate in the technical field, for with the present rate of technical advance in the larger countries it is difficult to see how a small under-developed country like Iraq can narrow the gap. But there will always be some danger that it may cease to try to do so—at any rate under Western auspices—if political developments should cause it to follow its emotions rather than its reason. A false move by the American Government, for example, an action giving rise to the belief that the United States decisively favoured Israel at the expense of the Arabs, might give an opportunity to those forces of nationalism and xenophobia, which are present in Iraq and in an even more violent form in other Arab countries, to promote a movement which would sweep away American influence as easily as it would British influence. It is, therefore, in the interests of the United States as much

as it is in our own that our two countries should co-operate to ensure that this does not happen. On this subject—Anglo-American co-operation in Iraq—I hope to submit to you a separate despatch.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

VQ 1051/34

No. 9

ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received July 16)

(No. 181. Confidential—Guard)
Sir,

*Baghdad,
July 11, 1957.*

Iraq and Britain—Since Suez

In my despatch No. 298 of December 7, 1956, I had the honour to report on the effect upon Anglo-Iraqi relations of the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt simultaneously with the attack on Egypt by Israel at the end of October.

Effect in Iraq of the Suez Crisis

2. When I wrote that despatch it was only a few weeks since the breaking-off of relations by Iraq with the United Kingdom had been hanging precariously in the balance, and this was still a possibility. Few if any Iraqis would enter the Embassy, the operations of the British Council had virtually come to a halt, and it was a general topic of speculation whether the close connexion and special relationship of confidence and friendship which we had built up here over a quarter of a century had not gone with the wind never to be re-established. Most people would have bet their last sixpence that it had.

3. Symptomatic of this feeling was the attitude of many (although not all) American officials and the American community in general, especially American business men. For a time there was virtually an American boycott of everyone British. Even in the presence of Iraqis whose personal relationships with us remained unaffected, there were cases of Americans ostentatiously turning their back upon British people. There were American business who made no secret of their view that this was their opportunity to move in once and for all at our expense. The general attitude of Americans here has now improved considerably, and this is especially true of most of the staff of the American Embassy. Nonetheless, the behaviour of the American community as a whole, or a large part of it, since last October has been such as to lead Iraqis, and among them the most highly placed, to conclude that there is a basic American desire to see the British out of the Middle East, and to step into their shoes. This has not made our task any easier here. At the same time it is to some extent being counter-productive to American interests. In any case it has left scars in the relationship between the British and the American communities which may take a long time to heal.

4. As the year ended it was an open question what direction future Iraqi policy would take, and indeed whether the régime and the monarchy, committed as they had been to the British connexion, had been fatally shaken. Meanwhile the Iraq Government had suspended participation in any Baghdad Pact meetings with British representation.

5. This state of affairs had been brought about because the United Kingdom had acted simultaneously with, and it was widely thought in collusion with, Israel. The severity of the crisis was not due to the fact that the United Kingdom had resorted to force in a quarrel with Egypt, but to our association with Israel.

6. To-day the situation has changed notably for the better, even if it affords no grounds whatever for complacency. It may be of interest to examine how this improvement has come about, and to consider what lessons we can learn for the future both from the crisis and from its aftermath.

Israel

7. It was immediately clear after the Anglo-French intervention that the crux of the matter in Iraq lay in the question whether Israel would be induced or compelled to withdraw her forces behind the Armistice lines, including evacuation of the Gaza Strip. This was not a mere matter of emotion but derived from the Arab fear, so deep and persistent, of further Israeli expansion. It was also to Iraqis the test of the motives behind the British action, and of the truth or falsity of collusion with Israel. If, ran the argument, the West and especially Iraq's best friend in the

West, namely Britain, would condone Israeli expansion beyond the Armistice lines into Gaza (or further), this would clearly indicate that any future Israeli expansion, for example into Jordan, Syria or the Lebanon, would equally be condoned. It would show that some argument would always be found by the West for allowing Israel, whether from design, sympathy, or impotence, to retain any territory she might occupy beyond the Armistice lines. Compared with this issue other aspects of the matter were secondary, and upon it turned more than on anything else our future relations with Iraq.

8. It is often said, even by many Iraqis, that having decided to intervene by force Britain made a grave mistake in not seeing the matter through and finishing off Nasser at any cost. But this, in my view, is to over-simplify. If it had only been a question of finishing off Nasser with Israel sitting quietly behind the Armistice lines, the argument, at least in so far as Iraq is concerned, would probably be valid. But in fact Israeli forces were near the Canal, and this being so I believe a truer analysis to be as follows. If Her Majesty's Government were prepared, having finished off Nasser and established British forces in a position of strength along the Canal, to insist immediately and within a matter of days upon the withdrawal of Israeli forces out of the Gaza strip and behind the Armistice lines (not merely a certain distance from the Canal), and if necessary to use British forces to ensure compliance, then we should have done better to continue. If, however, Her Majesty's Government were not prepared to take this action and if necessary to use force against Israel as they had used it against Egypt, I would judge that our difficulties with Iraq would have been greater and not less.

9. In the event Her Majesty's Government and the French Government accepted a cease-fire before the Canal area had been fully occupied, Nasser remained in power a wounded tiger, and the question of Israeli withdrawal behind the Armistice lines was left to be dealt with by the United Nations. This was the situation, fraught with almost every conceivable difficulty, which had to be faced in Iraq.

The Attitude of the King, the Crown Prince and Nuri

10. The outcome inevitably depended on the attitude of the King, the Crown Prince and Nuri. Nuri, growling like a wounded bear, took the line: "I will save the Iraqis from themselves and the British from themselves". He was on occasion in a minority of one in his own Cabinet. But he put heart into his colleagues, into the Army, and into senior officials. His aim was to maintain the connexion with Britain, to preserve the Baghdad Pact and to strengthen Iraq's ties with the United States. To draw the United States closer to the Pact, if possible into full membership, was one of the objectives immediately chosen, and partly with this in view the Crown Prince left Baghdad on January 16 to visit the United States and other capitals, being away for about two months. Before and during his absence Nuri, with the solid backing of the King, settled down doggedly to holding the country steady until a chance might offer to move forward again. He devoted his main attention to internal security and refused to yield an inch to demonstrations or criticism, the first time in the history of Iraq that a Prime Minister had maintained this attitude at a moment of critical tension. He was helped by the fact that the country was prosperous and that there was no economic discontent which others could exploit.

Sabotage of the Syrian Pipeline

11. But one of his gravest problems was the diminution in oil revenues as a result of the sabotage of the pipelines in Syria. If the programme of the Development Board and of the various Government departments were once halted a process of national collapse would have begun which could hardly have been arrested.

The Holding Operation

12. Meanwhile, Nuri had to jettison something. He chose to break relations with France but not with Britain, felt impelled to issue a violent manifesto about Israel, and at one moment toyed with the idea of nationalising the Iraq Petroleum Company or at least of insisting upon the elimination of French participation. He had also by suspending all participation in the Baghdad Pact activities in which the United Kingdom were concerned, put the organisation into cold storage. Whether this holding operation would suffice hinged above all on the attitude of Her Majesty's

Government over the withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the Armistice lines. The debates on this question in the United Nations Assembly in January were therefore literally crucial. Foreign Office telegram No. 394 of January 24 to the United Kingdom Delegation, New York, stated that for Her Majesty's Government to vote with the majority in the United Nations for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces would have been to do violence to our sense of justice. Had we in fact failed so to vote on such a motion, and particularly if we had voted with a small minority against such withdrawal, the struggle here must, I think, have been lost. But in the event we were saved from this dilemma.

13. This enabled the other forces working in Iraq's and our favour, and the series of helpful actions which we ourselves were able to take, to exercise their effect both in reducing Iraq's isolation in the Arab world and in restoring our position here.

Forces of Recovery

14. High among them must be rated the weight which the Prime Minister of Turkey, the Shah of Persia, and the President and Prime Minister of Pakistan threw into the scales; the steadiness of the President of the Lebanon also had its effect. A turning point in another field was the decision of the Iraq Petroleum Company, largely under the influence of Her Majesty's Government, to open a line of credit for the Iraq Government up to £25 million in order to support the budget of Iraq which was beginning to stagger under the effect of the disruption of the pipeline in Syria. In parallel there came a series of other actions and events, some minor and some major, but cumulative in their impact. Among these were the quick response of Her Majesty's Government in December to an appeal for arms help from the Lebanon, which although small in itself had a far-reaching effect here behind the scenes; and the gift of Hunter aircraft to the Iraqi Air Force. The announcement of the Eisenhower Doctrine on January 5 implied the readiness of the United States to give support to the Baghdad Pact in countering direct and indirect Communist action in the area; and the steady development of United States policy in the direction of resuming partnership with the United Kingdom, culminating in the Bermuda Conference in March and the announcement of American readiness to join the Baghdad Pact Military Committee, were of great help both to Nuri and to ourselves.

15. The tide had in fact started to turn early in the New Year, and by the middle of February Nuri felt strong enough to agree to the unobtrusive resumption of work in the Pact Committees with British participation. This trend was reinforced by the preparation for an experience of Development Week at the end of March. This was an outstanding success and in many ways a vindication of important aspects of Nuri's internal policy. It was followed immediately by the opening of the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre in the presence of King Faisal and attended by scientists from member countries led by Sir John Cockcroft, who gave great lustre to the occasion, which was the turning point in the public resumption of Baghdad Pact activities. Shortly afterwards the Council began to meet again at Deputy level and it was not long before the full range of Committees met. That by early March the tide was already flowing strongly in Nuri's direction, and that so far from Iraq being isolated it was rather Egypt and Syria which were becoming so, was clearly shown by the decision of the Syrian Government on March 6 to allow the resumption of oil pumping through the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline. Meanwhile British business contacts and activities had remained unaffected, long-standing and widespread personal relationships stood fast, and British Council activities began to be resumed.

Nasser

16. In parallel, Nasser overplayed his hand. The subversive activities over a long period of Egyptian agents abroad, particularly Egyptian Military Attachés, in Baghdad, Libya and Khartoum, were followed by an attempt on the life of King Saud and the plot to depose King Hussein. It would, I suggest, be a mistake to regard these events, which had a profound effect in the Arab and Moslem world, as entirely a fortuitous gift of fortune or as a mere miscalculation by Nasser. That he miscalculated is true. But Nuri, and not Nuri alone, had consistently maintained for more than two years that attempts of this kind were in Nasser's programme and that they were an essential part of his long-term intentions. In order to counter these intentions, sustained pressures had been brought to bear by others, not least

by Nuri. These included the opposition of the Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact, the pro-Western stand by President Chamoun, and the persistent efforts by Iraq, encouraged by ourselves and assisted by the United States and others from the middle of 1956 onwards to detach Saud from Nasser. Nor were the contacts sought and fostered by Nuri with Morocco, Tunis, Libya and the Sudan, again assisted by others, without their effect, even though French policy in Algeria and towards Israel played in the opposite direction and put some powerful cards in Nasser's hands. All these pressures combined with the growing economic weakness of Egypt, made it, at least as seen from here, increasingly difficult for Nasser to remain inactive, to risk losing the initiative, and to avoid over-reaching himself.

The Position in May-June

17. On May 11-14 King Saud paid a State visit to Baghdad. This event, for which Nuri had worked so hard and so long, was a success for him and indirectly for us, marking as it did an important step in the detachment of Saud from Nasser and a reconciliation with the monarchy and the régime in Iraq friendly to us. This was closely followed by the meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council at Ministerial level from June 3-6 which marked, so far as Iraq was concerned, the success of the King, the Crown Prince and Nuri in their effort to preserve the Baghdad Pact. The decision of the United States to join the Military Committee and to provide a permanent Deputy of high rank in the combined Planning structure, coupled as it was with the American and the British financial contributions to the economic work of the Pact, and the British contribution for infra-structure, in fact represented a considerable strengthening of the Pact. Internally in Iraq pressures were relaxing, most of those still in detention for political offences were being released, and development was progressing. The visit of Saud, the staunchness of President Chamoun, and the change in attitude of Hussein meant that Iraq no longer felt isolated in the Arab world, while her friendships in the remainder of the Moslem world had been consolidating. It would be outside the scope of this despatch to expand upon these factors. The point here is that those who fought to maintain friendship with Britain, and at their head the King, the Crown Prince and Nuri, were being increasingly justified by events. So much was this the case that when the Palace decided upon a change of Prime Minister in June (perhaps temporarily) this involved no change in the main lines of Iraqi foreign policy, and Nuri went off for a holiday in a position of great strength. The new Government are, I judge, no less friendly to us than the previous Government, although they are a weak team.

Gains and Losses

18. It is too early to estimate the lasting effect on relations between Britain and Iraq of the Suez crisis. On the surface the day-to-day relationships between British and Iraqis have recovered the ease and warmth of a year ago. In the business field, which was never much affected, our exporters ought to regard their opportunities as no less promising than before Suez. If these opportunities are lost, it will be from the pusillanimity of our own business people rather than from any lack of good will on the Iraqi side. Ordinary personal and official contacts are now little clouded. There are indeed, perhaps certain gains. In some quarters there is the feeling that it has been proved once again that while Governments from time to time do unwise or unpopular things, the strength of the general ties between Britain and Iraq are so strong that they can survive occasional political aberrations. At the same time Nasser's recent behaviour to his Arab neighbours has perhaps led to a spreading of the thought that Britain had more justification than many had appreciated in her quarrel with Nasser. If she was temporarily led away in the heat of this quarrel, perhaps by the fault of France, into acting with Israel, this error (to Arab eyes) was acknowledged and largely atoned for by the resignation of the Prime Minister of the time. These processes of thought are noticeable in our relationship to-day with many Iraqis in positions of authority, in whom one can discern a feeling, even if unexpressed, that out of the troubles of the past six months we have come out closer friends. But there is another side to the picture also. This year the King and Crown Prince have thought it more politic to spend their summer holiday in Turkey and not to pay a visit to the United Kingdom, to which they always look forward as almost a visit home. In the Development Board there has been a definite movement, headed by Dr. Jalili and with the sympathy of the Vice-President, Tasha Pasha, to dispense with British personnel and to substitute German. There are increased pulls towards the United States. Over and above this, many Iraqis have drawn the conclusion that Britain is not as powerful as they had

thought, and that our hand did not show the skill, either military or political, in the handling of the Suez crisis which over long years they had come to expect of us. Finally our attitude as between the interests of Israel and of the Arab countries has been called gravely into question. In some quarters the wound thus inflicted may never heal. In others there is a suspension of judgment, which even one further action which might be construed as pro-Israeli and anti-Arab might cause to fall against us irrevocably, and with incalculably dangerous consequences to us here.

Some Conclusions

19. The situation in the Middle East is still packed with tension, and it would be unwise as it might be misleading to attempt any predictions. But the experience of the last eight months points to certain conclusions which, in so far as they may have validity, may be of help for the future.

Israel

20. High among these is the proof (if such were needed) of the extreme strain which must inevitably be placed on our relations with Iraq if we act together with Israel, or side with Israel, on any major issue affecting Arab interests, above all if the question of the expansion of Israel should be involved. It is hardly conceivable that our relations with Iraq would bear a second strain of this kind.

Iraq Development Programme

21. A further point which has become more sharply apparent is that the Iraqi Development Programme, with which Britain is in many respects identified, and the present level of budgetary expenditure have become such an integral part of the fabric of the national life that they can only be arrested at the cost of severe and almost certainly fatal internal trouble. It was fortunate that when the revenues deriving from the flow of oil through Syria were cut off, the Development Board had a large reserve of funds allocated in theory but still unspent. As a result it was calculated that Iraq could hold out for perhaps nine months without being obliged to curtail development activities with the effects which this would have had upon employment as well as on other aspects of the economy. The same did not, however, apply to the Ordinary Budget, to which 30 per cent. of the oil revenues are allocated. Had the Iraq Petroleum Company not agreed to open a line of credit to be repaid out of future revenues, there would, in the absence of any American action to fill the financial gap, soon have been a Government crisis which would have been likely to lead to nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum Company and to a general reorientation of Iraqi policy in an anti-Western sense. It is hardly possible to avoid the conclusion that one of the conditions of the consolidation of Iraq as a stable country friendly to the West is that her oil revenues should be assured and, indeed, as time goes by, increased. If a grave threat should again arise to these revenues, the West will have to help Iraq, or lose her.

Anglo-Iraqi Friendship

22. That our relations with Iraq stood the strain of the present case and in the special circumstances which, because of our apparent association with Israel, could hardly have been more unfavourable, was largely due to the inherent strength of the ties of understanding and friendship between Iraq and the United Kingdom which had been built up over more than one generation. I do not believe that they could withstand so great a shock a second time, but short of this they remain a most valuable asset which it must be in our strong interest to foster. We have been able to show in the last few months that we are ready to continue to exert a substantial effort in the economic and military fields to help Iraq, and I feel sure that we must continue to do so, while also keeping in good repair the multitude of ties which link our two countries in so many fields. A sustained effort will be needed and I submit it is to our interest to make it.

Other Friendships in the Moslem World

23. It has equally been shown that in a crisis in the Arab area of the Middle East, the understanding and help of the leaders of the Moslem countries outside the immediate area, primarily our allies in the northern tier, and also the new Arab countries of North Africa, can be of great help in supporting the position of the United Kingdom provided we can keep a firm relationship with Iraq. These relations may well become of increasing importance to us. Through them we, and

the other Western nations with interests in this part of the world, have an opportunity of greatly strengthening our position both in the struggle against Communism and in the general development of this key area of the world. We should have this clearly in mind in considering the problems of Israel and Algeria, and looking further ahead should realise what the loss or retention of the friendship of the majority of the Moslem world may mean to us in developing our long-term relationship with Africa and Asia.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Tehran, Beirut, Bahrain, Washington and New York, to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Karachi and to the Head of the Political Office with the Middle East Forces, Cyprus.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

VQ 10345/9

No. 10

THE FUTURE COURSE OF UNITED STATES-IRAQ RELATIONS AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE UNITED KINGDOM'S POSITION IN IRAQ

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received July 23)

(No. 190. Confidential—Guard)

Baghdad.

Sir,

July 19, 1957.

In my despatch No. 177 (10322/1/57) of July 8, I have reported on the multiplication and growth of ties, political, commercial, academic and cultural, between Iraq and the United States. The increasingly close relations now existing between the two Governments and the two peoples has naturally brought about an increase in American influence in Iraq which seems likely to grow further. The question arises of whether and how far this increase will be gained at the expense of a decline in British influence in the country. Any conclusions which it is possible to reach on this question must clearly be tentative, both because Iraq is only one part of the Arab world and developments here can be profoundly affected by events in the other Arab countries, and because the development of Russian policy towards the Middle East, of which we are perhaps seeing now only the initial stages, may play a large part in determining the standing here of the Western Great Powers.

2. It should first be said that, so far as manifestations of official State Department policy are concerned, there is, despite the ostentatious way in which the American community in Baghdad and some high American officials dissociated themselves from us at the time of the Anglo-French intervention at Suez last year, little sign of any present United States intention to try to supplant the United Kingdom in its role of adviser, friend and ally of Iraq; instead, the indications are of a desire for close partnership with us. This is apparent both in the decision to join in all the main activities of the Baghdad Pact, thereby seconding the main recent United Kingdom initiative in the area, and in the co-operation which continues to exist in military questions of which we have had recent confirmation in the discussions on the supply of equipment to the Iraqi forces which were reported upon by Her Majesty's Ambassador, Washington, in his despatch No. 130 of May 16. If the United States wished to secure the replacement of British by American equipment throughout the Iraqi armed forces their physical and financial resources are such that there is little doubt that they would succeed: instead, they are prepared for the Iraqi forces to continue to use British aircraft and tanks, and indeed will help them to do so through off-shore orders. In other less tangible ways, through the day-to-day contacts of our two Embassies, of our representatives in the Baghdad Pact, and of the British and American members on the Development Board, they show every desire to maintain a close partnership with us. This desire for partnership must of course be predicated upon the assumption that the United Kingdom will continue to do its share in meeting the economic, military and political needs of the area. A British abdication would probably lead inevitably to an American effort to take our place.

3. It cannot be said that this spirit of partnership permeates all the agencies of the United States Government. For example, the actions of the local representatives of the C.I.A. indicate a deliberate and sustained attempt by a series of planned manoeuvres to acquire a United States monopoly of the Western liaison and influence with Iraqi Intelligence and Security authorities. To some extent also the attitude of the United States Information Services leaves something to be desired. Their principal representative here a short time ago (now departed) said to a member of my staff that if a search were made in the files of the Foreign Office it would be found that there was an understanding between the United Kingdom and American Governments that the latter should gradually take over British responsibilities and the British position in the Middle East. On occasion, and certainly during the Suez crisis, there were indications of this type of thinking at least in the local operations of the United States Information Services. I have noticed a tendency now and again on the part of visiting American newspapermen and commentators to talk in the vein that an increase in American influence and a diminution in British influence in Iraq was inevitable and to them far from

distasteful; this may or may not indicate briefing by the United States Information Services in Washington or elsewhere. This tendency is, of course, even more marked when one looks outside the field of Government activity into that of industry and commerce. Although the local situation has not yet been affected, I understand that there is a good deal of jockeying for positions of greater influence among the shareholders of the Iraq Petroleum Company, as shown by the decision to appoint an American Joint Managing Director, and I imagine that the American objective is to increase their share of control at our expense. In other branches of business, the American export effort is handicapped by Iraq's membership of the sterling area and the consequent restriction of dollar imports. Despite this handicap American firms show their usual competitive thrustfulness, but they have not yet acquired a very strong position in this market which continues to be dominated by the United Kingdom and Western European countries. Nevertheless the increasing flow of students and technicians to America for training must in the long run exert a marked influence which may be to our detriment; the effects are liable to be cumulative, in that the young men come back both into the business world and into academic employment and influence others to follow in their footsteps. It is perhaps the long-term effects of this growth in personal and technical contacts between Iraq and the United States, coupled with the sheer size and strength of the United States, which seem bound to give rise to a steady growth in American influence here.

4. The United Kingdom have sought to interest the United States increasingly closely in the affairs of the Middle East and can therefore only welcome the growth of United States-Iraqi relations. This growth will almost certainly be accompanied by an increasing concern on the part of the United States Administration in maintaining the prosperity and stability of the country, which are a major United Kingdom interest. It is however essential, as seen from this post, that the growth of United States influence should not be too much at the expense of British influence. If we are to shoulder our proper share of responsibility for ensuring the supply of oil from this country, if we are not to lose the advantages obtained under the Special Agreement of April, 1955, if through our close friendship with Iraq we are to retain an important card of entry in the Arab world, and if we are to avoid a rot starting here which might spread to the oil States in the Persian Gulf, we must keep our end up in this Anglo-American partnership.

5. It is true that the United Kingdom has valuable assets. The King and the Crown Prince have a strong regard and affection for the United Kingdom and these sentiments tend to be shared by the more conservative groups centred round the landowners and tribal leaders. Secondly, many Ministers and senior members of the civil service have largely been educated in British methods, and most of the senior officers of the Army have enjoyed British training and the contact over many years with British servicemen. Thirdly, the Iraq Petroleum Company, despite the spread of its shareholding has, for local purposes, been a largely British concern, and through its enlightened training policy, has given British education to many of the younger technicians. Finally there are many Iraqis of all generations and different walks of life who, whether through visits to the United Kingdom, contact with English people in Iraq, or participation in activities of the British Council, have a liking for and understanding of Britain, which seems to come rather more easily than a similar liking of the United States. To some extent these assets may decline as comparable centres of American influence grow. Thus, among the younger civil servants there will in future be an increasingly large number who have studied or worked in the United States, whereas the older generation who knew and liked Britain so well will gradually disappear from the scene and their successors who continue to do so may be less numerous. The strength of the tribes and the landowners is likely slowly to decline in relation to the expanding business and professional middle-class community where American influence can be expected to increase. Another factor affecting our links with the Iraqi armed forces is that the tradition of supplying them with some of their main items of equipment from Britain may, I understand, become increasingly difficult as our production of conventional weapons declines, and the greater abundance from the United States may lead to the sheer physical necessity of substituting American for British arms.

6. Fortunately Iraq Governments, although they are prepared to play us off in small matters, appear to prefer a situation in which the United States and the United Kingdom are co-operating in the Middle East rather than quarrelling and this will take the sting out of the change in the relative strengths of our influence.

The Iraqis were of course grateful to the United States for the part their Government played in the Suez crisis but they do not have the same confidence in the soundness of American judgment or the continuity of American policy as they have come to have in those of the United Kingdom, despite what they consider to be the recent deplorable aberration. If we can continue our present policy of avoiding giving offence to Arab countries over Israel, many Iraqis will be confirmed in their conviction that our action with Israel over Suez was a single mistake and not a sign that we have espoused the cause of Israel at Arab expense. On the other hand, they have a constant fear that the Jewish lobby in the United States may cause changes for the worse in American policy and in any case they see Israel as economically viable only as a result of private American assistance. There are therefore many who think that Britain and America working in co-operation in pursuit of a Middle Eastern policy which is at least reasonably favourable to the Arab point of view, is the best situation. This is not a sudden recent growth. Perhaps the clearest test came as long ago as September 1953 when Dr. Jamali was appointed Prime Minister. He had been trained in the American University of Beirut and in the United States and he had been opposed to Britain before and during the early part of World War II; he brought into his Government several Ministers who had a similar background to himself. There were at that time those who foresaw a mild swing of the Iraq Government away from ourselves towards greater reliance upon the United States. While, however, Dr. Jamali saw more of the American Ambassador than had the previous Prime Minister, his own relations and those of his Government with my predecessor continued to be as frank and cordial as ever before. The same desire to keep on good terms with both Governments and to encourage them to work closely together in matters affecting Iraq has been shown throughout the Government of Nuri Pasha. I do not believe that the latter has clung to the British connexion, despite our reduced circumstances, because he was too old to change his ways, but rather because he is a realist. I feel sure that he saw that in the British connexion he could count on the advice and help of a powerful friend who would both enable him to avoid being swamped by the immense power of the United States and provide a method of influencing the latter. I would expect the Government which has just taken office, and its successors, to be guided by a similar view.

7. Thinking Iraqis, as I have said, see an advantage in the maintenance of the British as well as the American connexions. Can we rely on the United States in the future continuing, as they have done hitherto, to see the advantages to them of this three-fold relationship? I believe that it is in their interest that they should do so. Their object must be the prosperity and stability of the country and the exclusion of Communist influence. The continuance of Iraq along its present course will ensure this, in the absence of any forward move by Russia in the Middle East, which the defence policy of the Western world must prevent. I am in no position to judge whether a threat from Russia will develop either directly or through the agency of Satellite régimes elsewhere in the area, but as seen from this post the only real danger is that of unbridled Arab nationalism. To protect herself from this, Iraq possesses strong factors of stability in her régime, her army, her development programme with its dependence upon oil markets in the West and the influence of the other Muslim countries of the Northern Tier. Nevertheless her frontiers and her monarchical régime are comparatively recent in origin; her wealth has not yet been widely spread; education both academic and technical is only now reaching more than a small part of the population; and there are no signs as yet of any particular younger successor to Nuri Pasha to give the country the firm paternalistic government which it requires in moments of stress. So long as the Arab nationalist movement has not spent itself, and this will certainly not be the case so long as the problems of Israel and Algeria remain unsolved (and their solutions may only prove to be stages in the development of Arab nationalism, with its search for unity as well as independence), there must always remain the possibility of an explosion of feeling in this country which might take an anti-Western turn. Such an explosion, of which there have been a number in the past, would in all probability not distinguish between the United States and the United Kingdom and the danger would be that the influence of both would be destroyed. It goes without saying that, if the Governments of our two countries were following a policy which the Arabs regarded as decisively opposed to their interests, there would be nothing which either country could do to maintain its position. Short of this, however, the more diversified the Western interests here, and the more numerous and interwoven the relations binding Iraq to the West, the easier it may be to maintain Western influence; that is an important

lesson to be drawn from our recent difficulties over Suez. The United States may well have reached the same conclusion through hard experience gained in assisting other countries in the world where there are strong nationalist feelings. If so, she may be the readier to believe that the long-term continuance of our partnership here is in her own interest as well as in that of the United Kingdom and of Iraq.

8. If this conclusion is right then certain obvious points arise:

(a) If the principle of co-operation and alignment of policy, instead of rivalry, is to be the aim of the Americans and ourselves here, it is important that this aim should be both understood and practised not only by the representatives in Iraq of the State Department but also of the C.I.A., the United States Information Services, and other American governmental agencies.

(b) There must continue both between Washington and London and between our Missions in Baghdad and our delegations in the Baghdad Pact, the closest co-operation on all matters of policy affecting the area. There is no risk of this leading to the Iraqis looking upon the United Kingdom as a satellite of the United States.

(c) We must continue in the future as in the past to play our full part within our resources in helping Iraq forward along its chosen path of development and must maintain our educational effort both through the admission of Iraqi children, students and technicians to establishments at home and through the activities of the British Council in Iraq, to foster knowledge of Britain in the new generation.

9. Provided we do these things and provided we can bring home to the United States Government that it is to their interest as much as to ours that the influence of each of us here should be complementary to that of the other, then I do not believe that the British connexion with Iraq need necessarily be damaged by the growth of Iraqi ties with the United States.

10. Perhaps I may add to the above two reflections of a more tentative character.

11. First, in the Baghdad Pact as now constituted the United States is a full member of the Economic Committee, the Military Committee and the Counter-Subversion Committee, but only sits in the Council as an observer. On the other hand, two members of the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom and Pakistan, are full members of the Pact. If Pakistan remains a member both of the Pact and of the Commonwealth, and if our Commonwealth ties with Pakistan should be maintained and strengthened (in spite of the Kashmir issue), the influence of Pakistan in Iraq and indeed throughout the Middle East may prove to be a valuable support to our own position and influence, and a healthy counterweight to the risk of any undesirable or undue increase in American influence at our expense.

12. Second, it is for consideration whether Australia, and even perhaps New Zealand, who have links with the Middle East dating back to the First World War and A.N.Z.A.C., might not devote somewhat more attention to Iraq. There are, for example, few and indeed I believe no Iraqi students in Australia or New Zealand, although Australian Educational Institutions have in many fields as much to offer Iraqis as those of the United States. Equally there are few Australian or New Zealand experts or technicians who come to Iraq. There have recently been one or two exceptions to this which proved most fortunate. There is no doubt that the Iraq Government, and Iraqis in general, would welcome their presence. Equally welcome would be the establishment of an Australian diplomatic Mission in Baghdad. If there is felt to be any force in the suggestions in this paragraph it might perhaps be worthwhile to discuss them with the Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Casey, who I understand will be visiting London in September, and who has a special interest in and knowledge of Middle East questions.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

SECRET—GUARD

EA 1015/320

No. 11

IRAQI ATTITUDE TO THE OMAN QUESTION

Mr. Beaumont to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received August 27)

(No. 224. Confidential)

*Baghdad,
August 23, 1957.*

Sir,

Now that the recent rebellion in central Oman is over, and the Security Council has refused to accede to the Arabs' request for the inscription on the Agenda of an item accusing the United Kingdom of aggression, it seems possible that Oman will cease to be the centre of attention that it has been during the last few weeks. I have the honour in this despatch to report on Iraqi opinion during this period. As the spotlight of public attention moves elsewhere, it seems, as seen from Iraq, that a definite milestone in the history of the Arabian peninsula has been reached and passed.

2. The Iraqi Press and public were slow to begin to take an interest in the Omani rebellion. Once they had done so the reactions were uniformly critical of Her Majesty's Government and often hostile. But Oman is a long way from Iraq and the most intelligent Iraqis realised that the rebellion itself was a small-scale affair whose importance had been inflated and distorted by publicity. They admitted that there were no real grounds for proclaiming the Imam and his hangers-on as Arab nationalists, as the local Press did following the Egyptian lead, and that to do so was irresponsible and a disservice to the public. I did not during this period detect any of the passion with which the Anglo-French action last November was so widely greeted here. On the other hand, events of this kind, especially if repeated, certainly have had and would have a cumulatively adverse effect on the Iraqi attitude towards Britain.

3. It may be said that it is unreasonable of the Iraqis to be critical of us when we have done nothing except respond to the request of the Sultan, for whom those Iraqis who have met him have some regard, for assistance in dealing with a small internal rebellion, stimulated by Saudi money and Egyptian propaganda. That the Iraq Government should join with other Arabs in accusing us of aggression and that the Baghdad newspapers should paint our action in the blackest terms seems more than a little unfair. Unfortunately, however, we must recognise that in this matter both emotion and what the Iraqis conceive to be their self-interest were against us.

4. As I have reported in telegrams the Iraq Government at first hoped that the whole affair would be over before they were compelled by events to take a stand; at that stage their only concern was to ensure that nothing was said publicly to suggest that we were using our staging post facilities at Habbaniya to assist our military effort so that they could not be accused by the other Arab countries of assisting imperialism against their "brother Arabs". In this connexion, I should like to acknowledge the care that was taken by the Political Office with the Middle East Forces in Cyprus to consult this Embassy on all movements of military stores through Habbaniya. They then sought to delay a decision by the Arab League Council meeting in Cairo. However, in the end they found themselves obliged to commit themselves, and at this point, despite their correct understanding of the status of the Sultan, they do not appear to have doubted that the right course was to stand with the other Arabs in disregard of what they knew to be the right cause. This was because the initiative in pressing for action in the Security Council was taken by the Saudi representative and they feared that any hesitation would throw King Saud back into the arms of Nasser at this critical juncture. The Foreign Ministry were extremely distressed at having to support a view of the status of Oman with which they did not believe, but Ministers were inclined to take the line: "Surely you would prefer that we should sign an objectionable letter attacking you about this unimportant affair than that we should risk damaging our *rapprochement* with Saudi Arabia which we, urged on by you, have so laboriously achieved". In any event, as the Arab representative on the Security Council, they considered that they were caught since they could scarcely escape putting forward whatever case the other more truculent Arab States agreed on. It never occurred

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to them that they might be able, by vigorous leadership among the other like-minded Arab States, to prevent the Egyptians, Saudis and Syrians carrying Oman to the United Nations or if it did, their desire to appease the Saudis remained paramount. But in my view this was only partly the reason for the Iraq Government's attitude. They knew too that public opinion at home would be extremely critical of any deviation by them from the "Arab" point of view, because their domestic position is not a strong one. Their instinct is to placate Arab nationalist feeling at home wherever possible rather than take an unpopular line. I fear that we may see this tendency having its effect in other matters during the coming months. I need hardly add that the Government had no desire for the approach to the Security Council to succeed, and were only relieved to find that they were not alone with the Russians in asking for the inscription of the item on the Agenda.

5. The Government were undoubtedly right in thinking that they would have incurred unpopularity if they had not gone along with the other Arabs in attacking the United Kingdom. From the start they allowed the Press, which is feeling its oats under the new administration, to follow the line put out by the Egyptians and "The Voice of the Arabs". Once this had happened they could not have put the machine into reverse without strong and unpopular measures. So the Omani rebels became "heroic Arab nationalists" struggling to be free; the British were "aggressors" and, because of exaggerated reports of the fighting, "bloodthirsty imperialists". The rebels became accepted as the protagonists of a progressive modern force and the Sultan as the representative of a reactionary servility to imperialism.

6. One can of course dismiss the newspaper attacks as irresponsible—which they were—and one can discount their influence. But it is a fact that quite apart from the Press intelligent and unintelligent opinion alike was tilted against us. Even when the true facts were admitted, the large bulk of "nationalist" opinion held: "The Omanis are Arabs and our brothers. There can be no excuse for you, the British, to make war on Arabs anywhere", and then excused Egyptian and Saudi intervention as being "Arab" intervention in an Arab affair. The intelligent Iraqi, admitting that we had little choice but to act as we did in this case, tended to feel aggrieved that we should have placed ourselves and Iraq in so embarrassing a position. We ought, they felt, to have organised our relations with the Gulf States so that British intervention was not required. "Could you not have foreseen in 1955 what would happen and taken precautions to deal with it?" they have asked. Our friends begged us to ensure that a similar situation did not occur again. Sayid Yusuf al-Gailani, the Permanent Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for instance, suggested that since the intervention of British troops was becoming increasingly difficult and undesirable politically, we should find some way of giving arms and seconding personnel to the Gulf Rulers to enable them to ensure their own security and dispense with help from British forces, even if this would cost us more.

7. I think that we must draw from this affair two conclusions. First the use of British forces in Oman or in the Persian Gulf in the future would inevitably tend to range the Iraqi Press, public opinion and Government against us, in varying degrees, but more strongly than on the present occasion. We could not hope that reactions will be so slow or so restrained, and the effect upon our relations with Iraq may well be serious. It is true that even if the Rulers under our protection can by their own efforts (and with our assistance by way of training and the provision of arms) successfully put down any minor rebellions in their territories, this will still attract adverse attention from Left-wing Iraqi opinion but it will not be so dangerous from the point of view of Anglo-Iraqi relations. As I am reporting elsewhere, the Iraqis are looking towards the future political evolution in the Gulf. The Oman affair has convinced them that evolution is necessary as well as inevitable. They are concerned that it should be peaceful and that Iraqi interests should be protected. Meanwhile our friends here sincerely hope that British forces will not again be needed to keep the peace outside British territory. The second conclusion is that the Iraq Government do not see themselves in the role of leaders of opinion either at home or abroad and that they are likely in the future again to be dragged unwillingly into dangerous courses by their failure to make an early stand. In this they are perhaps more representative of the thinking of their fellow countrymen than are Nuri Said or, even, Dr. Fadhil Jamali. In the course of my service at this post, I have been struck time and time again by the desire of Iraqis of all classes—

even the so-called progressive youth—to be led rather than themselves to lead. They do not seem to envisage themselves or their country as leaders of the Arab world and I have noticed that when a visitor to Iraq has suggested to them that they might give a lead in working, for instance, towards the popular goal of Arab unity, they have acquiesced—because they could scarcely do otherwise—but always with obvious embarrassment. To this perhaps is attributable—as much to their lack of faith in the nature of their present leadership—the hold which Egyptian leadership and Egyptian propaganda exercise over their minds.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Tehran, Amman, Beirut, Bahrain, Washington and the United Kingdom Delegation New York.

I have, &c.

R. A. BEAUMONT.

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I have, &c.

R. A. BEAUMONT.

VQ 1051/49

No. 12

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND
Dr. NADIM PACHACHI ON SEPTEMBER 27, 1957

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Mr. Beaumont (Bagdad)

(No. 189. Confidential)
Sir,

Foreign Office,
September 28, 1957.

On the afternoon of the 27th of September I had a talk with Dr. Nadim Pachachi, the Minister of Economics in the Iraq Government.

2. We began by discussing the situation in Syria, Dr. Pachachi observing that in his opinion an exaggeratedly serious view had been taken of the situation. I said that it was a matter of opinion whether the sharp verbal reaction from the United States was good or bad tactics, but I felt no doubt that the situation was very serious. Syria appeared in the light of our information to have gone a very long way in the direction of becoming a Soviet satellite. The police and the army were now in charge of people directly subservient to Russian influence and the things that the Syrian Prime Minister ought to do to retrieve the situation were ten times more difficult now than they would have been a year ago.

3. Dr. Pachachi said that he did not mean to underrate the seriousness of the situation, but it was still the hope of the Iraq Government and of the Iraq people, that the Syrians would continue to assert their independence as an Arab nation. He was himself going to Damascus on the 30th of September, to try to see for himself whether this estimate was right. In this connection I deprecated the tendency of the Press to describe visits by representatives of other Arab States to Damascus as Syrian diplomatic successes; they were much more like life-belts extended to aid the survival of Syrian independence.

4. Dr. Pachachi asked me whether it was our intention to resume relations with Egypt at an early date, since he thought this would have an important bearing on the situation. I said that I did not wish to take a rigid position on this question, but that it was essential for the Egyptians to give some sign of willingness to meet us on the question of sequestered British private property before there could be any question of relations being officially resumed.

5. We then turned to the subject of oil, on which Dr. Pachachi explained that the Iraq Government were seriously worried by the prospect that, if there were not an early and substantial increase in the production of oil in Iraq, there would have to be a considerable slowing down of the Iraq development programme. This would in turn have a seriously adverse effect on the fortunes of the Government and the country. It was his hope therefore that the oil companies would agree to a fairly rapid increase of the throughput through Syria, to the diversion of the Haifa pipeline through Jordan and Syria and to the development of greatly increased facilities for export on the Persian Gulf.

6. In the latter connection Dr. Pachachi said that he had heard that the first optimistic reports of the discussion in Beirut between the Ruler of Kuwait and the Foreign Minister of Iraq (Ali Mumtaz) had in fact been misleading and that the Kuwaitis had now introduced reservations into what at one time looked like being agreement. Could we not put stronger pressure on the Kuwaitis to arrive at an agreement which would allow Iraq oil to be taken through Kuwait territory by pipeline and be exported from there? I pointed out to Dr. Pachachi that there were two sides to this argument, particularly the argument about the Iraq-Kuwait frontier, and that I thought it was an argument in which Iraq, as by far the bigger partner, could, and should, be generous. As regards pressure on Kuwait, I pointed out that there were limitations to the amount of pressure which it was possible for us to put on a friendly Ruler. We had of course done our best about this dispute between two of our friends, which we should like to see solved in the general interest as soon as possible.

7. Dr. Pachachi said that much time had been spent in fruitless discussion and he thought that Iraq would now have to decide in favour of the development of facilities in Iraq territory at the north end of the Persian Gulf.

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8. After Dr. Pachachi had left me he had a further discussion in the Foreign Office with Sir Paul Gore-Booth, at which Mr. Maurice Bridgeman of British Petroleum and Mr. Searight of the Shell Company were also present. The discussion covered all possible methods of increasing the output of oil in Iraq and pipeline capacity. In particular, Mr. Bridgeman pointed out that work was proceeding actively on the northern (Syrian) pipeline at maximum speed practicable to increase the annual throughput to 25 million tons; a decision to go further than this would be a very difficult one to take in the present disturbed conditions in Syria and nothing would be gained by trying to take that decision now when the work could not be put in hand for several months in any case. It would be better to await developments for a short time. As regards the Haifa diversion, Mr. Bridgeman and Mr. Searight said that this was a politically attractive idea, although the economics of it were far from attractive. It was also under study, but the Iraq Petroleum Company would certainly want to have some idea of the Lebanese attitude towards the proposal, particularly on the subject of tariffs, before any decision could be taken. Dr. Pachachi said he would be enquiring about this attitude in his visit to Beirut next week.

9. As regards the outlet in the south, Mr. Bridgeman explained that the present capacity in Iraq territory was some 13 million tons and that a considerable increase in output at the Basra oilfields would be needed to justify a big increase in capacity such as present Iraqi ideas appeared to contemplate. The shareholders of the Company would have to discuss the situation in the light of the latest reports from Kuwait. Dr. Pachachi, Mr. Bridgeman and Mr. Searight agreed without commitment that the time seemed to have come when a decision should be taken to give up the hope of exporting this oil through Kuwait and to go ahead with the proposal for facilities on Iraq territory.

10. Summing up this discussion, Sir Paul Gore-Booth said that it was certainly the hope of Her Majesty's Government that it would be possible in the near future to extend both the oil output in Iraq and the pipeline facilities for conveying this oil to the outside world. He asked what Dr. Pachachi's attitude would be to the third alternative, viz. the development of pipeline facilities through Turkey. Dr. Pachachi indicated that he personally and, he thought, his Government, would much prefer outlets in Arab territories, though in the last resort, if events in Syria went very badly, the possibility of an outlet through Turkey would have to be considered.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Bahrain, Beirut, The Hague, Kuwait, Paris, Tehran, Tel Aviv and Washington.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

SECRET—GUARD

VQ 1015/42

No. 13

ASSESSMENT OF ALI JAWDAT'S GOVERNMENT AFTER THREE MONTHS IN OFFICE

Mr. Beaumont to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received October 8)

(No. 251. Confidential) *Baghdad,*
Sir, *October 1, 1957.*

When the Government of Ali Jawdat al Ayyubi took office on the 20th of June, the general expectation was that the Government would seek to avoid any major new initiatives of policy and would be mainly concerned to keep out of trouble. Nevertheless, with the departure from office of Nuri as Said, it was expected that the new Government would pursue a more liberal and more progressive policy in internal affairs than their predecessors. Now that we have had three months of experience of the present Government, it is convenient to consider whether the Ali Jawdat Administration have lived up to the hopes placed on them in this respect.

2. The main directions in which Ali Jawdat and his Ministers were expected to show a more liberal tendency were in their handling of the Press and radio, in their attitude to the formation of political parties and in the release of political prisoners. The most striking individual action in these fields came in the early days of the Government when the Prime Minister, against the advice of the Minister of Interior, decided to cease the jamming of Cairo and Damascus broadcasts, which had for the last six months been very imperfectly heard in the towns of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. The result has certainly been to improve the reception of the Pan-Arab and anti-Western propaganda emanating from Cairo. This propaganda has always been heard in Iraq but the fact that it was now heard by more people, particularly in the capital, has made it all the more difficult for the Government and for the newspapers to lead public opinion and to take an independent line over such matters as Oman and developments in Syria. What is equally important is that the publicity given by the Iraqi Government to the ending of jamming may make its reintroduction, if ever necessary, more difficult.

3. Apart from this action, there have been few other important changes in the fields mentioned. In spite of the confident

expectation that a number of additional newspapers would be licensed this has not happened. Indeed, the Minister of Interior has kept a fairly close watch on the existing organs of the Press and towards the end of July summoned their editors to a meeting at which he cautioned them against excessive criticism of the Government and their policies, in case he might find it necessary to withdraw some of their licences. Since then he has used the milder sanction of withholding government advertising (a useful weapon) when he thought individual newspapers were going too far. Nevertheless, the comment in the Press has been much freer than it ever was under Nuri's Government. There has, for instance, been more adulation of President Nasser and fairly open criticism of the Ali Jawdat Government.

4. The Government's attitude towards the formation of political parties has also been publicly declared. The Director-General of Guidance has stated that anyone who wishes to form a party should apply in accordance with the procedure laid down in the appropriate law. But in fact no one has applied and there is a general belief that a licence will not be granted if they do. There has been considerable publicity given to the intention of Dr. Fadhil Jamali to form a new and progressive party, but present indications are that Dr. Jamali has not succeeded in rallying sufficient support in political circles to justify an application for a licence.

5. With regard to political prisoners, there has been a trickle of releases of ex-Communists who have renounced their allegiance, but these have been small fry and the main prisoner, Kamil al Chadirchi (Leading Personalities No. 73), who was imprisoned at the time of the Suez crisis for spreading false rumours regarding Iraq, and whose friends have been most active on his behalf, remains in imprisonment. Two other leading Radicals, Faiq Samarra (No. 50) and Siddiq Shenshel (No. 91), who had been forcibly rusticated, were allowed to return to Baghdad but were cautioned to

behave well or they would be sent off again. In this connection, mention might also be made of the severe restrictions placed on the number of Iraqi lawyers, who are notoriously extreme in their views (and the new President of whose Association is Faiq Samarra), who were permitted to attend the recent Arab Lawyers' Congress in Damascus. Only three were permitted to go from the large number who applied. Stern measures have also been taken against those Iraqis who, against the Government's veto, attended the Moscow Youth Festival; one man has been sentenced to a year's imprisonment for forging travel documents. The police have also been active in watching for groups who might be conspiring against the régime, and publicity has been given to the rounding up of one subversive group and also to the arrest of youths who had been circulating Communist pamphlets.

6. The total effect of the new Government's actions in the field of liberalisation has therefore been small, apart from the cessation of jamming of foreign broadcasts. The reasons for this "lack of liberalisation" may be that the King and Crown Prince have stood out against any freedom of the Press or political parties, and that the Minister of the Interior is well aware that liberty in Iraq can very quickly degenerate into extreme licence and has made a cautious approach to each question as it has arisen. On the other hand, the Government have shown signs of an intention to pursue a socially more progressive policy than their predecessors, partly under the influence of the Minister of Social Affairs, Arkan Abadi. Time has been too short for any substantial results yet to appear but action has been initiated in a number of fields. The Minister of Social Affairs has announced the initiation of a programme for creating clubs, recreation centres and other social amenities for villages; and the construction of housing estates both by his Ministry and by the Ministry of Development has been given a fresh impetus. Secondly, the long-awaited decision to proceed with the foundation of the new University of Baghdad, which was delayed by Nuri's Government through fear of the political effervescence of the students, has been taken with the appointment of a President, who is now actively seeking the formation of a Foundation Board. Thirdly, the long-projected Public Service Board, which will control the appointment, the promotions and the discipline of all

Government servants, except those in the armed forces, has been established; this results from the passage of the Civil Service Law of 1956 which incorporated many British ideas. Finally, the Government have approved a project which has come up through the Development Board for a comprehensive programme for stimulating development in the rural areas through local initiative. This last development is potentially a most important one and will form the subject of a separate report when further information has been collected. Suffice it to say that by allowing schemes to emerge which will meet the felt immediate wants of the population rather than imposing on them from above (i.e., the Development Board) what is known to be good for them, this rural development scheme, if rightly applied, might do much to win over a traditional mistrustful population to a greater belief in the benefits of Government and to wean them away from Communism.

7. If the Ali Jawdat Government were given time and were left undisturbed by political events outside the country, there is reason to think that they might ultimately make quite a good showing in internal affairs through progressive social developments, while maintaining a fairly firm control over the political extremists. It must be admitted, however, that their period of office has coincided with the Baghdad summer when political activity is at its lowest and when many leading Iraqis are out of the country. We are now approaching the period when the travellers will all have returned, when the new term at the Baghdad colleges will start and the students will once more be collected together, and thoughts will be increasingly directed towards next year's national election; moreover, the anniversary of the Suez crisis is not far ahead. In these circumstances, the Government are likely to be more sternly tested and developments in Syria may confront them with increasingly difficult decisions in foreign policy. It is hard to believe that it will be possible for Ali Jawdat to continue for long without some reinforcement of his Government, of which the two most important Ministries—those of Foreign Affairs and Development—are still held on an acting basis by Ministers with other portfolios. It is probable that events outside Iraq rather than purely internal developments will determine whether the reconstruction, which is likely to happen

some time before the end of the year, is of a relatively minor character entailing only the filling of existing vacancies, or requires a clean sweep. It is too early to make a prediction on which is the more likely to occur.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Beirut, Ankara, Tehran, Washington, Bahrain, Karachi and to the Political Office with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

R. A. BEAUMONT.

SECRET—GUARD

VQ 10834/6

No. 14

STATE VISIT OF THE KING OF IRAQ TO TEHRAN

Mr. Russell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received November 4)

(No. 121. Confidential) *Tehran,*
Sir, *November 1, 1957.*

I have the honour to report that King Faisal II of Iraq paid a State visit to Iran from the 18th to the 28th of October. King Faisal was accompanied by a suite which included the Prime Minister, Ali Jowdat El-Ayubi; the Minister of Finance and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ali Momtaz El-Daftari; and the Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff, Major-General Ghazé Aldagheshani. The programme, which went smoothly, included the usual mixture of receptions in Tehran and sight-seeing in the provinces. The latter had to be cut short as King Faisal decided to return two days early to Baghdad owing to the Middle Eastern situation. He found time, however, on the last day to visit the Shrine at Meshed. The only novel elements in the programme were a military demonstration by IV Corps in the Kermanshah area and a military parade of I Corps in Tehran. Although the former proved to be a set piece, mainly to show off Iranian tanks, guns and jet aircraft, it was the most ambitious so far attempted, and together with the parade reflected considerable credit on the Iranian Army and Air Force, whose standards of efficiency are slowly, but steadily, improving, largely as a result of the patient work of the American Military Mission.

2. The communiqué issued at the end of the visit, a copy of which is enclosed,⁽¹⁾ is written in general terms and with appropriate emphasis on the desirability of non-intervention in the affairs of other countries, economic development and the value of the Baghdad Pact.

3. During the visit talks went on at two levels: the two Kings had some lengthy exchanges of view, while their Ministers discussed a number of subjects in more detail. Perhaps the most important of the latter were the Irano-Iraqi frontier problems. According to Dr. Ardalan, it has been agreed that negotiations should start simultaneously but separately on the Shatt-el-Arab (in Baghdad) and on land frontier problems (in Tehran): but there are to be no talks on frontier water problems. It is possible, however, that the Iraqis still have mental reservations about the Shatt, since their Foreign Minister's reply to a letter

from Dr. Ardalan confirming the verbal agreements reached by the two monarchs was only delivered as they were literally on the point of leaving, and in Arabic at that. When I last spoke to him, Dr. Ardalan was not yet aware of its contents.

4. Other subjects which by implication appear to have been discussed include the Persian Gulf: cf. paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 673 of the 24th of October, about substitutes for Egyptian and Syrian teachers in the Gulf States; and oil. There have been reports in the Press that the talks on oil were the prelude to the co-ordination of Iraqi, Iranian and Saudi Arabian oil policies, but neither we nor the Americans have so far been able to obtain any confirmation of this. According to the Press, other subjects which have been discussed were the rights of each country's nationals in the other, and the junction of the Iraqi and Iranian railways in the Khorramshahr-Basra area. This link, which existed during the war, would chiefly benefit the pilgrim traffic.

5. Finally, there have been indications that the Russians have been trying to use this occasion to prepare the way towards the resumption of diplomatic relations with Iraq. The Soviet Ambassador was certainly sedulous in his attendance at parties given in honour of the Iraqis.

6. Generally speaking, the visit has served a useful purpose, at any rate publicly, in consolidating relations between the two countries in the broad field of foreign affairs. But relations seem to remain prickly when it comes to dealing with specific problems between the two countries. And the Persians have throughout been disappointed at the lack of public enthusiasm for the Baghdad Pact on the part of the present Iraqi Government, even though they understand the pan-Arab pressures that inspire this caution.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch (without enclosure except to Baghdad) to Her Majesty's Representatives at Baghdad, Ankara, Karachi, Beirut, Amman, Bahrain, Washington and to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

J. W. RUSSELL

(Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires).

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

SECRET—GUARD

VQ 1015/1

No. 15

THE GOVERNMENT OF ALI JAUDAT—JUNE—DECEMBER 1957

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received December 31)

(No. 300. Confidential) *Baghdad,*
 Sir, *December 27, 1957.*

I have the honour to report that on the 14th of December His Majesty King Faisal formally accepted the resignation of Sayid Ali Jaudat al Ayyubi and requested Sayid Abdul Wahab Murjan to form a Government. The Ali Jaudat Government had been in office rather less than six months.

2. In despatch No. 251 of the 1st of October Mr. Beaumont reported upon the record of the Ali Jaudat Government in internal affairs during the first three months of its tenure. This was a story of moderate progress in the fields of social development and of administration. It included the formation of the Public Service Board to supervise the civil service, and initial steps towards the foundation of the new University of Baghdad. A project for the extension of the development programme into the rural areas was also approved and will form the subject of a separate despatch. The other feature of the Government's record had been their firmness in dealing with the Press and radio, mitigated only by the decision of the Prime Minister, against the advice of his Minister of the Interior, to stop the jamming of Cairo and Damascus Radios. The last two months of the Ali Jaudat Government have not brought any new developments of major political importance, but have shown very much the mixture as before. In the field of administration there has been a reorganisation and expansion of the Prime Minister's office which will probably lead to the smoother conduct of business, the establishment of an Economic Advisory Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. McDiarmid of the International Bank, who is on loan to the Development Board, to keep the general lines of economic policy under review, and the efficient completion of the national census. Further, there was an agreement with Her Majesty's Government which will enable the Iraqi Central Bank to increase its gold holding over three years, and a successful intervention with the Iraq Petroleum Company, to increase its oil output from the Basra field. The attitude of firmness towards the Press continued and led to the

suspension of the licences of two newspapers for giving exaggerated publicity to the views of Colonel Nasser while paying inadequate attention to those of the Government of Iraq.

3. In the field of foreign affairs, Ali Jaudat made it clear on taking office that Iraq's foreign policy would remain unchanged in that he wished to give special emphasis to Iraq's relations with the other Arab countries. All his public acts were in line with his first, and highly popular, statement of intention "to clear the clouds in the Arab atmosphere." Although he claimed privately to share the general view of responsible Iraqis that the developments in Syria constituted a serious danger, he was probably more optimistic than most in hoping for a change for the better in that country through the efforts of the moderate elements there. Whether moved by this hope or by a desire of popularity at home, he gave a striking demonstration of Arab solidarity by visiting Damascus at the end of September. In his discussions with the Syrian leaders, he did not apparently give anything away and managed to avoid subscribing to a joint communiqué which would have caused dismay among Syria's other neighbours. His visit to Damascus brought the Prime Minister considerable popularity in Iraq. The attitude of Ali Jaudat's Government towards Arab affairs was also shown by their readiness to go along with the other Arab States in opposing the United Kingdom in the United Nations over Oman, by the relative lack of warmth in their statements of support for King Hussain of Jordan in his vigorous opposition to Egypt and Syria, and by the Prime Minister's refusal to make any reference to the Baghdad Pact as an element in Iraq's foreign relations in his public statements of policy. Fortunately for the Government, however, no major issue came to the fore during their period of office on which they would have had to choose between Arab solidarity and their Western or Baghdad Pact allies. Syria's complaint against Turkey was brought before the United Nations, but happily, however, the Government were rescued from having to make a

decision to support Syria against Turkey by King Saud's offer of mediation. They came out firmly in support of him and played their part in securing the burying of the question in the United Nations Assembly.

4. Throughout his period of office, Ali Jaudat paid the closest attention to the views of King Saud. Both over Oman and over Syria, the decisive factor was King Saud's attitude. In this policy which, fittingly enough, culminated in the royal visit to Saudi Arabia from the 2nd of December to the 7th, on which I am reporting separately, the Government were, I think, pursuing a double aim: first, to ensure that it was Syria and Egypt that were isolated in the Arab world and not Iraq, and second, to appear at home as good Arabs. In both they were largely successful.

5. They were not, however, so successful in pleasing those who normally make policy in Iraq. In the first three months of the Government's life, the King and the Crown Prince were absent in Istanbul on holiday for much of the time and Nuri Pasha was also away. At a lower level Yusuf Gailani, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Ministry, and Lieutenant-General Rafiq Arif, Chief of the General Staff, were also on leave for much of the time. The Prime Minister was, therefore, able very much to have his head. But the situation changed sharply in the middle of October when the King and Crown Prince, Nuri and the others all came back. By that time the developments in Syria were causing great concern to Her Majesty's Government and to the Governments of the United States, Turkey, Jordan and the Lebanon. Nuri has many supporters in public life here and, with his return to Baghdad, they became more restive and more vocal against the foreign policy of Ali Jaudat. The visit to Damascus, although it had been made with Nuri's agreement, and despite its popularity among the majority of Iraqis, was criticised in private as an encouragement to the extremists in Syria and as evidence that Ali Jaudat would not prove sufficiently firm to deal with the dangerous situation which might arise there or in Jordan. King Hussain of Jordan seems to have become increasingly anxious at the absence of firm indications of support from Iraq, and grave doubts about the firmness of the Government were certainly felt by the Prime Minister of Turkey and the President of Pakistan, who undoubtedly let their views

be known to the Palace. Indeed, the irritation felt by M. Menderes towards Iraq as a result of this visit has not yet disappeared and has now been fed by the unfortunate failure of the Iraqi representatives with the United Nations to follow their instructions and vote with Turkey over the Cyprus issue.

6. From mid-October onwards, it became increasingly clear that Ali Jaudat did not have the support of the King and Crown Prince and that the latter were in close touch behind the scenes with Nuri. Nuri, who saw an attempt to take at least the worst passion out of the Palestine problem as the key to improvement in the Middle Eastern situation, took this question up actively and persuaded the Palace to seek the support of King Saud and other Moslem Governments in the area in making an attempt to persuade the United States Government to make a new start upon the problem. Although Ali Jaudat agreed with this view, it was in fact to Nuri that the King turned to co-ordinate action on this question. In this and in other ways Ali Jaudat became to some extent by-passed by the Palace.

7. In view of these developments, it was a matter of some surprise that it was made known late in October that the Ali Jaudat Government intended to meet Parliament when it convened on the 2nd of December. For the present Parliament consists to a large extent of Nuri's supporters and it appeared not impossible that events might move towards a serious clash. In fact, however, November proved a quiet month and, as the meeting of Parliament approached, it seemed that no large issues were likely to arise which would cause immediate difficulty. Indeed, His Royal Highness the Crown Prince was away from Baghdad for almost the entire month of November on his tour of the Far East and official attention was devoted to the plans for the visit to Riyadh. The first meeting of Parliament passed off quietly. Nevertheless, it appears that by that time the Palace had already decided that a change would have to be made. Nuri left for his trip to Tehran, Ankara, Washington and London on the 30th November saying that he had to be back by the 12th of December, the implication being that a change might be expected about then. Simultaneously, rumours began to circulate that Ali Jaudat had already offered his resignation, but had been persuaded to stay in office temporarily. These continued actively throughout the

week after the return of King Faisal from Riyadh on the 7th of December, and on the 14th of December Ali Jaudat's resignation was formally accepted. When Ali Jaudat's letter of resignation was published on the 18th of December, it was revealed that he had in fact asked to be allowed to resign as long ago as the 16th of November. I enclose a copy of a translation of this letter and of the King's reply.⁽¹⁾

8. According to this letter his resignation was due to his inability to put certain reform legislation through the present Parliament and to his desire to dissolve the latter and hold a fresh election, a request which had been refused by the King. As I reported in my telegram 1500 of the 8th of December the Crown Prince confirmed to me that the actual issue on which the Prime Minister would resign was his desire to hold elections. The evidence is, however, that the reference to legislation in his letter is misleading. What he felt he needed was a Parliament, perhaps less conservative and representative of the landed interest than that elected in 1954 and at any rate more amenable to himself, to give him general support, both in internal and external affairs. In this bid he was supported by the Minister of Finance, Ali Mumtaz, but not by the other members of the Cabinet. In any case, the King was not prepared to agree that this was a suitable time for an election and Ali Jaudat had no alternative but to leave office.

9. Much of the life of the Ali Jaudat Government coincided with the quiet period of the year when Parliament is not in session and political life is at a low ebb, and partly for this reason its record of actual achievement is not great. From the United Kingdom point of view, its attitude over

foreign affairs, though in the event it may, except over Oman, have worked by and large in favour of our interests, gave grounds for uneasiness as to what would happen if a serious crisis arose in the Arab world. In internal affairs, however, it showed itself sensible, reformatory and by no means lacking in enterprise. Some of its actions such as the initiation of the Rural Development Scheme and of the Economic Advisory Committee (which were its own initiatives), and the reactivation of the plans started earlier under Nuri for the setting up of the Public Service Board and for the founding of the Baghdad University, should all bear valuable fruit in the future. It had under preparation a draft law for charging land-owners for improvements to their land resulting from the spending of Development Board money on water control and irrigation, and another, inherited from Nuri's previous Government, and the work of Khalil Kenna and Nuri, for the imposition of a land tax, both important questions about which much more will be heard in the near future. The Government was, moreover, a popular one with the nation at large for its endeavour to realise in a small measure the Arab aspiration of close co-operation with other Arab countries corresponding to the deep-rooted feeling of the people. By giving encouragement to this feeling, it may have circumscribed to some extent the actions of its successors.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Beirut, Amman, Bahrain, Ankara, Tehran, Karachi, Washington and the Political Office with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

VQ 10325/1

No. 16

KING FAISAL'S STATE VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received December 31)

(No. 301. Confidential)
Sir,

Baghdad,
December 28, 1957.

I have the honour to report that King Faisal of Iraq paid a State Visit to King Saud of Saudi Arabia from the 2nd to the 7th of December. This was in return for a similar visit paid by King Saud to Baghdad in May of this year and reported in my despatch No. 140 of the 30th of May.

2. His Majesty was accompanied by the Crown Prince; Senator Ali Jaudat al Ayyubi, Prime Minister; Sayid Ali Mumtaz al Daftari, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs; Sayid Arkan Abadi, Minister for Social Affairs; Dr. Abdullah Damluji, Ambassador for Arab countries; Lieutenant-General Rafiq 'Arif and Major-General Khalil Jamil, Chief of General Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations); Senator Taufiq Suwaidi, former Prime Minister; and members of the Royal Household led by Sayyid Abdullah Bakr, Rais of the Royal Diwans and Tahsin Qadri Pasha, Master of Ceremonies.

3. The public programme comprised a strenuous round of royal entertainment in Riyadh, a military display and parade which included some Bedouin dancing in which King Saud himself joined in honour of his guest, an inspection of military establishments at Al Kharj, and a visit on the way home to the oil installations at Dhahran. On the 8th of December, as reported in my telegram No. 1504 of the following day, a joint communiqué was issued referring, in the terms common to such communiqués, to the devotion of both monarchs to the Arab League, the unity of the Arab world, the Arab Collective Security Pact, the Resolutions of the Bandung Conference and the Charter of the United Nations; denouncing Zionism, Imperialism and subversive principles of all kinds; and expressing their intention to support the people of Algeria in their glorious struggle.

4. In the course of the visit a commercial agreement between the two countries, which had been in preparation for some time, was formally signed. The text will be communicated to the Department when it has been published.

5. The visit was in essence a further step in the process, to which the Iraq Government have devoted so much care in the last few years, to cementing relations between the two Royal Houses and the two countries. They have seen the importance of this not only because of their long-term desire to improve inter-Arab relations and bury past feuds which no longer have meaning, but also because of the need to consolidate King Saud's anti-Communist feeling and his developing readiness to co-operate with Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon to resist attacks and subversion from Egypt and Syria. In both respects it appears that the visit was successful. Personal relations between the Royal Houses seem to have been good and the Iraqi party found King Saud, whose chief pro-Egyptian advisers were absent, bitter against Nasser and ready to pledge his support for King Hussain of Jordan. That this was not asserted in the communiqué was apparently partly a result of the failure of the Iraqi Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to press for it, but it was also no doubt an indication of King Saud's continuing reluctance to take public actions which might be construed as challenging Colonel Nasser and the Syrian Government.

6. So far as concrete steps to give effect to the growing co-operation of the two countries were concerned, the results of the visit were somewhat meagre. The Chief of General Staff was unimpressed by what he saw of the Saudi armed forces. He has told me that he found that the Saudis had no military staff of the kind which would permit of any joint planning against future emergencies or for the support of King Hussain; in this field, it appears that liaison will have to be of a fairly elementary character. Nevertheless, King Saud accepted an Iraqi offer to receive some Saudi military personnel for training in Iraq, and a small number have already arrived here to undergo courses. Military Attachés will also be

appointed in the Missions of the two countries to each other. These arrangements will be followed up and it is hoped extended when Prince Fahad, who holds the nominal office of Minister of Defence and Chief of Staff to King Saud, visits Baghdad in January in response to an Iraqi invitation. It is also apparently hoped to be able to increase the cultural contacts and possibly to appoint Cultural Attachés.

7. On the question of Anglo-Saudi relations, Dr. Damluji had two talks alone with King Saud, and I have reported the result of these in my telegram No. 1527 of the 12th of December. I am confident that Dr. Damluji reports very faithfully what King Saud says on this subject and anything we wish conveyed to King Saud. The channel remains open and is available should you wish to make use of it in the future. It is greatly in Iraq's interest to improve relations between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, both because of the implications which this can have for the development of the Arab States in the Persian Gulf, notably Kuwait, and for its larger advantages in the Middle East as a whole.

8. The visit was therefore chiefly significant as maintaining and developing the goodwill of each country for the other rather than for the concrete decisions reached, and as a step in consolidating the feelings of confidence between the two Royal Houses. Despite his growing bitterness against the Egyptian and Syrian régimes, King Saud appears still to wish to maintain his position somewhat *au dessus de la mêlée* and to keep his lines out to all the Arab countries. That this ought to bring benefits in the long run is undeniable and I do not think that we should take too tragically the absence of further concrete actions on the part of King Saud of commitment towards Iraq and Jordan. King Saud was able to be helpful in the recent Syrian-Turkish dispute before the United Nations; he has given full assurances of his support to King Hussain and has placed the Saudi Brigade in Jordan under the King's orders; he will undoubtedly do his best to prevent the spread of Communism in his own country. Considering the antiquated nature of his governmental machine and of his régime, he naturally feels extremely vulnerable to Egyptian propaganda and his refusal to commit himself more completely in public seems understandable.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Beirut, Amman, Bahrain, Ankara, Tehran and the Political Office with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

VQ 1015/2

No. 17

THE GOVERNMENT OF ABDUL WAHAB MURJAN

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received December 31)

(No. 303. Confidential) *Baghdad.*
Sir, *December 28, 1957.*

In confirmation of my telegrams Nos. 1543 and 1544, I have the honour to report that, on the resignation on the 14th of December of Senator Ali Jaudat al Ayoubbi, Sayid Abdul Wahab Murjan was asked by the King to form a Government. This request was accepted by Abdul Wahab Murjan who immediately submitted his list of Ministers and the new Iraqi Cabinet was announced on the morning of the 15th of December. This list is enclosed.

2. The new Cabinet is essentially a Cabinet of Nuri's supporters without Nuri. Abdul Wahab Murjan himself, who had been President of the Chamber of Deputies during the last Nuri Government and Minister of Communications and Works until the last few days of the Ali Jaudat Government, has for long been a supporter of Nuri and has recently been regarded by him, as well as by the Palace, as the man most likely to be the chief Shia personality in politics following the death of Saleh Jabr. He is a rich landowner from Hilla, where his family have made many benefactions, and he is essentially a conservative and moderate in politics. He is somewhat lacking in personality, and it may be doubted how far he has it in him to become a strong future leader in Iraq, but with the support of Nuri and of the Palace he can be expected to receive the support of the majority of the Chamber. Meanwhile, it is to be applauded that the Palace should have looked to the younger generation in choosing the Prime Minister instead of reverting once again to the old faithfuls such as Taufiq Suwaidi or Jamil Madfai. The man who is most likely to have felt that he was passed over on this occasion is Dr. Fadhil Jamali who also aspires to the leadership of the Shias.

3. If the new Prime Minister himself is included, no less than eight members of the new Government were Ministers in Ali Jaudat's outgoing Government. The most striking omissions, apart from Ali Jaudat himself, were Ahmad Mukhtar Baban and Ali Mumtaz al Daftari. The omission of

the former does not indicate any reduction in his influence. He is essentially a Palace man, he is thought to prefer working behind the scenes rather than as a Minister, and he will no doubt continue to play the part of go-between in the relations of the Palace with the political world. He probably had a considerable influence in the selection of the new Government. Jamil al Urfali, the new Minister of Agriculture, is a protégé of his, and he is likely to have played a part in keeping Said Qazzaz out of office. The disappearance of Ali Mumtaz is perhaps more significant. He is essentially a financier, who has worked his way up through all levels of the Ministry of Finance. On the other hand, he does not appear to have proved very effective in the public aspects of a Minister's duties, for he is no speaker nor a very imposing personality, and appears to have found it difficult to introduce order into the preparation of the budget for next year. He has been regarded in the past as a possible future Prime Minister, but his experience in the Ali Jaudat Government has not strengthened his claims. The immediate cause of his not being appointed was probably that he supported Ali Jaudat in seeking the King's approval to hold elections now, the issue on which Ali Jaudat resigned.

4. One of the features of the change of Government was the removal from office of some of the more elderly members of the Ali Jaudat Cabinet, and this effect has been increased by the choice of those who now come into office. Of the Ministers who now come into office, only Senator Saleh Saib al Jubhuri, Minister of Development and formerly Minister of Communications and Works in Nuri's Government is nearing 60. The others, including Burhanuddin Bashayan who was Nuri's Foreign Minister, are much younger, and the new Minister of Economics, Mohammad Mohsin al Hardan, is under 40. This introduction of younger men, coupled with the leadership of a more youthful Prime Minister, is an interesting sign of the times, although too much should not be read into it. The new Government is on the whole composed of honest men, anxious to prove their ability, and will not, it may be hoped, prove to be

lacking in a certain degree of determination. On present indications it will wish to carry out the general policy desired by the Palace and will also be strongly influenced by Nuri.

5. In internal matters the new Government is likely to wish to show itself progressive and constructive with the emphasis on improving the conditions of living of the people, especially in the Liwas and in rural districts, but always within the limits imposed by its own moderate character and by the strong conservative elements in the Chamber of Deputies. It can do a good deal in this field by administrative action, by improving the execution of laws already passed, and by influencing the decisions of the Development Board. But far more than existing legislation is required. Parliament in Iraq normally sits only from December to June. While it is possible with great determination and energy to initiate, draft and secure the passage through Parliament of entirely new measures during the winter months, the bulk of the legislation passed usually consists of measures under preparation by previous Governments and worked upon by officials during the summer and autumn, which are then debated, perhaps amended, and steered through both Houses before Parliament adjourns for the summer. In the present case, the new Government has within its first few days of parliamentary activity secured the final passage of the Labour Law inherited from previous Nuri Governments, and a Social Services Council Law for setting up a Central Council for Rural Affairs under the Ministry for Social Affairs, prepared by the Ali Jaudat Government. It is confidently expected that it will pass the law to authorise the charging of landlords for improvements resulting from Development Board expenditure, prepared by the Ali Jaudat Government. A greater test will be its willingness and ability to pass the Land Tax Law prepared by Nuri's last Government with Khalil Kenna (now Speaker of the House) and Nuri himself as the prime movers. This law would be the first real attempt to tackle the problem of the maintenance of excessive and often uncultivated land in the hands of big proprietors, and would bring in fresh revenue to the State estimated at between five and six million dinars annually. (It is noteworthy that the State at present only receives about three million dinars annually from income tax.) Nuri has assured me that he will back this measure and the Minister of Finance has confirmed the intention of the

Government to press it. It is too early to predict whether the new Government will attempt both to initiate and to put through any substantial and completely new legislation. But if it secures the passage of the measures mentioned and is willing to give impulsion to the better execution of certain legislation already passed, including the Amara Land Law for distributing Government-owned land in equal measure to existing tribal leaders and to fellaheen, it will perform reasonably well. To do this it will require the support of Nuri and of his powerful adherents at present out of office. In progressive internal measures it is virtually assured of the support of Dr. Jamali and his friends, who are not without influence.

6. In the field of foreign affairs, the Government is expected to follow, and, indeed, to wish to follow, the general line desired by the Palace, by Nuri and by Dr. Jamali, which includes support for the Baghdad Pact and an anti-Communist line in general. It is, however, not without significance that, in the first debate in the Chamber after the Government was formed, the Prime Minister in reply to a question felt obliged to say that, in the event of a clash between the Government's duties to Arab countries and to its Pact allies, it was the policy of the Government that the former would come first. However, the Government will be under pressure to take a firmer attitude than Ali Jaudat, even if it cannot be expected to display the strength of Nuri himself. It will, of course, be subject, as are all Governments of Iraq, to Pan-Arab influences. How far it will feel inclined or obliged to pay increasing attention to Pan-Arab sentiments among the people and the rising middle class remains to be seen. The opportunity given for the practical expression of these sentiments is of course restricted in Iraq by the conviction held by the Palace and by many of the more responsible politicians, and in varying degrees by the tribal leaders and elements in the commercial community, that the Egyptian revolution is not intended to be for domestic consumption only but to be followed by a similar form of revolution in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and ultimately Saudi Arabia. The hope that this second set of considerations will prevail is likely to turn partly on the degree and the speed at which the Government and the Development Board, by progressive legislation and administration, can spread the benefits of the oil revenues into improvement of the

life of the people, and can maintain, through firmness by the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior, law, order and stability while this process is being pushed forward. But the administrative apparatus of the country is not such as to be capable of producing quick results over a wide field, and it is in many respects a race against

time. The outcome must remain a question mark.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Amman, Beirut, Bahrain, Ankara, Tehran, Karachi, Washington and POMEF.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

Enclosure

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Abdul Hamid Kadhim (10).

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Arkan Abadi (44).

Economy

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Health

Mahmud Baban (85).

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APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

VQ 1902/1

No. 18

IRAQ: HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS

Mr. Beaumont to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received August 27)

(No. 220. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
Sir, *August 20, 1957.*

With reference to Mr. Hooper's despatch No. 199 (1903/3/56) of the 24th of July, 1956, I have the honour to transmit herewith an annual report upon the Heads of Foreign Missions at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

R. A. BEAUMONT.

Enclosure

Afghanistan

Lieutenant-General Mohamed Qasim Sharif, Minister (July 3, 1956).

Lieutenant-General Mohamed Qasim Sharif was born about 1902 and commissioned in the Afghan army in 1920. He was Director of Military Intelligence about 1935. In 1944 he became Governor and Commander of the garrison of the Southern Vilayat of Afghanistan, subsequently Commandant of the Military College, and in 1950 Chief of the General Staff. He relinquished his appointment for reasons of health and later retired from the army. This is his first diplomatic appointment.

He is a quiet and modest figure, is very friendly, speaks a little English and hopes to learn more. He has an amiable wife and daughter.

Belgium

M. Fredegond Cogels, Minister (October 27, 1955).

*M. Cogels was previously Counsellor in Rome. Solid, pleasant and with a true Belgian appreciation of the good things in life, he and his wife find little to occupy or amuse them in Bagdad. (Written in 1956.)

China (Nationalist)

M. Chen Chih Ping, Ambassador (October 10, 1956).

The Nationalist Chinese Legation became an Embassy in 1956 and M. Chen is the first Chinese Ambassador to Iraq. He is married and speaks English. We are not of course in diplomatic relations.

Denmark

M. Christian D. Holten Eggert, Minister (May 9, 1956).

M. Eggert resides in Cairo. In May 1957 the Legation here was taken in charge by M. Frederik de Jonquieres, a career diplomat with service at Berne and Rome, a friendly and civilised colleague whose wife will join him in autumn 1957. He speaks excellent English.

Egypt

Sayid Taufiq Ismail Qatamish, who had been Ambassador here since April 18, 1954, left Bagdad on December 30, 1956, under somewhat strange circumstances. The Embassy has since been run by *Chargés d'Affaires*, the present one being Sayid Abdel Zader Khalil.

France

The Iraq Government severed diplomatic relations with France on November 9, 1956.

Germany (Federal Republic)

Dr. Wilhelm Melchers, who had been Head of Mission here since 1953, becoming Ambassador on November 4, 1956, was transferred to New Delhi in May 1957. His Counsellor, Dr. Robert von Foerster, is *Chargé d'Affaires ad interim*.

Holy See

Mgr. Armand Etienne Blanquet du Chayla, Apostolic Delegate (November 20, 1948).

*Mgr. de Chayla, Latin Archbishop of Bagdad, a Frenchman and a member of the Carmelite Order, was appointed Apostolic Delegate in 1948. He is a cousin of the French Ambassador in Cairo (written in 1955), and a descendant of the French Admiral defeated by Nelson at the Battle of the Nile.

*A courtly and cultivated figure whom it is a pleasure to meet and who gives the impression of a Cardinal *manqué*. He is outspokenly tired of this country and frankly critical of the shortcomings of its people. Aristocratic and fastidious, he has not taken kindly to Iraq. His health is indifferent.

His diplomatic status has been under discussion with the Iraq Government for many years but has not yet been recognised. (Written in 1955.)

Indonesia

Haj Mansur Daud Datuk Palimo Kajo, Minister (November 25, 1956).

His predecessor having resided in Tehran, Haj Mansur is the first resident Indonesian Minister at Bagdad.

Born in 1909, Haj Mansur received a religious education and became a teacher at religious schools. He was arrested in 1937 and sentenced to a year's imprisonment for political activity, and during the Second World War took part in resistance to the Japanese. President of the Sumatra branch of the Moslem *Ma'jumi*, he was elected a Deputy in 1955. Haj Mansur set out again upon the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1957. Our relations are friendly but tenuous.

Iran

Major-General Nadir Batmanglidj, Ambassador (February 24, 1957).

General Batmanglidj was born in Tehran in 1903 of simple parentage, studied at the Military School from 1919, visited Switzerland, Germany and the United States to purchase arms, and became Chief

of Staff of the Second Armoured Division in 1941. He was interned by the Allies between 1942 and 1945. Having retired from the army he rejoined in 1946 in the rank of Colonel, participated in the reoccupation of Azerbaijan in that year and was appointed Military Governor of Tabriz. He was briefly imprisoned by Dr. Mossadeq. After the downfall of Dr. Mossadeq he was appointed Chief of the General Staff in August 1953, a position which he held until August 1955, when he was appointed Ambassador to Pakistan.

Honest, sincere and extremely friendly, apparently genuinely convinced of the importance of co-operation with the United Kingdom, General Batmanghlij is a hard-working colleague in the Council of Deputies of the Bagdad Pact and does his best to play a helpful role. Unfortunately, he has no head for detail and is inclined to plunge into business like a bull at a gate, but is well-intentioned and his direct approach to problems and soldierly keenness to get things done make him a refreshing personality. I understand that he has political ambitions but that they may remain unsatisfied since in Tehran he is not rated very high for intelligence. His five nephews have been sent to school in the United Kingdom. He speaks English, but not without difficulty. His wife is a well-bred and highly cultivated lady who is also very friendly.

Italy

Michele Lanza, Minister (November 17, 1954).
"M. Lanza served in London as Third Secretary before the war, and during the war in Berlin. Before his appointment to Bagdad he was head of the Trieste Department at his Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

M. Lanza is a Monarchist by sympathy. In younger days a sporting and lively person, he drove a car for a bet from Milan to London in twenty-four hours and fought a duel with a Fascist. He is still an active and vigorous personality. He is friendly and straightforward. His wife is also lively and amusing, enjoying parties. They have a grown-up daughter who was "finished" in the United Kingdom. (Written in 1956.)

Japan

M. Shiro Ishiguro, Minister (November 9, 1956).
Born in 1908, M. Ishiguro graduated from Tokyo University of Commerce in 1931 and entered the Japanese Foreign Service in that year. After service in London and at Shanghai as well as at the Ministry in Tokyo, he became in 1949 Chief of the Special Assets Division of the reparations Agency and later Deputy Chief of the Agency. In 1951 he was appointed to the Japanese Overseas Agency in São Paulo, where he became Consul-General in 1952. From 1954 until his appointment to Bagdad he served in Tokyo in the rank of Counsellor in the Planning Council.

M. Ishiguro is a quiet, earnest and rather dull man. He is friendly and speaks excellent English. He has a charming and more lively wife.

Jordan

Sayid Abdullah al Zuraikat, Chargé d'Affaires (Minister, May 18, 1955).

Sayid Abdullah al Zuraikat has been in charge since 1952, being promoted Minister *sur place* on May 18, 1955. On January 19, 1956, Iraq and Jordan agreed to promote their missions to the status of Embassies, but Sayid Abdullah remained in charge. He is now on the point of transfer. It is reported, but not confirmed, that Amir Abdul Majid Haidar, formerly Jordanian Ambassador in Turkey, has been appointed Ambassador at Bagdad.

Lebanon

Kazim al Solh, Ambassador (November 3, 1953).

"Kazim al Solh is a cousin of the late Riad al Solh, formerly Prime Minister of the Lebanon. Born about 1903, a Sunni Moslem of Beirut, he is a graduate of the Damascus Law School. He started life as a journalist, but his newspaper was suspended by the French. He later organised a small but influential Nationalist (but not anti-British) political party, Nida al Qawmi.

He speaks good French and some English. His wife does not appear in mixed society and spends nearly all her time in Beirut. He himself goes frequently to Beirut for long periods and has political aspirations there. When in Bagdad he moves freely in Iraqi society and has shown considerable political activity in the traditional Lebanese role of mediator. He is not a clever man, but might be pleasant if he were not so tiresomely pompous and *protocolaire*. (Written in 1955.)

Morocco

Si al Haj Fatmi ben Sliman, Ambassador (December 18, 1956).

Haj Fatmi is the first Moroccan Ambassador to be appointed to an Arab country of the Middle East. Born at Fez in 1908, he served in the Customs Administration from 1923 to 1927, as Khalifa of Meknes from 1937 to 1944, and as the Grand Vizier's *Délégué* for Education from 1945 to 1953, and became President of the High Sherceffian Tribunal. Becoming Pasha of Fez in 1946, he is reputed to have made a fortune in that capacity. In October 1955 he was invited by the Council of Guardians of the Throne to form a Government, but resigned, without having done so, upon the Sultan's return. He became Governor of Fez in 1955.

In politics an opportunist, Haj Fatmi is nevertheless a devout Moslem and an engaging personality. He is a close friend of the Sultan. He is very willing to co-operate in the cultivation of close relations between his own country and Iraq and manifests no particular sympathy with extreme Arab nationalism. He speaks excellent French but no English.

Netherlands

Beron E. J. Lewe van Edward, who had been Chargé d'Affaires *en pied* since July 25, 1954, left Bagdad on transfer on August 4, 1957. A successor has not yet been appointed and the Legation remains in the charge of M. F. van Dongen, First Secretary.

Saudi Arabia

Shaikh Ibrahim as-Suwayil, Ambassador (July 2, 1957).

Shaikh Ibrahim was born in 1916 at Anaiza, studied at Cairo University and entered the Saudi Foreign Service. He was First Secretary at Cairo from 1943 to 1952, Counsellor at Beirut from 1952 to 1955 and Acting Under-Secretary in Jedda until his appointment to Bagdad.

Spain

Don José Ricardo Gomez-Acebo y Vasquez, Ambassador (February 19, 1957).

Born in 1894 of a rich and aristocratic family, M. Gomez-Acebo has seen diplomatic service in Vienna, Paris, Buenos Aires, Valparaiso, Quito, San Paulo, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Budapest, Washington and Rabat. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Madrid he was Chief of the Treaty Department and Director of the Department of Relations with the Holy See. According to the Bagdad Press, he holds decorations awarded by the Vatican, Morocco, France, Finland, Italy, Belgium, Bulgaria and

Ecuador, and is a Member of the Order of the British Empire. He has been very unwell in Bagdad and it is doubtful if he will stay long.

M. Gomez-Acebo is married to a Balt.

Sudan

Mr. Jamal Mohamad Ahmad, Ambassador (November 28, 1956).

Born in 1915 in the Northern Sudan, Jamal Mohamad Ahmad was educated at Gordon College in Khartoum (1932-36). He became a teacher and wrote children's stories for a Government publication. From 1944 to 1946 he studied education at Exeter, and after post-graduate studies at Oxford between 1952 and 1955 he became B. Litt. with a thesis on social and political development in the Arab world. Returning to Khartoum he was appointed Students' Warden of the University.

Jamal Mohamad Ahmad is accredited also in Amman, Damascus and Beirut.

He is extremely friendly, intelligent and apparently well disposed, with "New Statesmanlike" views. He has six children.

Switzerland

M. Egbert de Graffenreid, Minister (January 3, 1957).

M. de Graffenreid is accredited also in Beirut, Amman and Damascus and resides in Beirut. The Legation in Bagdad is conducted by M. Giovanni Enrico Bucher, a cheerful and sociable little bachelor, a keen worker, whose last post was in the Political Department in Berne and who has served in India and Pakistan. He speaks excellent English.

Syria

Dr. Haidar Mardam Bey, Minister (April 18, 1954).

Born about 1900 of a leading Damascus family, cousin and brother-in-law of the former Prime Minister Jamil Mardam Bey, Dr. Haidar Mardam studied law in France and became private secretary to King Faisal as King of Syria. He served as an official under the French Mandate, becoming Governor of various Syrian provinces. At the termination of the Mandate he transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, first as Head of Protocol and later as Minister at Jedda and Rome, in which posts he was on good terms with Her Majesty's Ambassadors.

Dr. Haidar Mardam speaks French and a little English. His wife is Christian and his son was educated in the United Kingdom. He is a pleasant colleague, and his sympathies are not with the extreme nationalist régime at present in power in his own country. In spite of the rupture in Anglo-Syrian diplomatic relations he has gone out of his way to show personal friendship towards members of Her Majesty's Embassy.

Turkey

Lieutenant-General Behçet Türkmen, Ambassador (April 3, 1957).

Born at Mitylene in 1899, General Türkmen was commissioned in 1915 and served in the infantry and on the General Staff both in Palestine and against the Greeks at Izmir. After post-war service in

Western Turkey, when he distinguished himself in action against the Kurds, he became Military Attaché at Athens, Moscow and Stockholm. He returned to the Eastern frontier in 1942 as a Staff Officer. From 1944 to 1948 he was Director of Military Intelligence, was appointed a Brigadier-General at Iskenderun in 1950 and Major-General in 1951, and in 1952 became Turkish Assistant Commander at H.A.L.F.S.E.E. at Izmir. From 1953 until 1957, General Türkmen was head of the Turkish Security Service, devoting himself to radical reform and improvement. He is a close associate of the Turkish Prime Minister.

General Türkmen is very friendly towards the Western Powers and proud of his British and American connections in the Security Service. He is a little "touchy" and *protocolaire*, and I doubt if his political horizon is very wide. He is an amiable if obstinate colleague in the Council of the Bagdad Pact. He speaks a little English and rather more French.

United States

Mr. Waldemar J. Gallman, Ambassador (November 3, 1954).

Mr. Gallman was born in 1899 in Wellsville, New York. He graduated B.A. at Cornell University in 1921, spent a year at Georgetown University Law School and joined the State Department in 1922. He served in Cuba, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Latvia and Poland. In 1942 he became Consul in London where he was later promoted to be Counsellor and Minister. He was Ambassador to Poland from 1948 to 1950, spent a year at the United States War College and from there he was appointed Ambassador in South Africa.

He is amiable and equable but rather lacking in drive. He is basically friendly to Britain and he co-operates well in the Council of the Pact, but he is shy and it has been difficult to get on to terms of intimacy with him. He was greatly distressed over the Anglo-French action at Suez, and under his inspiration the American Embassy dissociated themselves from us. But relations are now close and cordial. His wife is agreeably simple, sincere and unaffected. They both take a very friendly interest in people and life in Iraq, but Mrs. Gallman has been recently absent in the United States with her two sons for the better part of a year. Mr. Gallman is a keen tennis player.

Missions Accredited in Iraq without Representatives Resident in Bagdad

The following countries are represented by Ministers residing in the capitals shown:—

Austria (Beirut).
Ethiopia (Cairo).
Greece (Beirut).
Libya (Ankara).
Mexico (Beirut).
Norway (Ankara).
Portugal (Ankara).
Sweden (Tehran).

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

VQ 1012/3

No. 19

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN IRAQ IN 1957

Mr. Beaumont to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received October 14)

(No. 245. Confidential) *Baghdad,*
 Sir, *September 26, 1957.*

With reference to Mr. Hooper's despatch No. 192 of the 7th of September, 1955, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on leading personalities in Iraq in September 1957.

I have, &c.

R. A. BEAUMONT.

Enclosure

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Leading Personalities in Iraq
Royal Family

1. King Faisal II.
2. Abdul Ilah, His Royal Highness the Amir.
3. Zaid, His Royal Highness the Amir.
4. Hussain Ali, Sharif.
5. Hussain Nasir, Sharif.

Other Personalities

1. Abbas Ali Ghalib (Major-General).
2. Abbas Mahdi.
3. Abdul Amir Allawi (Dr.).
4. Abdul Amir al Uzri.
5. Abdul Aziz al Duri (Dr.).
6. Abdul Ghani al Dalli.
7. Abdul Hadi al Chalabi.
8. Abdul Hadi al Dhahir.
9. Abdul Hadi al Pachachi (Dr.).
10. Abdul Hamid Kudhim (Dr.).
11. Abdul Ilah Hafidh (Dr.).
12. Abdul Jabbar al Chalabi.
13. Abdul Jabbar Fahmi, C.B.E.
14. Abdul Jabbar Jommar (Dr.).
15. Abdul Karim Kannuna (Dr.).
16. Abdul Karim al Uzri.
17. Abdul Mahdi (Saiyid).
18. Abdul Majid Abbas (Dr.).
19. Abdul Majid Allawi, C.B.E.
20. Abdul Majid Mahmud.
21. Abdul Majid Qassab.
22. Abdul Muttalib Amin al Hashimi.
23. Abdul Qadir al Gailani.
24. Abdul Raman al Jalili.
25. Abdul Rahman Jaudat.
26. Abdul Rasul al Khalisi.
27. Abdul Razzaq al Dhahir.
28. Abdul Wahhab Mahmud.
29. Abdul Wahhab Murjan.
30. Abdullah Bakr.
31. Abdullah Damloji (Dr.).
32. Abdullah Qassab.
33. Ahmad Adnan Hafidh.
34. Ahmad al Ajil al Yawir (Shaikh).
35. Ahmad Mukhtar Baban.
36. Ahmad al Rawi, K.B.E.
37. Ali Haidar Sulaiman.
38. Ali Jaudat al Ayyubi.
39. Ali Mahmud Shaikh Ali.
40. Ali Mumtaz al Daftari.
41. Ali al Safi (Dr.).
42. Ali al Sharqi.
43. Amin al Mumaiyiz.
44. Arkan Abadi.
45. Arshad al Umari, K.B.E.
46. Ata Amin.
47. Baba Ali Shaikh Mahmud (Shaikh).
48. Bahauddin, Nuri.
49. Burhanuddin Bashayan.
50. Darwish al Haidari.
51. Daud al Haidari.
52. Dhia Ja'far (Dr.).
53. Fadhil Jamili (Dr.).
54. Faiq Samarra.
55. Faisal Damloji.
56. Fakhri Jamil al Fakhri, C.B.E.
57. Fakhri Tabaqchali.
58. Ghazi Muhammad Fadhil al Daghestani, C.V.O. (Major-General).
59. Hafidh al Qadhi.
60. Hashim Jawad.
61. Hussain Makki Khammas.
62. Hassan Sami Tatar.
63. Hassan al Suhail (Shaikh).
64. Hassan al Talabini (Shaikh).
65. Hikmat Sulaiman.
66. Husamaddin Jumaa.
67. Hussain Jamil.
68. Ibrahim Akif al Alusi.
69. Ihsan Rifat.
70. Ismail Safwat.
71. Izzuddin Mulla.
72. Jalal Baban.
73. Jalal Khulid.
74. Jamal Baban.
75. Jamal Umar Nadhmi.
76. Jamil Abdul Wahhab.
77. Jamil Madfai.
78. Jamil al Urfali.
79. Jussem Muhammad Shahr (Colonel).
80. Kadhim Abadi (Brigadier).
81. Kamil al Chadirchi.
82. Khalil Ibrahim.
83. Khalil Jamil (Major-General).
84. Khalil Kanna.
85. Mahmud Baban.
86. Majid Mustafa.
87. Mar Shimon (His Beatitude).
88. Matti Akrawi (Dr.).
89. Muhammad Ali al Chalabi.
90. Muhammad Ali Mahmud.
91. Muhammad Hassan Salman (Dr.).
92. Muhammad Hadid.
93. Muhammad Ja'far al Shabibi.
94. Muhammad Mahdi al Jawahiri.
95. Muhammad Mahdi Kubba.
96. Muhammad Ridha Shabibi (Saiyid).
97. Muhammad Shafiq al 'Ani.

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98. Muhammad Siddiq Shanshal.
99. Muhammad Salim al Radhi.
100. Mulla Mustafa.
101. Muntaz al Umari.
102. Musa Shabandar (Dr.).
103. Mustafa al Umari.
104. Muzahim Amin al Pachachi.
105. Nadhir al Umari.
106. Nadim Shakir al Pachachi (Dr.).
107. Naji al Asil (Dr.).
108. Najib al Rawi.
109. Najib al Rubaii (Major-General).
110. Nasrat al Farisi.
111. Nuri al Qaraghuli.
112. Nuri al Said, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., D.S.O.
113. Nuruddin Mahmud.
114. Rafiq 'Arif al Qaimaqchi, K.B.E. (Major-General).
115. Rashid Ali al Gailani.
116. Rashid Najib.
117. Rauf al Bahrani.
118. Rauf al Chadirchi.
119. Rayid al Atiyah (Haji).
120. Rushdi al Chalabi.
121. Sa'ad Umar.
122. Sabih Muntaz al Daftari.
123. Sadiq al Bassam.
124. Said Qazzaz.
125. Saleh Mahdi Haidar (Dr.).
126. Saleh Saib al Jubhuri.
127. Saleh Zakki Taufiq (Major-General).
128. Sami Fattah.
129. Shakir Maher.
130. Shawkat al Zuhawi (Dr.).
131. Sheet Na'man.
132. Taha al Hashimi.
133. Tahsin Qadri, K.C.V.O., O.B.E.
134. Talib Jamil.
135. Tariq al Askari.
136. Taufiq al Mukhtar.
137. Taufiq al Najib.
138. Taufiq Suwaidi.
139. Taufiq Wahbi Ma'ruf, C.B.E.
140. Umar Nadhmi.
141. Yahya Qassim.
142. Yusuf Abdullah al Gailani (Saiyid).

Obituary (1955 Numbers)

59. Hassib al Rubaii (Major-General).
77. Mahmud I Shaikh Said (Shaikh).
89. Muhammad al Sadr (Saiyid).
107. Rafail Petros Butti.
118. Saleh Jabr, K.B.E.
124. Shakir al Wadi, M.V.O.

The Royal Family

1. King Faisal II

Born in Baghdad on May 2, 1935, only son of King Ghazi and Queen Aliya, a sister of Amir Abdul Ilah (q.v.). He succeeded to the throne on the death of his father on April 3, 1939. During the rebellion of Rashid Ali in May 1941 he and his mother were first confined at Qasr Zuhur on the outskirts of Baghdad but were later removed to Salahuddin near Erbil before the collapse and flight of the rebel Government.

His early education was directed by an English governess who was succeeded by an English tutor in 1946. In 1947 he went to Sandroyd Preparatory School and in 1949 entered Harrow, his father's old school. He remained at Harrow until 1952, returning occasionally to Iraq for the school holidays and in particular on the death of his mother in the autumn of 1950.

After leaving Harrow, visited the United States in August 1952 and thereafter returned to Baghdad. Acceded to the throne on May 2, 1953. King Faisal has paid State Visits to Turkey, the United Kingdom and Spain. He holds the G.C.V.O. and received the Chain of that Order on the occasion of the State Visit in 1956. In 1955 he was given an honorary commission of Air Vice-Marshal in the Royal Air Force.

Since his infancy, King Faisal has suffered from asthma and this has restricted his activities, particularly in a dusty country like Iraq. His health appears, however, to be improving, and he enjoys shooting, water ski-ing, swimming and driving fast cars. His friends and advisers encourage the first three of these sports hoping to distract him from the fourth.

He is intelligent and well-mannered and his accession in 1953 was the occasion of great public manifestations of loyalty and popularity. His popularity has, however, tended to decline since 1953, particularly with the younger generation, who are disappointed in their hopes that a new political and social deal in Iraq would come about as a result of his assumption of office. In fact, however, King Faisal is maturing, albeit slowly. Though still largely in the hands of his uncle the Crown Prince, he is coming more and more to rely on his own judgment and to have his own views. He is clearly determined to rule as a constitutional monarch, though it is questionable whether the circumstances of Iraq will permit this in the long run.

2. Abdul Ilah, His Royal Highness the Amir

Born in the Hejaz in 1912, the only son of the late King Ali, ex-King of the Hejaz. He came to Baghdad with his father in 1926 after Ibn Saud had expelled the latter from the Hejaz. Educated privately and at Victoria College, Alexandria. He became Regent on the death of his cousin, King Ghazi, in April 1939 and remained until the accession of King Faisal II in May 1953.

The first years of his Regency coincided with World War II and the Rashid Ali revolt in Iraq. In January 1941 he fled to Diwaniya to escape threats to his life made by four army officers, later known as the "Golden Square," desirous of prolonging the life of Rashid Ali al-Gailani's Cabinet. He did not return to Baghdad until Rashid Ali had resigned and Taha al Hashimi had succeeded him. On the night of April 1, 1941, the same officers occupied Baghdad and tried to impose Rashid Ali as Prime Minister on the Regent. He was, however, warned in time and took refuge in the American Legation. Thence he was smuggled to Habbaniya on April 2 and flown to Basra in the hope of rallying support. However, the Officer Commanding, Iraqi Army, at Basra, attempted to arrest him and he took refuge in one of His Majesty's ships. On April 16 he was flown to Jerusalem together with Ali Jaudat (q.v.) and Jamil Madfal (q.v.), who had joined him at Basra. He remained in Palestine until the Rashid Ali revolt was crushed in May.

In November 1943 he was declared heir presumptive to the throne by an amendment to the Organic Law.

In 1947 he took part with Nuri Pasha (q.v.) in discussions with the Foreign Office in London about the Iraq Government's desire to replace the 1930 Treaty. He was therefore to some extent committed personally to the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty and was placed in an embarrassing position by the popular outburst against it in January 1948, which resulted in some loss of credit to himself. In 1948 he took a personal part in the unsuccessful attempts to unify the war effort of the Arab States against Israel and paid a number of visits to the Iraqi Army in Palestine. In January 1957 he visited the United States at the request of the four Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact in the hope of enlisting further

American support for the Pact. On this occasion he met informally King Saud of Saudi Arabia and paved the way for a reconciliation between the two royal families.

Amir Abdul Ilah has paid frequent visits to the United Kingdom. Among these have been an official visit as a guest of King George VI in 1943 and visits for the Victory Parade in May 1945 and for the coronation of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth in June 1953. He accompanied King Faisal II on his State Visit in July 1956. He is perhaps more at home in the company of British people than of Iraqis. He was made an honorary Air Vice-Marshal in the Royal Air Force in 1952 and was appointed G.C.M.G. in 1942, G.C.V.O. with the Royal Victorian Collar in 1943 and G.C.B. in 1956.

He has also visited many other countries, including France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Iran, Turkey and Kuwait.

Amir Abdul Ilah is an intelligent man with an excellent memory. He has a shy charm of manner and his natural judgment is good. He undoubtedly took his duties as Regent seriously and did his best to hand over the monarchy unimpaired in strength and reputation to his nephew, and he has tried to give wise guidance to the latter after his accession. The nature of his relationship with his nephew is complex. Undoubted affection is allied to a strong protective sense of a desire not to let King Faisal be confronted with too many problems and has resulted in his retaining a large measure of political power in his own hands and, as he has no alternative fields for his activity, he remains the dominant force in the Palace despite the steady maturing of King Faisal. His position as senior surviving member of the Hashemite House and the rude experiences which he suffered at the hands of the Iraqi people in 1941 have led him to take actions which have not increased his popularity either in Iraq or elsewhere. He is indeed, although respected by some and feared by others, an unpopular figure in the country as a whole. His intervention in the affairs of Jordan after the assassination of King Abdullah and the illness of King Talal were thoroughly ill-conceived. Likewise his desire to retain a measure of patronage in his own hands and not to give complete confidence to any Prime Minister or politician has made the lot of Iraqi Prime Ministers very difficult. This has been particularly the case with Nuri al-Said (q.v.), though others have not escaped it.

Amir Abdul Ilah has been thrice married. In 1936 to the daughter of Salahaddin Fawzi of Cairo, whom he divorced in 1940; in 1948 to Miss Faiza Tarabulsi, also an Egyptian, whom he divorced in 1950, and in 1956 to a daughter of Mohammed Amir al Rabia. He has no progeny and according to rumour is unlikely to have any. His private life and certain business transactions have from time to time been the subject of unfavourable comment.

3. Zaid, His Royal Highness the Amir

Born at Istanbul 1900, he is the youngest son of the late King Hussein of the Hejaz and a half brother to the late Kings Ali of Hejaz and Faisal I of Iraq, and to King Abdullah of Jordan. His mother was a Turk.

He was educated at Istanbul. He served with the Sharifian forces during the first world war and won the good opinion of British officers. He was appointed an Honorary G.B.E. for his services.

He came to Iraq in 1922 and was commissioned in the Iraq cavalry. He acted as Regent for a short time during King Faisal's absence in 1924. From 1925 to 1928 he studied agriculture at Oxford and from 1928 to 1931 he lived in Cyprus where his father had retired after being driven from the Hejaz by Ibn Saud.

After the death of King Hussein in 1931 the Amir Zaid was appointed Iraqi Minister at Ankara in

January 1932. He was transferred to Cairo in 1934, owing to the scandal caused by the marriage of his sister to Ata Amin (q.v.), but he refused to accept this appointment. At the end of 1934 he was engaged in litigation in Athens about properties which he claimed to have inherited in Greece. He was appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935. In 1937 he was recalled for enquiries into allegations that he had used his position to give false certificates for arms destined for Spain. He survived the enquiry and returned to Berlin. He was withdrawn from Berlin in the spring of 1938 and remained in Iraq until the summer of 1939 when he went to live at Istanbul.

In 1933 he had married a Turkish lady who had been divorced by her previous husband. This *mésalliance* was the main reason for his not being made Regent on the death of King Ghazi in 1939.

During World War II he remained for the most part in Turkey though he came occasionally to Iraq to act as Regent in the absence of Amir Abdul Ilah (q.v.). In 1946 he was appointed first Iraqi Ambassador in London and has remained there ever since, making almost annual summer visits to Baghdad to act as Regent in King Faisal's absence. He was awarded the G.C.V.O. on the occasion of King Faisal's State Visit to London in 1956.

The Amir Zaid is a friendly and well-mannered man. He is a shrewd observer who takes a detached and cynical view of Iraqi and Arab politics. He speaks English and Turkish in addition to Arabic. His wife has had some success as an artist, having held exhibitions of her paintings in London and in Paris, but she is seldom seen in Iraq. They have one son, Raad, born about 1938, who was educated at Victoria College, Alexandria, and is now at Cambridge. She has a daughter in Turkey by an earlier marriage.

4. Hussain Ali, Sherif

Born about 1920, a member of the Egyptian branch of the Hashemite family. Is married to Princess Badia, sister of Amir Abdul Ilah, and the father of three small boys. A pleasant if not very intelligent man who has family and property in Egypt. He plays little political role in Iraq.

5. Hussein Nasir, Sharif

A cousin of the King and of the Regent, with the style of "Highness."

He was educated in Istanbul during the 1914-18 war. From 1935 to 1938 he was attached to the Iraqi Legation at Ankara and later held an appointment in the Royal Palace at Baghdad. Iraqi Consul in Jerusalem from 1946 to 1948.

He is married to a daughter of King Abdullah of Jordan, whose service he entered in 1948. He was appointed Jordan Minister at Ankara in December 1948.

A good humoured, genial and friendly man without much ability or personality.

He is little seen in Iraq.

Other Personalities

1. Abbas Ali Ghalib

Sunni of Kurdish origin. Born in Baghdad 1908. Was a cadet at the Royal Military College, Baghdad, and the Royal Military College, Woolwich. After graduating became a Royal Artillery officer. He passed the Staff Colleges at Baghdad and Quetta. Was senior Iraqi Liaison Officer in Palestine in 1948. Has been Director of General Staff in the Ministry of Defence, promoted and given command of the 1st Division, 1953, and promoted major-general, 1954. Transferred as Director-General of Police in 1956.

A capable and ambitious officer with a pleasant manner and speaking English well. Sympathetically

inclined to the West and a supporter of the 1948 Portsmouth Treaty. He accompanied the Chief of the General Staff to the United States in 1954 after Iraqi acceptance of American aid. After an initial period finding his feet in the police appears to have settled down to be a competent Director-General. His wife goes out but rarely.

2. Abbas Mahdi

Shia. Born 1898. Served in the Head Post Office, the Iraqi Legation at Tehran and the Ministry of Education. Minister of Education, 1932-33. Minister of Economics and Communications in Jamil Madafai's Cabinet in 1934. Director-General of Tapu, 1934. Master of Ceremonies at the Palace, 1937. Minister of Economics and Communications, 1937-38, in the Cabinets of Hikmat Sulaiman and Jamil Madafai. Appointed Principal Private Secretary at the Royal Palace in July 1941.

Minister at Tehran, 1943-45. Appointed first Iraqi Minister in Moscow in 1945. Was made Senator in 1949, after his return from Moscow. He played a prominent part in opposing the policy of Nuri al Said's Government in the Senate in 1951 and again in 1952.

He is now a spent force politically, but enjoys a certain amount of patronage which has led to his being made a member of the Iraqi Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly on several occasions. He is friendly to the United Kingdom and speaks English. His younger brother, Saleh Mahdi, is a member of the Iraqi Foreign Service and at present Counsellor in Washington. His wife does not appear in society.

3. Abdul Amir Allawi, Dr.

Shia. Born 1911. Graduate of the Baghdad Medical College and was for many years at Great Ormond Street Children's Hospital. Entered the Medical Service of the Iraq Government in 1933 and was appointed Director of the Child Welfare Hospital in 1947.

Although he has taken no part in politics he was Minister of Health in Jamali's Government in September 1953, in Nuri's Government from December 1955 to June 1957, and again in Ali Jaudat's Government since June 1957. Elected as Deputy for Muntaliq in September 1954. A close friend of Sayid Abdul Mahdi and married to a daughter of Abdul Hadi al Chalabi, and it is largely due to this that he has been a Minister so often. Dr. Allawi is a very good children's doctor, a pleasant though opinionated man, and speaks excellent English. His wife, who appears in society, speaks a little English.

4. Abdul Amir al Uzri

Born 1899 at Kadhmain of the well-known Shia landowning family. Brother of Abdul Karim al Uzri (q.v.). Educated Baghdad and United States. D.Sc. Michigan University. Appointed engineer in Directorate-General of Irrigation, 1929, and rose to Assistant Director-General in 1941.

Minister of Communications and Works in Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet of 1944. Minister of Supply for a month in August 1944 and then returned to Communications and Works. Appointed Director-General of Irrigation, 1946. He resigned this post in November 1950 on being appointed a member of the Development Board. Resigned from the Board in December 1952. Appointed Ambassador to Tehran, July 1956. A rather weak personality, incompetent, unreliable, and said to be corrupt.

His wife speaks no English.

5. Abdul Aziz al Duri (Dr.)

Sunni. Born 1908. Joined Government service in 1943 as assistant professor at the Higher Teachers'

Training College in Baghdad. Appointed Director at Headquarters of the Ministry of Education in 1949 and returned to the H.T.T.C. as professor in 1950. He became Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences in March 1951. Visiting professor at London University in 1956.

By profession an Arab historian, he is internationally respected as a sound scholar. A mild, shy and intellectual personality, he is little interested in administration or apparently in politics. He speaks English fluently. His wife, who also speaks English, rarely appears in public.

6. Abdul Ghani al Dalli

Shia of Suq al Shuyukh. Born about 1920. Educated at Nasriyah, Baghdad Law College and the London School of Economics (1945). Became a teacher at the Baghdad Law College in 1946 and in the same year was appointed by Saleh Jabr Assistant Master of Royal Ceremonies in the Palace. Became director-general of the Industrial Bank in September 1947, in which post he proved himself to be a competent official. Assistant Director-General of Finance, September 1952. Visited Canada with Darwish al Haidari to buy wheat for the Iraq Government in the winter of 1952. Elected Deputy for Suq al Shuyukh, January 1953. In September 1953 was appointed Minister of Agriculture in Dr. Jamali's Government. Served in the same capacity in Dr. Jamali's second Government and the Cabinet formed by Arshad al Umari in April 1954, but resigned after a quarrel with Arshad in June 1954. In March 1954 he accompanied King Faisal on State Visit to Pakistan. June and September 1954 re-elected for Suq al Shuyukh. Appointed Ambassador to Morocco and Tunis in July 1956.

A founder member of the Ba'ath Club in 1949. Intelligent and, though critical of some aspects of Western policy, a believer in co-operation with the West. As a Minister appears to have been conscientious and hardworking, if a little pompous. He speaks excellent English and his wife, whom he married in 1950, also speaks a little.

7. Abdul Hadi al Chalabi

Shia of Kadhmain. Born Baghdad 1895, the son of a wealthy landowner.

Deputy for Baghdad, 1934 and again in 1935. Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet of Arshad al Umari, 1946. Appointed Senator in June 1947 and elected First Vice-President of the Senate in February 1950, 1951 and January 1953. Re-elected First Vice-President of the Senate December 1953 and November 1954. Visited Turkey with Iraqi Parliamentary delegation in April 1955.

His principal interest is in business and in pursuance of it he supported at different times both Saleh Jabr and Nuri al Said, and has been used by the latter as an intermediary with the Shia community, particularly the religious dignitaries of Kadhmain. He is also on good terms with the Crown Prince, who has used him to further his designs on Syria, and this has strengthened his position with successive Prime Ministers, who have been careful to keep on good terms with him and to appoint members of his family to their Governments. He has not failed to profit by this, manipulating the grain market and particularly the export market, through his political contacts. His business record shows that he is unscrupulous and will not hesitate to evade his obligations if it suits him.

He is good company in Arabic and Persian, but speaks very little English, though he visits London annually. He is a philanthropist and has subscribed generously to Iraqi charities, and has built a hospital at his own expense at Kadhmain. His wife appears in public.

8. Abdul Hadi al Dhahir

Baghdad Shia, born about 1900, whose wealth derives mainly from property in the city of Baghdad. Interested in politics, but too rich to need to work, he twice entered Government service and twice resigned after two or three years. He has often been a Deputy and has intermittently practised as a lawyer. As Mutasarrif of Hilla from 1943 to 1944 he showed himself an experienced and honest but lazy administrator.

He has a clear mind, but though by nature affable and moderate, he has in recent years been under the influence of his more energetic and fanatical younger brother Abdul Razzaq (q.v.).

He was Minister of Economics in Tawfiq Suwaidi's Cabinet in 1946 and is a bitter opponent of Nuri al Said and Saleh Jabr. He was a founder member of the United Popular Front and was elected to the Front's Political Committee in June 1951. Member of the Court of Cassation, April 1953.

His wife does not appear in society.

9. Abdul Hadi al Pachachi (Dr.)

Sunni. Born in 1894. Son of a former Rais Belidiya of Baghdad and cousin of Muzahim al Pachachi (q.v.). Educated in Baghdad and Istanbul, he qualified as a doctor in France and entered Government service in 1933 as director of the Isolation Hospital.

He was Minister of Social Affairs in Arshad al Umari's Cabinet from June to November 1946, was appointed Mayor of Baghdad in 1948, and Director-General in the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1949. He has represented Iraq at the International Labour Organisation Conferences from 1951. Appointed Minister of Health under Arshad al Umari, April 1954, but returned to his post as Director-General, Ministry of Social Affairs, in order to attend the I.L.O. Conference in Geneva in June. He still holds this appointment.

Fat, genial and lazy but, nevertheless, accounted to be of some ability, he does not play a prominent part in politics. He is married to a White Russian wife and speaks fluent French and some English.

10. Abdul Hamid Kadhim (Dr.)

Born 1910. Shia. Joined Government service in 1930 on the educational side. Assistant professor at the Higher Teachers' Training College, 1941, and Dean of that college, 1950. Seconded to UNESCO on Cairo for one year, September 1952. Appointed Director-General of Education, 1953. Minister of Education in the Government of Arshad al Umari (q.v.), 1954. Member of Iraqi Delegation to Bandung Conference, 1955. Reappointed Director-General of Education, 1956. Minister of Education in Ali Jaudat's Government, June 1957.

As Dean of the Higher Teachers' Training College he was most successful. His views on education are clear, decisive and progressive, but he has never been able to carry them out either because as Director-General his initiative has been cramped by his Ministers, or because his spells as Minister himself have been too short. He has visited the United Kingdom as the guest of the British Council, is a member of the British Institute Club Committee and is well disposed. He is a liberal in politics and a believer in academic freedom, and for this reason is critical of the authoritarian type of Government which is generally in power in Iraq. He has perhaps a slight inferiority complex towards his colleagues in the Government as a result of his humble origins, but experience may give him greater self-confidence, in which case he might play a useful role in educational affairs.

11. Abdul Ilah Hafidh (Dr.)

Born about 1897 in Mosul. Son of Mohammed Ali Fadhl who was for some time a Senator. Educated in Paris where he qualified as a dentist but also took a degree in political science. On his return to Baghdad he practised as a dentist.

Deputy for Mosul in 1926 and again in 1935. In 1935 and again from 1938 to 1940 he held foreign service appointments at Paris, Beirut and Bombay. In 1936 he was Director-General of Commerce and in 1941 Director-General of Revenue.

Held a number of ministerial appointments from 1942 onwards under Nuri al Said. Arshad al Umari and Saleh Jabr. Appointed first Governor of the National Bank in 1949 and reappointed for a further term of three years in 1952 and again in 1955. In July 1953 was a member of Iraqi Economic Delegation to United Kingdom.

Fat, with a passion for growing roses, he is friendly and co-operative, but not energetic. Has little knowledge of banking and is inclined to play for safety. He speaks French and English.

When he came to his present job he had little knowledge of banking, but as a result of the experience he has gained is now much less of a fool than his enemies allege; but he is inclined to play safe. He speaks French and English. His wife speaks good English.

12. Abdul Jabbar al Chalabi

Baghdad Shia, born about 1906. Graduated in agriculture at the University of California and in education at Colombia Teachers' College. He served first in the Ministry of Education, in which he became Director of Primary Education (and Acting Director-General) in 1943 and Chief Inspector in 1946. He left Education in 1946 to become Minister of Supply in Tawfiq Suwaidi's Cabinet. When this Cabinet resigned he was appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Communications and Works. He has also been a member of Iraqi delegations to the San Francisco and other conferences. Minister of Agriculture, July 1952. Member of the Development Board, December 1952.

He is a sincere nationalist but broad-minded and reasonable with a keen sense of humour. He is convinced of the need of Western assistance for Iraq, and is highly respected by his many British friends, who can always rely on his co-operation. Is an active member of the committee of the British Institute Club. He remains the most efficient and intelligent Iraqi member of the Development Board, where he co-operates well with the British and United States members in trying to secure orderly and efficient administration, and in opposing the intrigues of Abdul Rahman al Jalili (q.v.). One of Iraq's few honest and competent officials, he has no illusions about his countrymen and is subject to fits of depression. He drinks fairly heavily and is inclined to be lazy. He speaks English very well. His wife, who speaks some English, appears in public. She is a sister of Abdul Hadi al Chalabi (q.v.).

13. Abdul Jabbar Rahmi, C.B.E.

Born 1905. Joined the Police in 1922 and rose fairly rapidly. Was Director of Police, Mosul, 1948, and Commandant of Police in Baghdad Liwa in 1952.

In 1953 appointed Mutasarrif of Baghdad and was active in this post during the severe flooding in 1954. Speaks fair English and returned from a visit to the United Kingdom in 1954 with favourable impressions of the relative efficiency of British administration and has made several visits to the United Kingdom to study particular aspects of it. As a result he has been active in promoting similar schemes, e.g., school meals, courses for the handicapped, night classes, &c., in Baghdad. He has also organised agricultural and industrial exhibitions in Baghdad, partly, it is

thought, in the interest of advertising himself as well as Iraq's products. He is politically a trimmer, but inclines to Nuri Pasha's Party, being related by marriage to Mohammed Ali Mahmud (q.v.). He was an efficient policeman and is a good Mutasarrif. Helpful but, unlike many of his countrymen, discreet. His reputation has been tainted by rumours of corruption but he narrowly escaped the axe of the Purge Committee in 1956-57.

Awarded a C.B.E. in 1955 for his help in the arrangements for the British Trade Fair held in Baghdad in 1954.

His wife, who also speaks good English, is a school-teacher and a charming and intelligent woman.

14. Abdul Jabbar Jomard (Dr.)

Born about 1907 in Mosul. A journalist and newspaper owner. Deputy for Mosul 1948, he resigned with other members of the Opposition in 1950.

Elected again in January 1953 as a member of the United Popular Front but resigned from the U.P.F. in October 1953 as he disagreed with the policy permitting members to serve in the Cabinet of Dr. Jamali—he himself was not invited to join it. In 1954 he was elected again for Mosul but as a member of the National Front. An effective speaker, Dr. Jomard was one of the main personalities of the Opposition. However, since the return to office of Nuri Pasha in 1954 little has been heard of him or other Opposition personalities. He does not speak English, but studied in France.

15. Abdul Karim Kannuna (Dr.)

Born 1913 of a Sunni mother and a Shia father. Studied in Germany, travelling also in France and Algeria, where he got into trouble with the French authorities. Joined Government service in 1931, appointed Inspector-General of Finance in 1951, Director-General of Income Tax in 1952, Accountant-General in 1953 and acting Director-General of Income Tax in 1955. A member of the Government Oil Refineries Administration Board since 1952. Appointed Director-General of the Estate Bank in September 1957.

An able accountant, he has risen steadily through hard work (he claims to have taken no leave for 15 years), and through cultivating useful friends. Friendly to the British, he resembles one of the nicer characters in the "Wind in the Willows." He speaks excellent English, German and some French. His wife also talks well.

16. Abdul Karim al Uzri

Kadhimain Shia, born in 1908; brother of Abdul Amir al Uzri (q.v.). Educated in Bagdad and at the London School of Economics, he has held a number of Government appointments. Secretary to the Ministry of Education, 1932. Assistant Secretary at the Royal Palace, 1934. Master of Ceremonies at the Royal Palace, 1936. Acting Director-General of Revenues, 1937. Director of Commerce, 1938. Resigned 1938. Director-General of Economics from 1939 until he resigned again in 1942 after being involved in a financial scandal.

Minister of Finance under Taufiq Suwaidi in February 1950, and under Dr. Jamali in September 1953. In March 1954 was Minister of Development in Dr. Jamali's second Cabinet but resigned in April.

Elected Deputy in 1943, 1950 and again in March 1954, he has represented Baghdad (Karadat) in double harness with Nadim al Pachachi (q.v.) since June 1954. He joined the National Democratic Party on its foundation in 1946, but resigned about a year later. A member of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce and of the Board of the National Bank, he has a profitable estate near Kadhimain and interests in a cement factory. He married into the large Rifa'i family of Najaf.

As a nationalist, he is highly critical of many aspects of British policy in Iraq and the Middle East generally; but he is Western in outlook, realises the value for Iraq of the British connection, and is friendly and co-operative. He was an able Minister of Finance and was chiefly responsible for the passage through Parliament of the law establishing the Development Board. He has supported Saleh Jabr in the past but is not at present on very good terms with him. He is anathema to Nuri Said, who regards him as the worst kind of Western-educated Iraqi youth and a trouble maker. The dislike is reciprocated and is really a contrast of two generations as well as of two creeds. Abdul Karim is a Socialist in outlook and it can be held to his credit that he resigned from Dr. Jamali's Cabinet because the reforms which he outlined as Minister of Finance were being obstructed. Not many Iraqi Ministers have done this. He speaks English well and his wife a little.

17. Abdul Mahdi (Saiyid)

Shia from the lower Gharraf (Muntafiq). Born about 1894 of an influential family and owns a large estate.

Deputy in the Turkish Parliament and in most Iraqi Parliaments from 1927 onwards. He was a supporter of the late Yasin Pasha al Hashemi.

Minister of Education under Rashid Ali in 1933. Minister of Economics in the Governments of Taha al Hashimi and Nuri Said in 1941 and of Communications and Works under Nuri in 1942. Senator from 1941. Again Minister of Communications and Works under Taufiq Suwaidi in 1950. He was a friend and supporter of Saleh Jabr with whom he founded the Popular Socialist Party. He later led the extreme faction of the party after its splits in 1953 and 1954.

In November 1950 he was accused of the attempted murder of Senator Khaiyun al Ubaid but was released on bail after a week in prison. Although the case against him was subsequently stopped, he bitterly resented what he considered to be a deliberate act of hostility on Nuri's part. He has still not forgiven the insult.

A strong nationalist and fervent Shia, he is uneducated and xenophobic. Sinister in appearance and influence. He speaks no European language.

18. Abdul Majid Abbas (Dr.)

Born in 1910 at Qala'at Sikkar on the Gharraf. Shia of tribal origin. Educated at the Scots College, Safed, Palestine, the Friends' School, Brummana, the American University, Beirut, and Chicago University from 1934 to 1939 (where he studied economics), all at the expense of the Iraq Government. Professor at the Baghdad Law College from 1940 to 1949. Deputy for Amara in 1947 and for the Muntafiq in 1948. Joined Nuri Pasha's Constitutional Union Party in 1949 and was for some time editor of the party newspaper. He submitted his resignation from the party in May 1951, but Nuri Pasha refused to accept it. Served with the Iraqi Delegation to United Nations in December 1950 and September 1951. Again elected as Deputy for the Muntafiq in January 1953 and served as Minister of Communications and Works in both Dr. Jamali's Cabinets. Re-elected for the Muntafiq in June 1954 and appointed Minister of Agriculture by Arshad al Unari. This appointment led to a dispute with the Central Committee of the Constitutional Union Party, who felt they should have been consulted before acceptance and considered him as having resigned from the party. In March 1955 was a member of the Iraqi Delegation to the Asian-African Conference at Bandung. In June 1955 was made a member of the Board of the Government Oil Refineries Administration.

A pleasant enough person, but too ingratiating and lacking in character and reputedly corrupt. A keen reader, he claims to be happy with his books, but would gladly return to politics in a more liberal administration. In close touch with the American Embassy. He is a friend and supporter of Dr. Jamali. Speaks good English and his wife, who appears in public, knows a little English. She is a Shia from the Lebanon of the Osseiran family.

19. Abdul Majid Allawi, C.B.E.

Born 1901. Shia of Baghdad. Graduate of the Baghdad Law College. Subsequently joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he held various appointments, including that of legal adviser, until he was appointed Head of the Political Section. Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet of Hamdi Pachachi, 1944. After serving as Mutasarrif of Karbala until 1948, he was an Administrative Inspector in the Ministry of the Interior until his appointment as Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet formed by Mustafa al Unari in July 1952. Resigned with Mustafa al Unari in November 1952. Appointed Director-General of Customs in February 1953. Appointed Executive Member, Development Board (July 1953), where he has proved himself an honest, painstaking but somewhat unimaginative official. In recent years he has become an increasingly warm supporter of the British connection. He speaks English pompously, rather in the manner of someone addressing a public meeting, and is intensely proud of his C.B.E., which was awarded to him in 1945 for the friendly and co-operative attitude he adopted towards the Embassy as acting Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1941 to 1944. His wife speaks some English.

20. Abdul Majid Mahmud

Shia. Born about 1909. Educated in the United States where he obtained a degree in Agriculture. Director of Education in the Muntafiq in the early 1930s. Superintendent (Personnel) of Public Revenues. Inspector in the Income Tax Department in 1941. Held an appointment in the Ministry of Economics in 1942. Appointed Assistant Accountant-General in 1944. A member of the Iraqi delegation to the Bretton Woods Conference in 1945. Director-General of Agricultural Bank, 1945-50. Appointed Minister of Economics under Nuri al Said in December 1950 and Acting Minister of Agriculture in April 1952. Defeated by Sadiq al Bassam in the elections of January 1953. Appointed to the Government Oil Board in February 1953. Appointed Minister of Finance under Arshad al Unari, April 1954. Elected Deputy for Muntafiq, June 1954, and September 1954.

Appointed Minister of Development, August 1954, and subsequently Minister without Portfolio after a small financial scandal and was dropped from the Government in May 1955.

Abdul Majid Mahmud was secretary of the Muthanna Club, most of the members of which were Western educated nationalists with leanings towards national socialism, and was a founder member of the Ba'ath Club, which contains many of the same individuals whose ideals are now those of democratic socialists. He played an active part in the Rashid Ali movement. He is much under the influence of Fadhil al Jamali, but owes his ministerial appointments to Nuri al Said. He is President of the Alumni Club of the American University of Beirut in Baghdad.

Abdul Majid Mahmud is a mild and friendly little man holding somewhat naïve nationalist views about which he is extremely garrulous. He says that he has moved away from his earlier extreme nationalism and believes in co-operation with the West, but the

fact is that his part, as Nuri al Said's Minister of Economics, in signing the new agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1952 cut him off from his former nationalist associates, who disapproved of this agreement. His English is good and his wife, who is friendly like himself, also speaks some English. As a Minister he appears to have been neither particularly efficient nor particularly honest. He has recently opened a law office in Baghdad and hopes to exploit his influence in official circles by acting as adviser to foreign companies.

21. Abdul Majid Qassab

Sunni of Baghdad, born about 1908. Educated at Baghdad and Beirut. Took a medical degree at Montpellier. A member of the Muthanna Club. Joined the Constitutional Bloc in 1947 and the Nationalist Bloc of Independent Deputies in 1952. He voted for the ratification of the agreement between the Iraq Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1952. Appointed Minister of Health in Nuruddin Mahmud's Cabinet in November 1952. During his few weeks in office he attempted to undo the work of his predecessors and antagonised most members of his Ministry. Was appointed Minister of Education in Jamali's first Cabinet in September 1953, when he and the Prime Minister insisted on reinstating in the schools and colleges students who had been expelled or imprisoned for Communist agitation. This measure, though liberal in its inspiration, led to an undoubted recrudescence of agitation among the students. Appointed Minister of Health in Jamali's second Cabinet (March 1954). Re-elected Deputy for Baghdad, June 1954, and again in June 1955.

Though somewhat unbalanced and moody, is pleasant company and has gone out of his way to be friendly to visiting British Members of Parliament, being himself a keen member of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. He speaks French and some English.

22. Abdul Muttalib Amin al Hashimi

Born 1907 in Baghdad. Sunni Moslem. A regular army officer who was at Sandhurst and later attached to the Royal Corps of Signals. He has also been on courses in England. Passed the Iraqi Staff College in 1949 and was for a short time Director of Military Intelligence at the Ministry of Defence. Military Attaché at Damascus, 1949-52. In November 1952 was Military Commander of Baghdad and made a good showing during and after the riots. Assistant Chief of General Staff, 1953. In October 1953 was appointed to Planning Staff of Military Committee of the Arab League and was Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) and Major-General, 1954. Retired and appointed Minister in Iraqi Foreign Service, February 1954. Appointed Minister to Indonesia, June 1954, where he was an *ex-officio* member of the Iraqi Delegation to the Bandung Conference in 1955.

Returned to Baghdad in June 1957 with the reputation of having been too deeply involved in Indonesian politics. Was appointed Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniya, July 1957.

Intelligent and pleasant. Abdul Muttalib has figured in various highly complicated intrigues, notably concerning Syria, with the result that no one knows whether they can trust him. Speaks excellent English and is regarded as pro-British. His wife goes out.

23. Abdul Qadir al Gailani

Born in Baghdad in 1904 of the family of the Naqibs of Baghdad and a lineal descendant of Abdul Qadir Gailani who in the 11th century founded the Qadiriya Sect which spreads over North-West India

and North and Central Africa. Elder brother of Yusuf al Gailani (q.v.). Educated at Baghdad and studied at the London School of Economics. Entered the Foreign Service 1926, and served in London and Cairo, where he was in charge of the Legation several times between 1934 and 1940. Master of Ceremonies at the Royal Palace, 1940. He was closely associated with the rebel Government of Rashid Ali and after its collapse was interned in Rhodesia and later in Iraq. Released, 1944. Re-appointed to Foreign Service and sent as Chargé d'Affaires to Karachi, 1948. Transferred to Cairo, 1949, but was not appointed Minister because the Regent distrusts him for the part he played in 1941. In June 1951 he was appointed Counsellor in the Iraqi Foreign Service on special duty with the Arab League. Appointed Minister to Pakistan 1953 and Ambassador, 1956.

He tries hard to be pleasant and has done his best to live down the past. He speaks good English. His Egyptian wife has little English, but speaks excellent French.

24. Abdul Rahman al Jalili (Dr.)

Born about 1907 of a leading family of Mosul. He became Deputy for Mosul in 1948 but resigned with the Opposition in March 1950. In 1951 he was elected to the Permanent Bureau of the United Popular Front Party and in 1952 to its Administrative Committee, of which he became secretary in 1953. In 1953 he was re-elected Deputy for Mosul. In September 1953 he was appointed Minister of Economics in Dr. Jamali's Government, when he made clear his conviction that the Iraq Government's agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company should be radically revised in favour of Iraq. In 1954 he resigned from the Cabinet because it would not abolish martial law in Basra. On June 27, 1954, he was appointed an executive member of the Development Board. In 1956 he undertook an extensive tour in Europe, including the United Kingdom, in an effort to engage European engineers for the development programme. In 1957 he revisited Germany.

A man of considerable intelligence, if also self-important, and a powerful personality, he is self-seeking, politically ambitious, an enemy of Nuri al Said, a strong Arab nationalist and bitterly anti-Zionist. In the Development Board he betrays a pronounced anti-British and anti-American prejudice and tends to favour German interests. He believes that the existing relationships between Arab Governments and the oil industry represent a form of exploitation by the Western Powers and that the 50/50 share is unfair to the Arabs. He has published a book on the subject. He speaks English well and is personally friendly. He is unmarried.

25. Abdul Rahman Jaudat

Born about 1910. His father was Sunni and his mother Shia; he himself is considered a Shia. Educated Baghdad Law College.

Served as Qaimmaqam in Najaf, Suq, al Shuyukh and Diwaniya. Appointed Mutasarrif in the Muntafiq in 1946 and in Diwaniya in 1947. Mutasarrif of Baghdad, December 1949 and appointed Director-General of the Interior in June 1951. Minister of Health under Mustafa al Umari, July 1952. Minister of Communications and Works, December 1952, and of Agriculture, January and May 1953. Deputy for Hindiya, January 1953. Re-elected 1954.

A competent official and co-operative in his dealings with the British. He did not distinguish himself as a Minister. He is in poor health. He speaks some English. His wife does not appear in society.

26. Abdul Rasul al Khalisi

Shia of Kadhmain and a nephew of the Shia Mujtahid Muhammad al Khalisi. Born in 1910. Joined Government service in 1932, served as Administrative Inspector and was appointed Mutasarrif of Karbala in September 1948. Transferred to Diyala in June 1950 and to Baghdad in June 1951. Appointed Minister of Justice and Acting Minister of Communications and Works in Nuruddin Mahmud's Cabinet in November 1952. Elected Deputy for Kadhmain in January 1953. Re-elected for Kadhmain 1954. Minister of Social Affairs under Nuri al Said, December 1955 to June 1957. Minister of Justice under Ali Jaudat, June 1957.

He owes his success principally to his connections with Muhammad al Khalisi and Abdul Hadi al Chalabi (q.v.). He is a quiet, not very intelligent man and an ardent Shia. He is married to a sister of Abdul Amir Allawi (q.v.) who does not appear in society.

27. Abdul Razzaq al Dhahir

Shia of Baghdad. Born about 1903. Younger brother of Abdul Hadi al Dhahir (q.v.). He has travelled in Europe and speaks English fairly well. In 1942 he was attacked by a nervous disease which affected his brain, commonly reputed to be due to hereditary syphilis, and he spent some time in a mental home in Beirut. Joined the Istiqlal Party when it was founded in 1946, but soon left it to join the late Sa'ad Saleh's Liberal Party, of which he continued to be a member until Sa'ad's death early in 1949. Deputy for Baghdad in 1948 and went on Iraqi delegations to several inter-Parliamentary conferences. Minister of Economics in Ali Jaudat's Government of December 1949. He resigned with the Opposition Deputies in March 1950 and is a founder member of the United Popular Front. In June 1951 he was elected to the Front's Permanent Bureau. Arrested after the riots in November 1952. Announced in December 1953 his decision "to abandon politics temporarily."

Abdul Razzaq and his brother are well off, having property in Baghdad and lands in Abu Ghurairh. He is a self-opinionated and somewhat unbalanced man with a wide range of superficial knowledge. A political opponent of Nuri Pasha. He has published a book damning tribal feudalism in Iraq and three volumes of essays inveighing against British imperialism.

His wife does not appear in society.

28. Abdul Wahhab Mahmud

Sunni of Basra. Born in 1909. Educated Basra and Baghdad, where he graduated in law in 1932. As a young man he held advanced Leftist opinions. Arrested by Jamil Madfai's Government in 1938 for attempting to raise the Diwaniya tribes against them. Released by Nuri Pasha after the military demonstration which removed the Madfai Government. Deputy, 1939 to 1947. Minister of Finance in Suwaidi Cabinet of 1946. Member of the Liberal Party from 1946 to 1948, when the party suspended activity. Elected President of the Bar Association in 1950, 1951 and 1952. He was replaced as President in 1953 by Hussain Jamil (q.v.). He is one of the leading Iraqi fellow-travellers and played a prominent part in the agitation leading up to the riots in 1952. As a result he was detained for six weeks.

He was active during the elections of June 1954 but after the formation of Nuri al Said's Government withdrew from politics and turned his attention to making money.

His daughter is married to Usama, son of Tahsin Qadri (q.v.), in the Iraqi Foreign Service. His wife is rarely seen and does not speak English.

29. Abdul Wahhab Murjan

Born about 1910 of a rich Shia landowning family of Hilla. Educated at the Baghdad Law College, he was appointed a judge about 1935 but soon resigned to practise as a lawyer.

In 1946 and 1947 he was leader in Hilla of Kamil al Chadirchi's National Democratic Party but resigned in 1947 owing to his exclusion from the party's Higher Committee and to his being taken up by Saleh Jabr, who secured his election to the Chamber of Deputies in March 1947.

He was again elected Deputy for Hilla in the 1948 elections and was appointed Minister of Economics in June 1948 in Muzahim al Pachachi's Government. Resigned on his election as President of the Chamber of Deputies in autumn 1948. Elected vice-president of Nuri al Said's Constitutional Union Party in December 1949. Became Minister of Communications and Works under Nuri al Said in September 1950 and was transferred to Finance in December 1950. Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1951. Deputy for Hilla in January 1953. Minister of Communications and Works January and May 1953. Resigned after a quarrel with Said Qazzaz in May 1953. Elected President of Chamber of Deputies in December 1953. Re-elected for Hilla in June 1954 and September 1954, when he was again elected as President of the Chamber of Deputies after serving for a month as Minister of Agriculture. Minister of Communications and Works in Ali Jaudat's Government, June 1957.

He is not very intelligent, but is pleasant and owes most of his influence originally to Saleh Jabr's and recently to Nuri al Said's support.

Since the death of Saleh Jabr he has been spoken of by Nuri al Said as a possible candidate for the position of leading Shia politician, but would appear to lack the personality and appeal for that role, despite the benefactions of his family. A decided nationalist in his views. He knows a very little English. His wife does not appear in society.

30. Abdullah Bakr, K.C.V.O.

Born 1907. A Sunni from Mosul. Joined the Iraqi Foreign Service at its inception and, after serving in various posts, was promoted to Minister Plenipotentiary in 1948. Chargé d'Affaires at the Iraqi Embassy in Washington in 1952. In the summer of 1953 was appointed Deputy Rais of the Royal Diwan and held that post until appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Dr. Jamali's Government in September 1953. Headed the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations in autumn 1953. Appointed Rais of the Royal Diwan in March 1954 and accompanied King Faisal on his State Visit to Pakistan that month. Also accompanied the King on his visits to Jordan in April 1955 and Turkey in June 1955 and in his State Visit to the United Kingdom in 1956, when he was made honorary K.C.V.O.

A pleasant if rather quiet personality with a suave manner, he can be relied upon to be sensible. His wife, also from Mosul, speaks English.

31. Abdullah Damluji (Dr.)

Sunni, born in Mosul in 1895, and formerly called Abdullah Said Effendi. Studied medicine in Constantinople and served in the Turkish army, but transferred his allegiance to Ibn Saud when the latter occupied Hasa in 1913.

As Ibn Saud's Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1922 he signed the Uqair Protocol, and in 1926 took part in the negotiations in London which led to the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927. His influence with Ibn Saud afterwards waned and in 1928, after the failure of the Medina Railway Conference at Haifa, at which he

was Ibn Saud's representative, he posted his resignation to Ibn Saud and came to Baghdad instead of returning to the Hejaz.

In Iraq he has been thrice Minister for Foreign Affairs (in 1930-31, 1934 and 1942), thrice Director-General of Health (1932-33, 1934-35 and 1941-42), and Master of Ceremonies at the Palace in 1937-38.

From 1942 onwards, he devoted himself mainly to business. He was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations in 1947 and was elected Deputy for Mosul in the 1948 elections.

He was appointed Iraqi Ambassador in Tehran in February 1950. He spent most of his time in Baghdad, however, and eventually resigned from this post in May 1951. Minister of Education under Mustafa al Umari, July 1952.

In 1956 he was appointed a roving Ambassador by Nuri al Said with a view to effecting a reconciliation between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In this capacity he achieved some success which culminated in the State Visit of King Saud to Iraq in May 1957.

Appears to have given up politics. He speaks English well.

32. Abdullah Qassab

Sunni of Baghdad. Born 1900, the son of an 'Alim, Abbas Amin al Fetwa. Educated Baghdad, graduated from the Law College, 1928, and entered Government service. Qaimmaqam Samarra, 1936. Director of Tribal Affairs, Ministry of Interior, 1938. Mutasarrif of Diwaniya, 1941. Minister of Interior under Nuri al Said (October-December 1943) and again under Arshad al Umari (June 1946), reverting in the interim to Mutasarrif of Mosul, 1944. Director-General of the Date Association, 1947. Appointed Mayor of Baghdad, 1951. Returned to Date Association, March 1953. Represented Iraq at Arab/Italian Economic Conference held in Italy in September 1953. Was made Deputy for Muntafiq, November 1956.

A fairly capable administrator without marked political leanings. He is now a sick man.

33. Ahmad Adnan Hafidh

Born 1909 of a Sunni family from Mosul. He joined Government service in 1934. Became Acting Chief Engineer, Posts and Telegraphs in 1944. Appointed member of the Board of Agricultural Machinery and Implements Administration in 1954. Promoted to Director-General, Posts and Telegraphs in the same year. Made President of the Baghdad Electricity Services Board of Administration, September 1955.

He has travelled abroad a lot. Was invited to the United Kingdom as a guest of Her Majesty's Government in the autumn of 1956. Has represented his country at various meetings of the International Telecommunications Union and, in February 1957, at the Arab Postal Conference in Libya.

An enormously fat man with a cheerful disposition. Not very cultivated but likeable. He relies much on his British technical advisors, but naturally insists that credit for success should be his. Has always been co-operative with this Embassy. He speaks good English.

34. Ahmad al Ajil al Yawir (Shaikh)

Sunni Shaikh of the Shammar Jarba tribe. Younger brother of Sfuq al Ajil, he was born about 1923 and educated at Victoria College, Alexandria, and in Mosul and Baghdad.

He went to London with his father Ajil in 1937 to attend the coronation of His Majesty King George VI. After Ajil's death in 1940 Ahmad set about undermining Sfuq's position in the tribe, disputed the inheritance with him, and in 1944 was suspected of being involved in an attempt to poison him with locust bait.

He became Deputy for Mosul in 1948 and in October of that year he was recognised by the Government as paramount Sheikh of the Shammar in Iraq instead of Mish'an al Faisal who had replaced Sfuq the previous June. He is now more popular than his rivals with the tribe, but constant intrigue amongst themselves has reduced the influence of al Shammar Sheikhs. Accompanied King Faisal II to America in 1952. Deputy for Tel Afar, January 1953, but because of Palace intervention was not re-elected in 1954. Included in Nuri's list of Deputies in September 1954. Has visited Europe and Asia extensively as member of the Iraqi Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

Flashy, engaging and plausible. Ahmad is one of the very few English-speaking tribesmen. During the past six years he has, with two Syrian partners, devoted much time and hard work to mechanised grain farming on his land in the Jezireh and appears to have prospered. He is believed to be in touch with Ibn Saud.

His wife does not accompany him away from home.

35. Ahmad Mukhtar Baban

Born about 1895. Sunni from near Khaniqin. He is not a true Baban but takes the name from a marriage connection with the late Jamil Bey Baban of Kifri. Educated Baghdad Law School and served as a judge for many years. Director-General of Supplies, 1942. Successively Minister of Social Affairs, Communications and Works and Justice under Nuri al Said, 1942-44. Minister of Justice under Hamdi Pachachi, 1944. Minister of Social Affairs, 1946. Head of the Royal Diwan, 1946. He visited Europe in the summer of 1951. Took a prominent part in the conduct of the elections of January 1953. Minister of Justice under Jamil Madfai, January 1953. Head of the Royal Diwan again in April 1953. Deputy Prime Minister in Jamali's second Cabinet, March 1954, and appointed a Senator. Appointed Deputy Prime Minister under Nuri from October 1954 until June 1957. Minister of Defence under Ali Jaudat, June 1957.

The advice he gave when Head of the Royal Diwan was not always good and, by being all things to all men, he acquired a reputation for insincerity and for sinister intrigue. This reputation appears, however, to be exaggerated. As Deputy Prime Minister he has shown himself lacking in personal authority.

He is still primarily a Palace man. He has divorced his wife and has one daughter at school in Beirut. He speaks little English.

36. Ahmad al Rawi, K.B.E.

Born about 1896, the son of a Baghdad Sunni Alim. Brother of Najib al Rawi (q.v.). Became a police officer soon after the formation of the Iraq Government and after reaching the rank of Commandant, served in several liwas as a mutasarrif. In 1939 he was made an administrative inspector and soon afterwards was placed on pension.

After the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebel Government in 1941 he was recalled by Jamil Madfai and made Director-General of Police. He held this position successfully for four years of war and co-operated wholeheartedly with the British Forces. He was appointed Honorary K.B.E. for his war services in 1946.

Crested Pasha by Amir Abdullah of Transjordan in 1941, he was appointed Iraqi Minister to Syria and the Lebanon in 1945 and to Transjordan in 1946. He returned to Iraq the same year to take up the post of Director-General, and later (1949) of Under-Secretary, in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In this capacity he represented Iraq at

several meetings of the Arab League Political Committee in 1948 and was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations in the latter half of 1949. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Amman in January 1951. In May 1952 he was appointed Iraqi Minister at Karachi. Defeated in the elections of January 1953. Appointed Ambassador to Lebanon, 1953. Elected as Deputy in Dulaim June 1954. Appointed Minister of Social Affairs under Arshad al Umari, July 1954.

A supporter of Iraq's British connection, Ahmad Pasha is an intelligent and pleasant man. More politician than administrator, he is generally well-informed but does not carry the weight that his position and connection would lead one to expect.

Is on bad terms with Nuri al Said and particularly the former Nazis among Nuri's supporters. For this reason he has remained jobless for the past three years and is correspondingly embittered. He speaks English well. His wife speaks some English.

37. Ali Hajdar Sulaiman

Born at Rowanduz 1905 of a well-known Kurdish family. Educated at Mosul and the American University, Beirut.

Lecturer in Modern History at the Higher Teachers' Training College, 1930. Transferred to Ministry of Interior, 1933. Transferred to the Iraqi Foreign Service and served at Rome and Cairo between 1937 and 1939. He was interned after 1941 as a sympathiser with Rashid Ali (he is a brother-in-law of Yunis Sab'awi who was hanged for his part in the rebellion). Released in 1944 he became a partner of Ali Kemal in the New Baghdad scheme. In 1949 he was associated in business with Abdul Hadi al Chalabi and was director of the firm, Iraq Engineering Works.

Deputy for Rowanduz, 1948. Resigned, 1950. Re-elected, 1953 and June 1954. Not re-elected in September 1954. Minister of Social Affairs under Muzahim al Pachachi, 1948. Minister of Communications and Works under Ali Jawdat, 1949-50. Appointed a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Iraqi Foreign Service in May 1951. Minister of Development in Dr. Jamali's first Government, September 1953, and of Economics in his second Government, March 1954, when he also acted as Minister of Development for a time. After returning to commerce for two years, he was appointed Iraqi Ambassador in Bonn in 1956.

A sincere and intelligent nationalist with moderate reformist views. As a Minister he was industrious and painstaking, but finds it difficult to delegate responsibility. His health is not robust and this is a continuous disability for him. Speaks good English. His wife appears in public, but does not know English.

38. Ali Jaudat al Ayyubi

Sunni of humble Mosul origin, born 1886. Educated at Istanbul and commissioned in the Turkish army. In Turkish times he was a member of the Arab Nationalist society, Al Ahd al Iraqi. He fought against the British at Shuaibah but surrendered soon afterwards and was employed in 1915 to encourage Arab officer prisoners to join the Arab Revolt. Later he joined Faisal, and in 1920 was Faisal's Military Governor at Aleppo.

He returned to Iraq with King Faisal in 1921 and from then until 1923 he held various posts in the provincial administration. In 1922 he took an active part in agitation against the Mandate.

As Minister for Interior under Ja'far al Askari (1923-24) he voted for the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922. He was again a provincial Governor and later worked in the Ministry of Interior between 1924 and 1930, when he became Minister of Interior under

Nuri al Said. He resigned from the Cabinet in September 1930 and also (in company with Yasin al Hashimi and Rashid Ali) from the Chamber of Deputies in protest against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930.

Private Secretary to the King, 1933; Prime Minister 1934, he was forced to resign by an agitation against him throughout the country organised by Yasin al Hashimi and Rashid Ali.

President of the Chamber of Deputies, 1935. Iraqi Minister in London, August 1935; Paris, December 1936-October 1937. Minister for Foreign Affairs under Nuri al Said, 1939.

After the Rashid Ali *coup d'Etat* in April 1941 he joined the Regent at Basra and accompanied him to Jerusalem. After the collapse of the rebellion he returned to Baghdad and became Minister for Foreign Affairs under Jamil Madfai in June 1941.

Iraqi Minister at Washington, 1942-48. He joined Muzahim al Pachachi's Government in the reshuffle of September 1948 as Minister for Foreign Affairs and was made a Senator, and in December 1949 he succeeded, after two failures, in forming a Cabinet, which resigned in February 1950. Deputy Prime Minister under Jamil Madfai, January to September 1953. His term as a Senator was renewed in November 1956. Appointed Prime Minister in succession to Nuri al Said in June 1957.

He has always been a weak and vacillating character of small intelligence and he is now a semi-invalid. He is, however, well meaning and friendly and he is respected for his Nationalist past. He is in close touch with the United States Embassy. He has become rich through acquiring Government land. His wife is a Syrian who speaks good English, his elder son is married to an American and his daughter is married to the son of Muzahim al Pachachi (q.v.). His sons are close friends of the King and the elder son, Nizar, is the agent for several British firms. Ali Jawdat speaks English.

39. Ali Mahmud Shaikh Ali

Sunni, connected with the Ubaid tribe. Born Baghdad, 1902. Educated at the Baghdad Law College, he practised as a lawyer from 1923 to 1936. An extreme Nationalist, he was arrested both in 1924 and 1930 for violent agitation against Anglo-Iraqi treaties. He was twice elected Deputy.

Appointed judge in the Court of Appeal in 1936 and Minister of Justice under Hikmat Sulaiman in 1937. Mutasarrif of Basra, 1939; Director-General of Customs, 1940. Again Minister of Justice in Rashid Ali's rebel Cabinet, he fled to Persia after Rashid Ali's collapse but was later surrendered to the British military authorities and interned in Southern Rhodesia. Sent back to Iraq, tried and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in 1942. During his internment he embarked upon an immense history of Palestine, taking the story back to pre-Islamic times.

Released in 1949, he practised as a lawyer. Appointed Director-General of Customs, July 1952. Minister of Finance under Mustafi al Umari for one week and then under Nuruddin Mahmud in November 1952. He drafted most of the ordinances issued by that Government aimed at lowering the cost of living of the lower classes. Appointed Vice-President, Court of Cassation, July 1953.

He is now on good terms with members of this Embassy, but he remains a rather unbalanced Nationalist.

40. Ali Mumtaz al Daftari

Born 1901. Sunni of the Daftari family of Baghdad. Educated at Baghdad Law College and entered Government service in 1920. Rose to be Director-General of Revenues by 1935, but had to

leave Iraq after Bekr Sidqi's *coup d'Etat* which overthrew the Government of Yasin al Hashimi in 1936 to whose daughter he is married. Reappointed Director-General of Revenues by Nuri al Said in 1939.

Minister of Finance under Taha al Hashimi, 1941. Director of Rafidain Bank, 1941. Again Minister of Finance under Nuri al Said in 1941 and 1943. Minister of Communications and Works under Tawfiq Suwaidi in 1946. Minister of Finance under Muzahim al Pachachi in 1948 and under Ali Jawdat, December 1949 to February 1950. Resigned from the Chamber of Deputies in 1950.

Appointed a member of the Development Board in November 1950 and tendered his resignation from the Board in June 1951. Minister of Finance under Jamil Madfai, January and May 1953. Appointed Senator, April 1953. The most energetic Minister in that Cabinet, Ali Mumtaz earned the respect of almost all Deputies for his conduct of affairs in the Chamber. Accompanied King Faisal on a State Visit to Amman, August 1953. Minister of Finance in Jamali's second Government, March 1954. He then reverted to his law practice for four years. Minister of Finance and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs under Ali Jawdat, 1957.

He was a member of the Liberal Party formed in 1946, but resigned in 1948. His name has frequently been mentioned as a possible neutral Prime Minister. He gives an impression of sincerity and ability, but when in power finds difficulty in co-operating with his Cabinet colleagues. He has been involved in at least one financial scandal. In recent years he has invested heavily in land and his financial reputation continues to be clouded, due, it is rumoured, to his having to find large sums to pay his wife's gambling debts. He and his wife speak very good English. They have a son at Cambridge.

41. Ali al Safi (Dr.)

Born 1913. Shia of Najaf. Studied at Heidelberg, taking a Ph.D. in political economy, remained in Germany during at least part of 1939-45 war, and is believed to have co-operated there with Rashid Ali al Gailani. He joined the Iraq Government service in 1948 as an instructor at the College of Engineering and became subsequently Assistant Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in the Ministry of Communications, where he failed to get on with the Director-General and was appointed Director of the semi-official National Leather Industry Company.

Was deputed by the Arab League, with two others, to try and dissuade the Federal German Government from paying reparations to Israel but is said to have succeeded only in making himself obnoxious to the German authorities.

Appointed Minister of Economics by Arshad al Umari in April 1954. Elected Deputy for Najaf in June 1954. Not re-elected in September 1954.

42. Ali al Sharqi

Shia from Najaf. Born about 1890. Originally a Mulla in Najaf and later Qadhi in Basra and elsewhere, he finally became Head of the Supreme Ja'fari Court. He was made a Senator in 1947 during Saleh Jabr's term of office. Minister without Portfolio in Ali Jawdat's Government of December 1949. Minister of State under Jamil Madfai, May 1953, under Nuri in August 1954 and again under Ali Jaudat in June 1957.

Although a man of little political importance, he has been retained in the Governments of Nuri and Ali Jaudat because he is a Shia, in touch with Najaf and with a knowledge of what is going on in the Shia parts of Iran. Is said to be making a tidy fortune by smuggling.

43. Amin al Mumaiyiz

Born Hamuja, 1909. Sunni. Educated at American University, Beirut. Joined Iraqi Foreign Service in 1933. Served in London, Washington (1947) and Damascus, then appointed Director of Arab Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1950. Appointed Minister in Jeddah, February 1954. Returned to Baghdad and the desk of Arab Affairs as Director-General in February 1956 at the request of the Saudis, for among other things rebutting Saudi criticism of Iraq's Western connection.

An experienced and cautious diplomat, he is one of the few Iraqis in the Foreign Service who can withhold information as easily as give it. Although basically friendly to the West, he has no illusions about the shortcomings of the West's Middle Eastern policies, and has frequently earned the epithet "pig-headed" from this Embassy with reference to his Arab nationalist views, as well as to his appearance. He acts as Permanent Under-Secretary during the absences of Yusuf al Gailani, but appears to have relatively little authority. He has published two books in Arabic, "The English as I know them" and "The Americans as I saw them." The former was frank and objective but friendly, the latter equally frank and therefore, to its subjects, rather less acceptable.

He speaks English well with a pseudo-Oxford accent. His wife speaks some English and French.

44. Arkan Abadi

Shia, born in 1919. A tribesman of the Fetlahi tribe of Diwaniyah. Brother of Kadhim Abadi (q.v.). Educated at the London School of Economics. Joined the Iraqi Foreign Service in 1944. He accompanied Fadhil al Jamali to the Palestine Conference in London in September 1946.

Deputy for Diwaniyah in 1947 and 1948. Resigned in 1950. Contested a by-election in 1950 but was defeated by Government action. Deputy for the Muntafiq in November 1950 and for Shumiya in January 1953. He was offered the portfolio of Agriculture by Nasrat al Farisi during his abortive attempt to form a Cabinet in January 1953. Re-elected in 1954. Was a member of Nuri al Said's Constitutional Union Party. Spent the summer of 1953 in the United States on an American bursary. Was Minister without Portfolio in charge of village and tribal affairs in Jamali's first Government (September 1953) and Minister of Social Affairs in Jamali's second Government (March 1954). Minister of Social Affairs under Ali Jaudat, June 1957.

Arkan is not particularly bright—it is a current joke that it took him ten years to get his degree at the London School of Economics—but he has common sense and was a not unsuccessful Minister in the past. He is already showing himself an energetic member of Ali Jaudat's Government. He is always immaculate in a somewhat "Brooks Brothers" style.

He and his wife, who is the daughter of Jamil Madfai, speak excellent English.

45. Arshad al Umari, K.B.E.

Sunni, born in 1888 of the well-known Umari family of Mosul. Educated in Turkey and employed as Municipal Engineer in Istanbul. He served on the Turkish staff in 1914-18 war.

A member of the first Iraqi Parliament, he later held several official appointments. Mayor of Baghdad from 1931 to 1933, and again from 1936 to 1944, with a short interruption in 1941 when he formed a Committee of Internal Security to conclude an armistice with the British forces after Rashid Ali's flight. He was a successful Mayor and can claim credit for much of the modernisation of Baghdad since the war.

He represented Iraq at the Arab Unity Congress in Cairo in 1944 which resulted in the formation of the Arab League and in 1945 he led the Iraqi delegation to San Francisco. Minister of Economics and Communications under Ali Jawdat in 1934. Minister of Supply under Hamdi Paenachi in 1944. Appointed a Senator in June 1944. He was Prime Minister from June to November 1946, and aroused great opposition by his dictatorial methods. He played some part in the political intrigues which resulted in the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty and was Minister of Defence in the Government of Mohammed al Sadr which took over after the Portsmouth riots. Resigned his seat in the Senate in November 1950 on his appointment as Vice-Chairman of the Development Board. In this capacity his erratic nature and his tendency to concentrate all work in his own hands earned him much criticism, which his outspoken retaliation did nothing to assuage. On the other hand, there was probably no other Iraqi who would have applied so much energy to the work of the Board; but even his ebullient nature was finally overcome by the merciless criticism of his work in the Development Board. He threw in his hand in June 1953 and his resignation from the Board was accepted in July. As a sop he was reappointed to the Senate.

Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Development, April 1954. He was responsible for the elections of June 1954 and managed to quarrel with a number of his Ministers.

He is president of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society and has done a good deal to improve their finances. His daughter, Mme. Mumtaz al Umari, is a leading figure in the Ladies' Committee of this society.

He has an attractive personality and a capacity for hard work which is rare in an Iraqi, but his rapid changes of opinion, his obstinacy and impatience of criticism make him unfit for politics. He speaks Turkish and some rather curious French. He was appointed Honorary K.B.E. for war services in 1946, and is always referred to as "Pasha." He is separated from his wife, who lives in Turkey on the charity of her relatives as he is too selfish to maintain her.

46. Ata Amin

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1898. Educated at the Baghdad Law School.

Assistant Private Secretary to King Faisal, 1921. Joined the Iraqi Foreign Service in 1925 and was appointed to the Iraqi Legation in London. Legal draftsman in the Ministry of Justice, 1927. Returned to the Foreign Service in 1928 and held appointments at Ankara, London, Rome, Paris and Berlin between 1932 and 1943. From 1940 to 1943 he was in charge of the Iraqi Legation in London. Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1943; Minister at Ankara, 1944; transferred to Paris, 1949. Director-General of Government Oil Refineries Administration in July 1952, but in 1956 was shunted into the virtual sinecure of Chairman of the Administration. His appointment to the Oil Refineries Administration caused some criticism as he had no qualifications for the job either in experience or personality.

He is married to a sister of the Amir Zaid who does not normally appear in public. He speaks good English.

47. Baba Ali Shaikh Mahmud (Shaikh)

Kurd. Born about 1912, second son of the well-known Sheikh Mahmud. He spent much of his childhood in Persia, when his father was engaged in various rebellions. Between 1928 and 1932 he was educated at the expense of the Iraq Government at Victoria College, Alexandria, where he was a classmate of the Regent. Later he went to Columbia University.

He was appointed to a minor post in the railways in 1928, but soon resigned. His outspoken criticism of Iraqi administration in Kurdish areas led to his arrest and exile for a few months in 1943. A repetition of the offence in 1945 narrowly missed having the same result. He is still a strong critic of the Iraq Government's handling of Kurdish problems.

Minister of Economics under Arshad al Umari in 1946 and in the succeeding Government of Nuri Pasha. Deputy for Sulaimaniya, 1947; lost his seat in 1948.

Baba Ali speaks excellent English and possesses an attractive, though not very forceful, personality. He is interested in the improvement of agriculture in Kurdistan and particularly in the growing and marketing of tobacco. Since 1948 he has spent much of his time in Sulaimaniya and although not a member of his party, was Saleh Jabr's most influential supporter in Sulaimaniya. He is now running a business in Baghdad.

He visited America in 1950 and since then has been in close contact with the United States Embassy.

48. Bahaddia Nuri

Kurd, born in Baghdad about 1897 of an Erbil family. His father was a well-known 'Alim. Educated in Baghdad, he joined the Turkish army in 1917 and the Iraqi army in 1921.

In 1924 he was First-Lieutenant Small Arms Instructor and in 1927 he was promoted Captain. Passed Iraqi Staff College, 1930; attended Staff College, Camberley, 1935-36. On his return to Iraq he was deeply involved in Bekr Sidqi's *coup d'etat* and was thereafter appointed to Operations Branch. Dismissed from the army by Taha al Hashimi in 1938, he became Assistant Traffic Director on the Iraqi State Railways.

In autumn, 1941, he rejoined the army as Major-General and was appointed Assistant C.G.S., but was retired again in 1944. He was Acting Mutassarif of Sulaimaniya in 1944 and was elected Deputy for Sulaimaniya in 1947 and 1948. Minister of Social Affairs under Nuri al Said during 1949. Appointed a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Iraqi Foreign Service in May 1951, and Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran. Ambassador there in 1953, where he proved a competent representative. Appointed Ambassador in Amman, January 1956.

One of the most capable Staff Officers in the Iraqi army, he suffered twice for his connection with Bekr Sidqi. He is an intelligent man and a fairly good administrator; but in spite of a frank and engaging demeanour he is not entirely honest or reliable. He is a Freemason and a connoisseur of mystic poetry, but he is also self-seeking and miserly. As Minister he was co-operative with the British, but he was widely censured for his continued connections with a Lebanese firm supplying the Government. He speaks Arabic, Kurdish, Persian, Turkish and English well. His wife speaks some English.

49. Burhanuddin Bashayan

Born 1914, a member of a prominent Sunni Muslim family of Basra.

Trained as a lawyer and has also commercial interests in Basra. A member of the United Popular Front Party with Taha al Hashimi (q.v.) and was on its political committee. Deputy for Basra on various occasions. He participated in the walk-out which the U.P.F. and other Deputies staged from the Chamber in 1950. Left the U.P.F. in 1954 and joined Nuri al Said who secured his election for Basra in September 1954. Appointed Minister without Portfolio by Nuri in August 1954 and was Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs during the prolonged absences of Dr. Musa al Shabandar. As

such he played a considerable part in the negotiation of the Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement of 1955. Was appointed substantive Minister for Foreign Affairs in May 1955, and was thus involved in the early meetings of the Baghdad Pact, being Chairman of the Deputies for 1956. He remains, however, first and foremost an Arab nationalist who might take up an anti-Western position if not guided by Nuri.

Despite an impression of slowness, he is quick to seize a point and a pleasant and patient negotiator with a good grasp of international affairs.

Visited the United Kingdom in March 1954, as a member of the Iraqi Parliamentary Delegation, guests of the British Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

His English is good. He has been handicapped by trouble with his sight and underwent operations in the United Kingdom in 1956, which appear to have cured him. His wife does not appear in society.

50. Darwish al Haidari

Born in Baghdad in 1907 of the Haidari family which originated from Erbil. Educated at the American University, Beirut, and at Texas University where he studied agriculture and was awarded an honorary degree in 1956.

Entered Government service, 1930. Director of Rustamiya Experimental Farm, 1933, and of Abu Ghuraib Experimental Farm, 1940. Director of Grain in the Local Products Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, 1942. Transferred back to the Department of Agriculture after he had been accused of the illegal disposal of a quantity of grain.

He was on the Iraqi delegation to the Hot Springs Food Conference in 1943. Director-General of Agriculture, 1946-54, in which capacity he attended several international conferences and went to Canada to purchase grain. Director-General of the 4th Technical Section of the Ministry of Development, 1954-56. Director-General of the Date Association, 1956. Iraqi representative in the Committee of Economic Experts of the Baghdad Pact.

Fat and jovial in appearance, he has a strong personality and much energy, initiative and determination, mainly directed towards furthering his own interests. He is a devout Moslem, a passionate Arab nationalist and a xenophobe. He is a dictator in his department and his jealousy of any interference has made it difficult for British experts to co-operate with him. On account of his American training he is generally believed to be biased in favour of American machinery and ideas, but the United States Point IV officials in Iraq have found him equally difficult. A window dresser, and regarded by many as a barrier to progress.

He unsuccessfully contested a by-election in Baghdad in June 1955 and hankers after a political career.

Darwish is a keen farmer on his own and tries to put into practice some of the principles he has preached.

He and his wife, who is a sister of Yusuf and Abdul Qadir al Gailani (q.v.) speak good English and French.

51. Dawd al Haidari

Baghdad Sunni, born about 1885. Son of a one-time Sheikh al Islam, his family is of Kurdish origin from Erbil. Once an A.D.C. to Sultan Abdul Hamid, he spent the 1914-18 war in Constantinople and came to Baghdad in 1921.

Member for Erbil in the Constituent Assembly in 1924. Minister of Justice under Taufiq Suwaidi, 1929. Deputy for Erbil, 1930-34.

Iraqi Minister in Tehran, 1941-42. Minister of Justice under Nuri Said, 1942-43. Minister in London, 1943-45. Appointed Senator in 1945.

Minister of Social Affairs in Mohammed al Sadr's Cabinet, January-June 1948.

He was an intermediary when the British Oil Development Company's concession was negotiated and has since been paid a retaining fee by the Basra and Mosul Petroleum Companies, who describe him as their legal adviser, but do not in fact consult him. He resigned from the Senate under a new interpretation of the Constitution in March 1949 rather than give up this fee.

Daud Pasha is a friend of the Crown Prince but is widely distrusted both politically and financially. He was involved in the agitation against the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948, but by 1952 he had become a supporter of Saleh Jabr.

His daughter and his step-daughter are well known in Baghdad society, being married respectively to Dr. Saib Shawkat and Rauf al Chadirchi (q.v.).

He speaks English fairly well and is well disposed towards the British, but his actions tend to be dictated by his financial embarrassments. A nice old man with a taste for horseracing. He looks as though he had spent a fortune—as indeed he has and enjoyed every minute of it. He is a widower.

52. Dhia Ja'far (Dr.)

Baghdad Shia, born in 1911. He studied mechanical engineering at Birmingham University, where he obtained a B.Sc. in 1934 and a Ph.D. in 1936, and then had twenty months' training with the Great Western Railway.

Appointed Assistant Mechanical Engineer in the Iraqi State Railways in 1937, he was subsequently promoted to be Mechanical Engineer. During the war he was Director-General of Engineering Supplies.

Deputy for Baghdad in 1947. He failed in the 1948 elections, but was later returned for Karbala in a by-election.

Minister of Communications and Works under Saleh Jabr in 1947 and of Economics under Nuri al Said in 1949 and under Tawfiq Suwaidi in 1950. A founder-member and member of the Central Committee of Nuri al Said's Constitutional Union Party, December 1949. Minister of Economics under Nuri al Said in September 1950. Transferred to Communications and Works in December 1950. He played a prominent part in the negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1950 and 1951. Appointed Acting Minister of Finance in December 1951. Elected Deputy for Baghdad January 1953. Re-elected 1954. Minister of Economics under Jamil Madfai in January and May 1953. Minister of Finance under Nuri al Said, 1954-55 and Minister of Development, 1955-57.

He is well educated and speaks excellent English. He was a successful Minister of Economics, and is a strong supporter of Nuri al Said, having close connections also with Saleh Jabr. He is a conservative and orthodox financier.

He helped to save British property in 1941. The financial reputation of his family is doubtful.

He enjoys British company, but is resentful against what he considers the unequal relationship between Britain and Iraq, and is consequently difficult to deal with officially. The I.P.C. regarded him as the main obstacle to an agreement on oil problems.

He is a relentless politician with a strong Shia bias, which makes him a troublesome colleague, and has energy and ability. He is at present very much a Nuri man and it is difficult to say whether he has a long-term political future, as he has no popular following. Nevertheless, he must be reckoned with as a potential Prime Minister.

His wife, who is related to the Agha Khan, looks as though she would be more at home in Beirut than in Baghdad. She speaks some English.

53. Fadhil Jamali (Dr.)

Shia of Kadhimain, born 1902. Educated American University, Beirut, 1921-27, and Colombia University 1927-29. Joined the Ministry of Education, 1929, Director-General of Instruction, 1933; Inspector-General of the Ministry, 1937. He visited Germany in 1937 and made arrangements for an Iraqi party to attend the Nuremberg Rally of 1938. Visited England in 1938 at the invitation of the British Council.

He was a founder member of the Muthanna Club, whose members were mostly Western educated nationalists, and whose political thinking was much influenced by national socialism. He strongly resisted British influence in the Ministry of Education and it was British influence which caused his transfer from that Ministry to a position in the Iraqi Embassy in Washington in January 1943. He did not take up this appointment, but became Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1944. He was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in 1945.

Foreign Minister from June 1946 to January 1948 in the successive Cabinets of Arshad al Umari, Nuri al Said and Saleh Jabr. During this time he attended the Palestine Conference in London in 1946 and the United Nations General Assembly in 1947. He was out of politics for a time after the failure of the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948, but was given a sinecure in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs later in the same year and was appointed Iraqi Minister in Cairo in February 1949. He was recalled almost immediately to become Minister for Foreign Affairs under Nuri Pasha in March 1949. He resigned after six months under a constitutional rule, since he had no seat in Parliament, and was appointed Permanent Iraqi delegate to the United Nations Organisation. He was elected Deputy for Diwaniya in the by-elections of June 1950 and became President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1950. Minister for Foreign Affairs under Mustafa al Umari, July 1952, and Nuruddin Mahmud, November 1952. Headed Iraqi delegation to United Nations, October 1952. Deputy for Diwaniya, January 1953, and elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. Was appointed Prime Minister in September 1953 and in March 1954 formed a second Cabinet, which, however, only survived a few weeks. He attended the Arab League meetings of October 1953. Minister for Foreign Affairs in Arshad al Umari's Government April 1953, when he was taken ill with a gastric ulcer. Re-elected for Diwaniya 1954. Received an honorary degree from Colombia University (July 1954). Represented Iraq at the United Nations in 1954, 1955 and 1956, and at the Bandung Conference in 1955. Since 1954 he has spent much of his time on lecture tours in the United States and Europe, and in reading.

Jamali is a self-made man, and is one of the first of the type to reach a prominent position. Although he is ambitious, he is unlikely to become a powerful influence in the country, for his supporters are chiefly among intellectuals and he has no considerable political following.

His period as Prime Minister was characterised by fair promises and lack of performance. He gave up the premiership in April 1954 with his reputation for integrity and sincerity unimpaired but his political weakness, instability of purpose and lack of powers of leadership had been exposed. He also showed a remarkable capacity for self-deception which led him to form his second Government when his political reputation made it much wiser for him to refuse to do so in view of his lack of support in the Chamber.

The xenophobic nationalism of his younger days has been greatly modified by his extensive contacts with the West and by a genuine conviction of the necessity for Iraq of co-operation with the West.

But he will never forgive the British policy in Palestine and Suez, and remains a Shia fanatic at heart.

He is bitterly anti-French and has taken a leading part in Arab agitation against French policy in North Africa. He is interested in Western literature and likes Western music. He has a great interest in the study of education. He is vain and self-important to a degree, but effective in debate and speaks very frankly in private discussion. He is married to a Canadian and has a large circle of British and American friends. His wife plays a leading part in running local charities such as the Cripples' Home (the Jamalis have a spastic child in the United Kingdom) and the Temperance League.

54. Faig Samarra

Sunni, born at Basra about 1904. Educated Baghdad Law College, 1928-32. Appointed a secretary in the Ministry of Justice, 1933; transferred to Tapu Department, 1934; Superintendent of Labour, Ministry of Interior, 1935, and attended a Labour Conference at Geneva in 1936. After a further period in the Ministry of Justice, he became Director-General of Press and Propaganda in 1939. After a short period of service in the police and at the Ministry of Social Affairs, became Director-General of Municipalities in 1940.

An extreme anti-foreign nationalist since his student days, he served a short sentence in 1930 for his part in the demonstrations against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. He was an active supporter of Rashid Ali and was interned from 1941 to 1945 at Fao, where he caused much trouble to the authorities. He was a founder member of the Istiqlal Party in 1946, secretary-general in 1947 and vice-president, 1948, 1949 and 1950. Deputy for Samarra, 1948, he resigned with the opposition Deputies in March 1950, but was again elected in the by-elections of June 1950. In 1949 and early 1950 he travelled in Syria and Lebanon for his party to make propaganda for Iraqi-Syrian union. Resigned with the other Istiqlal Deputies from the Chamber of Deputies in February 1952 in protest against the manner in which they alleged Nuri al Said was attempting to railroad the Oil Agreements through Parliament. Took a leading part in the agitation which led to the riots in 1952. He was interned for six weeks. In June 1954 was defeated in elections at Samarra but is convinced that it was as a result of fraud by the Government. He was banished to Halabja for his part in the disturbances of November 1956 (Suez crisis) and allowed to return to Baghdad in July 1957. Elected President of the Bar Association, August 1957, he resumed full political activity in sympathy with the revolutionary ideas of the Egyptian and Syrian Governments.

A grossly fat and unhealthy looking individual with a bad moral reputation, he is nevertheless intelligent, and a persuasive talker. His nationalist views are sincerely held, but are probably subject to modification if it suited his personal ambition. His attitude to Great Britain became slightly less hostile during 1949, possibly owing to the influence of Nuri Pasha who was in that year attempting to split the Istiqlal Party. He is not altogether trusted by his party colleagues. He speaks English.

55. Faisal Farouq Damluji

Born Mosul 1920. Sunni. A nephew of Dr. Abdullah Damluji (q.v.). Joined the Iraqi Foreign Service in 1943. Served in London and in the Foreign Ministry. Resigned 1954. Elected Deputy for Shaikhan, Mosul, in September 1954. A member of the Iraqi delegation to the Bandung Conference in 1955, to the Helsinki and London Conferences of

the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 1956 and 1957, and to the United Nations in 1956.

A shrewd and able man, he puts his knowledge of foreign affairs to better use in the Chamber of Deputies than most. Although one of our critics, he is very friendly to British and Americans, and supports Iraq's connection with the West. Both he and his Lebanese wife speak good English.

56. Fakhri Jamil al Fakhri, C.B.E.

Born in Mosul in 1910. Shia. Joined Government service in 1933 after studying abroad at Birmingham University. Chief Engineer to the Baghdad Municipality and subsequently served with the Development Board, where he was Director-General of the 2nd Technical Section in charge of public works. Appointed Minister of Communications and Works by Arshad al Umari in April 1954 and in June 1954 became Lord Mayor of Baghdad.

Awarded a C.B.E. in 1955 for services in connection with the British Trade Fair held in Baghdad in 1954. For a time in 1957, it looked as though he might fall a victim to the Purge Committee on a charge of corruption, but he survived.

Is not a politician and does his job as Lord Mayor energetically. He claims that by doing so he has made for himself a number of enemies. His general attitude to ourselves has always been friendly. His English is good.

His wife speaks some English.

57. Fakhri Tabaqchuli

Sunni. Born about 1900.

Began his official career as a judge. Mutasarrif of Amara, 1945, and Basra, 1948. Appointed to the Court of Cassation in December 1949 and made President of the Tribunal Court of Cassation in 1950. Lord Mayor of Baghdad, April 1953. Minister of Justice under Arshad al Umari, April 1954, and Acting Minister of the Interior (June 1954).

He was a protégé of the late Hamdi al Pachachi, Pompous, a showman and said to be corrupt, he is unpopular with his subordinates. He speaks fair English.

58. Ghazi Muhammad Fadhil al Daghestani, C.V.O. (Major-General)

Sunni born in Baghdad 1910. Son of Muhammad Pasha Daghestani, a Turkish General, and brother of the wives of Hikmat Sulaiman (q.v.) and Najib al Rawi (q.v.).

Attended the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, and the Staff Colleges at Quetta and Baghdad. Originally an engineer, he later transferred to the artillery. Appointed Military Attaché in London in April 1952 and served as A.D.C. to the Duke of Gloucester at the accession of King Faisal II in May 1953. At present Director of Military Operations and Acting Deputy Chief of General Staff (Operations), and as such played an active part in the negotiations leading to the Anglo-Iraqi Agreement of April 1955. Promoted Major-General November 1955.

Ghazi Daghestani is the Turk first and foremost; he has no Arab blood in his veins and in foreign company is liable to refer to his compatriots as "these Arabs." He is sending his son and daughter to Eton and Heathfield respectively and his appearance and manner are in keeping. He is pro-British and both he and his wealthy wife speak excellent English and French in addition to Turkish and Arabic. Although an intelligent, high-principled aristocrat and an able officer, and ambitious to take a prominent part in politics in the future, he has had no recent practical experience of soldiering. He is understood to be seeking an operational command.

He quarrelled violently with the Regent over the despatch of Iraqi troops to Palestine in 1948 but his family influence and his strength of character have enabled him to retain his position in the army and in society.

59. Hafidh al Qadhi

Sunni. Born about 1900. A leading merchant who has built up a prosperous business from the humblest beginnings. Started life as a car-washer and chauffeur, established his firm in 1919 and is now reputed to be worth over £100,000. In 1956 he was presented with an income tax assessment for £90,000 which he succeeded in settling for £15,000.

An uncouth individual of abounding vitality, shrewd and ruthless in business matters, though he can be kind-hearted outside. He now leaves a good deal of the detail to his American lady secretary, with whom he lives openly.

A leading member of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce, he is agent for H.M.V., but otherwise seems to prefer American products.

60. Hashim Jawad

Sunni, born Baghdad 1911, the son of a small official. He was educated at the American University, Beirut, and at London University, from which he graduated in Economics in 1936.

He was appointed Assistant Secretary to the Council of Ministers in 1936, joined the Iraqi Foreign Service in 1938 and was sent as Iraqi representative to the International Labour Organisation at Geneva. He returned to Iraq in 1941 and in 1942 became the first Acting Director-General of Labour in the Ministry of Social Affairs. He also acted as Secretary to a committee for the organisation of post-war affairs in Iraq. In his capacity of Director-General of Labour, he took part in the settlement of the Iraq Petroleum Company strike at Kirkuk in 1946. Later in the same year he was removed from his post by Arshad al Umari who regarded him as a fellow-traveller. From 1947 to 1956 he was employed in the International Labour Organisation. In 1956 was appointed Iraq's Permanent Delegate to the United Nations; it has however been arranged that he should not normally represent Iraq in the Security Council since he has shown himself ready to co-operate with the Russians there.

A quiet and studious man with a clear head and a genuine interest in labour questions, he found the conditions in the Ministry of Social Affairs extremely frustrating. He is married to a Swiss and speaks excellent English.

61. Hussain Makki Khammas

Born 1899 in Baghdad. A Sunni Muslim. Officer in Ottoman Army and a regular officer in the Iraqi Army Engineers. Took a course at the Staff College, Quetta, and went on secondment to United Kingdom on various occasions. Director-General (Administration) and later Acting Chief of General Staff after the appointment of General Nuruddin Mahmud (q.v.) as Prime Minister. Minister of Defence in Dr. Jamali's Governments (September 1953 and March 1954) and again in Arshad al Umari's Government (April 1954). Appointed a Senator in March 1954. Now head of the Military Affairs Committee in the Senate.

Hussain Makki is elderly, tired and lacking in drive. He is not a good administrator. As Minister of Defence he was purely a figure-head and fast lost the respect of many of his officers who are inclined to regard him as a benign buffoon.

He speaks English well, and in his personal relations with British officers he is friendly. He genuinely prefers the English way and methods to those of other foreign Powers.

62. Hassan Sami Tatar

Sunni Moslem (Turkoman) of Kirkuk, born about 1899. His education at the Constantinople Law School was interrupted by the first world war, in which he was taken prisoner by the British forces in Mesopotamia and spent two years in a prisoner-of-war camp in India.

Returning to Iraq after the armistice, he entered the newly founded Baghdad Law College and passed out at the head of the first batch of graduates. He was immediately appointed a judge in Baghdad and thereafter served in the Ministry of Justice and on the Court of Cassation until in February 1950 he became Minister of Justice under Tawfiq Suwaidi. Minister of Justice again under Nuri al Said in September 1950. Elected Deputy for Khanaqin in February 1951. Appointed first Iraqi President of the Court of Cassation, July 1951.

He is a quiet man with no particular political affiliations. He speaks Arabic and Turkish.

63. Hassan al Suhail (Shaikh)

Born in 1889 and brought up among the tribesmen of the Bani Tamim, of whom he is now Paramount Shaikh. The family acquired wealth through the possession of land in the neighbourhood of Baghdad which was irrigated during the British Mandate. At one time in receipt of an official salary in return for the good behaviour of his tribe, he has found it to his interest consistently to support the ruling family in Baghdad. During the Rashid Ali rebellion he was interned but resumed his former position after the rebellion had been put down. Although not a major tribal figure, he enjoys some social prestige due to the proximity of his tribe to the capital; the Iraq Government make frequent calls on his hospitality to offer suitable "Arab" entertainment to visiting notables. He used to support Saleh Jabr, and has often been a Deputy. Commercially, he enjoyed a spell as the decorative local agent for Cadillac, and has still some commercial interests.

He is humorously used by the Baghdad Press as the example *par excellence* of the old-time pro-British tribal shaikh. He has little or no English.

64. Hassan al Talabani (Shaikh)

Kurd, born about 1911 of a well-known family of Kirkuk. His ancestors were heads of a Sufi brotherhood. He graduated from the Baghdad Law College in 1934 and joined the Ministry of Interior in 1935. He served as Qaimmaqam in various Kurdish districts and at Mandali. Appointed Mutassarif of Sulaimaniya early in 1947, transferred to Erbil later in the year, to Hilla in 1948, to Diyala early in 1950 and Dulaim in October 1950. A.H.Q., R.A.F., Habbaniya, found him very helpful. Re-transferred to Diyala, August 1952. Made Mutassarif of Kut 1953 and Director-General of Guidance and Broadcasting June 1954 by Arshad al Umari. In 1955 appointed Inspector-General, Ministry of Finance. Director-General of Mortgage Bank 1956 and member of Civil Service Commission, 1957.

He is intelligent, honest and capable. He is not a strong character, but as an administrator he makes up in some measure for his lack of strength by persistence and a good sense of diplomacy. Personally he is good company and enjoys the companionship of English. He speaks Kurdish and Arabic, some Turkish and good English. He is unmarried.

65. Hikmat Sulaiman

Sunni, born 1886. A member of the Committee of Union and Progress, he was Director of Education and Assistant Governor of Baghdad under the Turks, and was in Constantinople when the British forces occupied Baghdad in 1917.

Returning to Iraq in 1921 he became Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in 1923 and was Minister of Interior under Abdul Muhsin Sa'dun (1925-26) and again under Rashid Ali Gailani in 1933. He visited Turkey in 1935 and was much impressed with modern Turkish methods.

In 1936 he joined Bekr Sidqi in the *coup d'etat* which over-threw Yasin al Hashimi's Government and became Prime Minister. He resigned in 1937 after the murder of Bekr Sidqi. As Prime Minister he disappointed expectations.

Although apparently reconciled with Nuri al Said in 1938, he was arrested and tried by court martial for treason under the latter's premiership in 1939. The death sentence passed on him was commuted to five years' imprisonment, and he was interned in Sulaimaniya. Released by Rashid Ali in April 1941, he was in Persia during Rashid Ali's rebellion.

When he returned to Iraq he devoted himself to farming and prospered. Unpopular with the Regent and Nuri al Said, he took little part in politics until 1947, when he was involved in the intrigues which culminated in the fall of Saleh Jabr and the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948. Since then he has often been reported to be making contact with discontented army officers and people of the Left, and is generally regarded as the "dark horse" of Iraqi politics; but this impression is probably coloured by his history and is an exaggeration of his present influence. He had a heart attack in 1949 and is unlikely to play any great political part again though he frequently gives advice to Nuri al Said. He was appointed a member of the Regency Council in April 1952 and in 1953 and 1954. Was the only member of the Regency Council in 1954 who opposed taking firm measures to deal with possible demonstrations against Iraqi acceptance of United States military aid, and, after this, used all his influence to further the candidature of Kamil al Chadirchi (q.v.) in the elections of June 1954. This attitude, which implied support for the Communists with whom Chadirchi was allied, was not dictated by any liking for Communism but partly from a sense of grievance at his own lack of political success (he undoubtedly thinks he might have been President of Iraq if the British had not imposed the Hashimite monarchy) and partly from a failure to understand the full impact of Communism. He is a friend of Chadirchi's family and lives in the past—as well he might, since he is the youngest and last-surviving son of a great family—his eldest brother having been born in 1834! He shows considerable friendship to Her Majesty's Embassy despite his inability to converse in any language but Turkish and Arabic. He now runs quite an up-to-date dairy.

His wife, a Daghestani, is a sister of the wife of Najib al Rawi (q.v.). She also is friendly but speaks Turkish only.

66. Husamuddin Jumaa

Born 1899. Sunni. Officer in the Turkish Army during the first World War. After the war entered the Police Department in Baghdad and was appointed Commandant of Police in 1932. Mutassarif of Kirkuk in 1937, and later of Diwaniya. From 1939 to June 1941 he was Director-General of Police. Although he was much criticised for his behaviour during the Rashid Ali rebellion in May 1941 he was not punished and was appointed Mutassarif of Mosul at the end of 1941. Between 1942 and December 1944 he held various appointments, including those of Director-General of Supplies and of Revenues. From December 1944 to 1946 he was Mayor of Baghdad, and was then transferred as Mutassarif to Basra but resigned. Elected Deputy for Diyala in 1948. Appointed Minister of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Mustafa al Umari in July 1952. Just before the riots in November he became

Acting Minister of the Interior. He resigned with Mustafa al Umari when the riots began. Elected Deputy for Diyala in January 1953. Minister of the Interior under Jamil Madfai in January 1953. Elected Deputy for Baghdad, September 1954. A wealthy man, he is a close friend of Mustafa al Umari. In appearance he is impressive but in performance undistinguished, and he finds difficulty in co-operating with his colleagues. He speaks no English.

His wife does not appear in public.

67. Hussain Jamil

Sunni of Baghdad, born about 1906. A member of the Jamil family which has marriage connexions with the Suweidis. His father was a judge. Educated at Baghdad and graduated from the Law College in 1930.

From 1933 to 1946 he served as a judge in a number of provinces including Diyala, Diwaniya, Hilla and Baghdad.

He resigned from the Public Service in 1946 in order to become a founder member of the National Democratic Party; he went into private practice as a lawyer and acted as defence counsel in a number of cases concerned with political offences.

Deputy for Baghdad, 1948. He resigned with the opposition Deputies in March 1950. Minister of Justice in Ali Jawdat's Cabinet of December 1949 to February 1950. Arrested after the disorders in November 1952. Elected president of the Bar Association, August 1953 to August 1957 and Secretary-General of the National Democratic Party in November 1953. Elected Deputy for Baghdad, unopposed, in June 1954. Not re-elected in September 1954.

Hussain is a convinced Democrat and a sincere reformer who is generally respected though in recent years he has been accused of playing politics for material ends and having a clandestine link with the reactionaries. He is less intransigent than most of the opposition leaders and is not always in agreement with the leader of his party. In the autumn of 1953 he quite gratuitously telegraphed an offer to defend Dr. Musaddiq in the Persian courts and he persists in regarding him as a great democrat and patriot. He dislikes Americans. He speaks some English and his wife, who appears in mixed society, is fairly fluent. He claims not to be anti-British.

68. Ibrahim Akif al Alusi

Sunni, born in Baghdad, 1894. Graduated from Istanbul Medical College in 1916 and served in Iraq under the Turks.

He later joined the Iraqi Health Service and rose to be Director-General of Public Health in 1939. He was also Secretary-General of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society for some time.

Minister of Education under Hamdi Pachachi, 1944-45. Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs in 1946; Minister in Damascus, December 1948; Minister in Ankara, February 1950; Ambassador there, 1953 to 1956, when he returned to Baghdad as Inspector in the Ministry of Health. Retired on pension 1957.

As Minister of Education he was incompetent and prejudiced, and it is generally considered that he was not a success in Damascus but was better in Ankara. Superficially friendly, he is a born intriguer.

69. Ihsan Rifat

Born Baghdad 1918. Sunni. A graduate of the American University at Beirut and Californian Universities at Los Angeles and Berkley. He holds a B.Sc. in Petroleum Engineering. Joined government service in 1939. Served as Engineer in the Ministry of Economics, where he became Director of Mineral

Resources in 1951. Studied at the Royal School of Mines in London 1947-48. Member of the Government Oil Refineries Administration Board since 1952. Appointed Director General of Oil Affairs in 1955. Visited the United Kingdom as a guest of Her Majesty's Government in June 1957.

Ihsan Rif'at is one of the best products of Western education. He combines ability and charm with a dry sense of humour which refuses to be discouraged by his country's shortcomings, which he readily admits. He is more interested in the practical needs of Iraq than in theoretical aspirations after Arab Unity. A personal friend of Nadim al Pachachi (q.v.) he advises him well on Oil Affairs. He and his wife, who qualified as a doctor in the United Kingdom, are active in entertaining. Both speak good English.

76. Ismail Safwat

Sunni of Mosul, born 1894. In Turkish times he graduated from the Teachers' Training School, and was a teacher in 1914. He was conscripted and served as a warrant officer in Eastern Anatolia during the first world war. In 1919 he joined the Arab army at Deir el Zor and took part in Jamil Madfai's advance on Tel 'Afar in 1920. After the collapse of Faisal's régime in Syria he went to Turkey.

He came to Iraq in 1922 and joined the Iraqi army. He was on Bekr Sidqi's staff at the time of the latter's *coup d'état* in 1936. From 1940 to 1943 he headed the Iraqi Military Mission to the Yemen. After his return to Iraq he held several brigade commands. Director of Military Operations. Ministry of Defence, 1944. Promoted Major-General, 1946.

In October 1947 he presided over the Arab League Military Committee which sat at Aley, Lebanon. Appointed Deputy C.G.S. early in 1948, he was made Commander of the Irregular Arab Army of liberation on the outbreak of hostilities in Palestine in May 1948. He returned to Iraq and was appointed G.O.C., Second Division, Kirkuk, in 1949. In the autumn of 1950 he became Deputy Chief of the General Staff on the revival of that appointment. In June 1952 was appointed director-general of the Iraq State Railways. In the spring of 1953 he quarrelled with Abdul Wahab Marjan and went on leave but returned shortly after. Left the railways in June 1955 and was returned unopposed as Deputy for Mosul. Appointed Iraqi member of Arab League Commission to visit the Yemen in connexion with Yemeni protests against British interference from the Aden protectorate, 1957. He allowed himself to be taken in by Yemeni and Egyptian propaganda.

He is a taciturn man with no sense of humour, but he has a reputation for efficiency and for being a good disciplinarian. He is a close friend and supporter of Jamil Madfai and Ali Jawdat who are also both from Mosul.

His wife does not appear in public.

71. Izuddin Mulla

Born about 1910. Sunni Kurd from Erbil, son of the well-known divine Mulla effendi. Educated in Iraq. Was reputed a gay young man. Entered politics in the middle '40s as a member of Nuri al Said's Constitutional Union Party. Deputy for Erbil 1948. Second Vice-President of Chamber of Deputies, December 1949. First Vice-President 1953. Re-elected for Erbil and as First Vice-President of the Chamber, September 1954. He has been an assiduous member of the Iraqi Inter-Parliamentary Group and has represented Iraq on the Executive Committee of the I.P.U.

He takes his duties as a parliamentarian seriously but cheerfully. He does not appear to be a strong character but has hitherto had little opportunity to prove himself.

72. Jalal Baban

Kurd of the Baban family, born 1892. At first an extreme nationalist, he was deported in 1920 but released in 1921. Appointed Qaimmaqam in 1923 and later promoted to be Mutasarrif, he served in the administration until 1932.

Minister of Economics and Communications under Naji Shaukat in 1932, of Defence under Rashid Ali in 1933, and of Education under Jamil Madfai in 1934. Director-General of Finance 1934-35 and 1936-37.

Minister of Communications and Works under Nuri al Said 1939-40 and under Jamil Madfai in 1941. Minister of Finance under Nuri al Said in 1943. Senator 1937-43.

Again appointed Minister of Communications and Works under Mohammed al Sadr in January 1948, he managed to retain his portfolio in the succeeding Governments of Muzahim al Pachachi and Nuri al Said until November 1949. Deputy for Diyala in the 1948 elections. Resigned his seat on his appointment as a Member of the Development Board.

No man was better versed in the art of government as it used to be practised in Iraq. He was in his day an unusually competent and elusive Minister. He is undoubtedly corrupt and is widely thought to be so. He is not likely to run for Ministerial office again. On the Development Board he is largely out of his depth and makes little effective contribution. He speaks little English. His wife does not appear in society.

73. Jalal Khalid

Sunni. Born 1902. Joined government service in 1925 and became Qaimmaqam in various parts of Iraq. Appointed Mutasarrif of Diwaniya 1939. As Mutasarrif of Baghdad in May 1941 at the time of Rashid Ali's movement, he went out to meet the Commander of the British forces approaching Baghdad in order to surrender the city, but was wounded in the hand by machine-gun fire. The attentions paid to him on that by Glubb Pasha made him a firm friend. He became Director-General of Awqaf in 1949 and Mutasarrif of Sulaimania in 1950, when he was responsible for the internment of Shaikh Latif, son of Shaikh Mahmoud (q.v.). He became Director-General of the Interior in 1953. He resigned later in the same year and was once more appointed Director-General of Awqaf, where he stayed until his appointment in 1954 as Director-General of Customs and Excise. Here he has concentrated his attention successfully on preventive measures against smuggling. In 1956 he visited the United Kingdom with a small party of senior officials as guests of Her Majesty's Government, showing particular interest in British Customs procedures.

Not a robust personality, he is shy but has a lively sense of humour, a strong sense of loyalty to his friends and a generous disposition. He has shown himself progressively more friendly during recent years. His English is only fair.

74. Jamal Baban

A Kurdish lawyer of the Baban family, born 1890. After serving for some time as a judge in Northern Iraq he became Deputy for Erbil in 1928.

Minister of Justice under Nuri al Said 1930-32, under Jamil Madfai 1933-34, and under Ali Jawdat 1934-35. In 1935 he joined the party organised by Jamil Madfai to oppose Yasin al Hashimi.

Minister of Social Affairs under Nuri al Said 1941-42 and of Justice under Saleh Jabr in 1947. Between his ministerial appointments he practised as a lawyer, and was often Deputy. Appointed Senator in July 1947 and again in 1955.

Minister of Justice under Mustafa al Umari, July 1952. His lenient treatment of the Communists

during the autumn of 1952 gravely weakened the Government's authority.

Like his relative Jalal Baban (q.v.), he was during the 1930s and 40s almost a professional Kurdish Minister. As Minister under Saleh Jabr he was criticised for venality and for influencing judges. He was Acting Prime Minister during Saleh Jabr's absence in London for the signature of the Portsmouth Treaty, and his handling of the situation caused by the demonstration was inept; but in his defence it must be said that Saleh Jabr had kept him in the dark over the course of the negotiations. He resigned with two other Ministers before Saleh Jabr himself gave up hope, and has not been very active since. He is critical of the measures taken against Iraqi Jews in 1950 and 1951. He is a champion of the cause of the emancipation of women. An attractive but weak man. His wife appears in society.

75. Janial Umar Nadhmi

Kurd, born in 1912. Son of Umar Nadhmi (q.v.). Studied at the American University of Beirut.

After serving in the Northern liwas and in Diyala he was appointed Mutasarrif of Basra in July 1949.

Deputy for Rania, January 1953. Re-elected 1954. Minister of Agriculture under Ali Jaudat 1957.

Energetic and respected by the local officials and fond of social life. He has a good name for honesty. Intelligent but easily excited and violently anti-Jewish. He has no particular political affiliations but was critical in Parliament of the lack of a progressive social policy shown by Nuri al Said's Government 1954-57.

He was exceedingly helpful during the Abadan crisis and gave every possible help and facility to our evacuees. Under a bumbling exterior conceals unexpected ability and enjoys respect.

He is an avid reader of British and American newspapers and periodicals. He speaks excellent English. His wife is a daughter of Rauf al Kubaisi and speaks little English.

76. Jamil Abdul Wahhab

Sunni of Baghdad. Born 1910 of a middle-class family. Educated at Baghdad Law College and practised for a short time.

Joined Iraqi Government service in 1933, and was appointed Assistant Magistrate, Baghdad. He was later transferred to Baquba.

Deputy for Diyala in 1939 and Baghdad in 1943 and 1947. He lost his seat in 1948, but became Deputy for Mahmudiyah in 1950. A member of the Central Committee of Nuri al Said's Constitutional Union Party from its foundation in 1949.

Minister for Social Affairs under Nuri al Said 1946, and under Saleh Jabr 1947. Appointed Minister of Justice in Nuri's Cabinet in July 1951. Deputy for Baghdad, January 1953. Deputy for Kut, 1954 and for Baghdad, September 1954. Deputed from Parliament as Ambassador to the Lebanon for a period of two years in June 1955. Resigned his seat in Parliament to retain his post.

His marriage in 1933 to a niece of Nuri al Said is the main reason for his political advancement. In spite of this connection, his attitude during the Rashid Ali rebellion was ambiguous. He is a personal friend of the Crown Prince, and in April 1949 was selected as Iraqi Minister at Cairo. The Egyptian Government, however, refused the *agrément*. He is reported to have engaged in doubtful land transactions in Hilla liwa and he is said to be dissolute, ambitious and untrustworthy but nevertheless makes a superficially pleasant impression. He speaks a little English. His wife does not appear in society.

77. Jamil Madfai

Sunni of Mosul, born about 1886. Educated Istanbul and gazetted an officer in the Turkish Army. He joined the Arab revolt and in 1920 was commanding the Sharifian forces at Deir el Zor. In that year he instigated the murder of the British Political Officer and entered Tel Afar, calling upon the tribes to rise against the British in the name of the Sharif. He retired to Syria when British troops approached from Mosul.

Returned to Iraq in 1923 and served as Mutasarrif in several liwas.

Deputy from 1929 and President of the Chamber from 1932 to 1933; Senator from 1935 to 1945 and again from 1948 onwards. President of the Senate 1943, 1949 to 1951 and again in 1956-57.

Minister of Interior under Nuri Pasha 1930; Prime Minister 1933 and again in 1934 with a different Cabinet. Minister of Defence under Ali Jaudat, August 1934; Prime Minister again for twelve days in March 1935, after which he was forced to resign by an agitation in the Middle Euphrates organised by Yasin Pasha al Hashimi. He refused an invitation to join the Government formed by Hikmat Sulaiman after the Bekr Sidqi *coup d'état* in 1936. He visited the Yemen in the winter of 1936-37 to obtain the Imam's adherence to the Iraqi-Saudi pact of Arab Brotherhood. Became Prime Minister again in August 1937 after the murder of Bekr Sidqi and Hikmat Sulaiman's resignation. He was forced to resign in December 1938 by a military demonstration organised in favour of Nuri al Said. He accompanied the Regent on his flight to Palestine during the Rashid Ali rebellion in 1941 and after its collapse became Prime Minister for a short time. In 1943 at the suggestion of Nuri Pasha, he toured the Arab countries to canvass support for Arab unity. In 1948 after the riots against the Portsmouth Treaty he took the portfolio of Interior under Muhammad al Sadr for a few months. In 1949 he was sent by Nuri al Said to various Arab capitals in an attempt to unify Arab policy towards Palestine. When disorders broke out in November 1952 and Mustafa al Umari's Government resigned, the Regent called on him to form a Cabinet. He failed to do so but became Prime Minister after the elections in January 1953. He resigned when King Faisal II acceded to the throne and was reappointed in May 1953, resigning in September 1953. He refused to be a member of the Regency Council in 1954 because he would not accept Muhammad al Sadr as its chairman. Was member of Regency Council during the King's visit to Jordan in April 1955.

Jamil Madfai is said to have been energetic and resolute in his earlier years. He is popular in most political circles and his influence, which is generally used on the side of moderation, is still considerable, but he is an ageing man, susceptible to the intervention of others and afraid of making enemies. He is unlikely to take any further political part except as a figurehead. His acquisitions of land and commercial interests have made him a rich man.

He is married to a Syrian. He speaks no English.

78. Jamil al Uriali

Born about 1907, of a long-established Baghdad family. Sunni. Educated at Baghdad Law College, whence he graduated in 1930, and studied for a short time at the London School of Economics. On his return he edited a weekly legal journal. He joined the Iraqi Judicial Service 1933 and served as a Judge in Hilla, Diwaniya, Nasiriya and later as Chief Magistrate and President of the Execution Department, Baghdad.

Deputy for Diyala 1947, 1953 and again in 1954. Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies 1949 and 1953. Founder-member and member of the

Central Committee of Nuri al Said's Constitutional Union Party, December, 1949. Minister without Portfolio in charge of Aqaf Affairs under Taufiq Suwaidi, 1950. Minister of Justice in Dr. Jamali's first Government, September 1953, and Minister of Education in his second, March 1954.

He is a protégé of Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, without much personal influence. He speaks very little English. His wife does not appear in society.

79. Jussam Muhammad Shahir (Colonel)

Sunni Muslim, born about 1915.

Has for many years been pilot to the Royal Family and, as such, has travelled extensively. Was appointed to the Command of the Tactical Air Forces in November 1954, since when he has done much to improve the R.I.A.F. In this capacity he took an active part in negotiations for the Anglo-Iraqi Agreement of April 1955.

A lively and very pleasant personality with excellent English.

His wife, who is a close friend of the Queen Mother, does not appear in public.

80. Kadhim Abadi (Brigadier)

A Shia Muslim of the Bani Lam. Born about 1910.

Entirely at home in a Western atmosphere, he has well assimilated an R.A.F. background. He commanded his squadron efficiently and, in November 1954, was appointed to the command of the R.I.A.F. In this capacity he took an active part in negotiations for the Anglo-Iraqi Agreement of April 1955. He was promoted brigadier in May 1955, despite the fact that he is not staff trained.

He is definitely most anxious to retain the British influence and system in the Iraqi Air Force.

Although pleasant and co-operative, he tends to be ineffective in action and over-burdened with self-importance. He speaks good English. His wife does not appear in public.

81. Kamil al Chadirchi

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1901. Half-brother of Rauf al Chadirchi (q.v.). His father was exiled in 1920 and he accompanied him to Istanbul where he studied medicine for a year.

On returning to Iraq he studied law and graduated from the Baghdad Law College in about 1925, when he was appointed to a minor position in the Ministry of Finance. Became Private Secretary to Yasin al Hashimi in 1929, and left official employment soon after to edit *Al Ikha al Watani*, the organ of Yasin Pasha's party of that name. In the early 30s he was associated with the Ahali group with Mohammed Hadid, Abdul Fatah Ibrahim and Abdul Qadir Ismail and started the newspaper *Saut al Ahali*, which continued with some interruption and changes of name until 1954. He was convicted under the Press Law in 1934 and arrested in the same year for publishing pamphlets against King Ghazi but released for lack of evidence.

The Ahali group was privy to the Bekr Sidqi *coup d'Etat* against Yasin al Hashimi in 1936 and Kamil became Minister of Economics and Commerce in the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman. He resigned in June 1937 because of the increasing influence of the Army. He later formed the Democratic Party with Mohammed Hadid, Majid Mustafa and Hikmat Sulaiman which had little success. He refused to enter Nuri al Said's Cabinet in 1943. In 1946 he formed the National Democratic Party, which voluntarily suspended activity in 1948, but resumed in 1950. Both in 1946 and 1947 he was prosecuted on Press Law charges. He took a leading part in the agitation which led to the 1952 riots. He was interned for six weeks. Elected Deputy for Baghdad

June 1954 with the help of Hikmat Sulaiman and other friends of his family. He headed the "National Front," composed of the National Democratic Party, the Istiqlal Party and Peace Partisans with various fellow-travellers. Despite the fact that they only secured some ten seats in the Chamber, the National Front achieved a resounding propaganda success, conducting their election campaign with a thoroughness and efficiency which was a new feature in Iraqi politics. Arrested in November 1956 for being a signatory of a telegram the contents of which he knew to be untrue, with the object of provoking disorder. He was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment by Military Court. His imprisonment was used by the Left-wing politicians to embarrass the Government of Ali Jaulat in the late summer of 1957.

Kamil is a muddle-headed idealist who holds progressive social democratic views with complete sincerity, but he is incapable of translating these views into a consistent policy suitable to Iraqi conditions. The poor success of the National Democratic Party in the past is largely due to his lack of leadership and organising ability. He is an unrelenting opponent of Nuri al Said. He is known to have been in contact with the Soviet Legation in 1951 and 1952.

Formerly a rich landlord, he has now sold much of his land and is no longer wealthy and his children's education has been largely paid for by his half brother. He speaks very little English.

82. Khalil Ibrahim

Born 1915. Sunni of Baghdad. Joined government service 1927 in the Directorate General of Civil Defence and later entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Served at the Iraqi Embassy in Cairo. There noticed by Nuri al Said who used him for many years as his Personal and Confidential Secretary. Appointed Acting Director-General of Guidance and Broadcasting, May 1954, which appointment was confirmed December 1956.

Khalil Ibrahim is a tough, hard-working and not very brilliant Civil Servant. He is devoted to Nuri Pasha and resents any Western influence which tends to harm Nuri's reputation with the Arabs. He is absolutely loyal to Iraq, but his unimaginative and negative approach to his present task and his irregular promotion have brought him many enemies, particularly among the more talkative and liberal-minded Iraqi politicians and intellectuals.

He is a proud and touchy person, slightly anti-British but not unco-operative. Perfectly sure of himself in all societies, he is nevertheless often overworked and tired, particularly when Nuri is in office and overburdens him. He speaks good English; he has a charming wife who speaks fair English and who is headmistress of a girls' school in Baghdad.

83. Khalil Jamil (Major-General)

Born about 1905. Sunni Muslim from Mosul. An engineer officer who was trained at R.M.A., Woolwich, in 1935, and at Chatham. Has been chief engineer for several years and was promoted major-general in December 1954. He played a major and successful role in the flood control operations of April-May 1954 in the Baghdad area.

Pro-British, energetic and essentially cheerful. Anxious to keep abreast of British engineering doctrine, though not well equipped to train sappers for their role in the field. Nevertheless he puts on a good show when called upon to do so. Speaks good English. Outside interests tend to detract from his value as chief engineer. Is popular with the Germans whose machinery he buys as it is cheaper than British. His wife does not appear in public.

84. Khalil Kanna

Sunni, born in Felluja about 1905. His family is of Turkoman origin. Educated at the American University of Beirut, and the Baghdad Law College, he entered Government service in 1933 and worked mainly in the Ministry of Communications and Works until 1941, when he supported Rashid Ali Garlani's *coup d'Etat* and was consequently interned.

In 1946 he was a founder-member of the Istiqlal Party, but he resigned from the Party with a flourish in 1947 and married a daughter of Ali Ridha al Askari, thus becoming a relative of Nuri al Said. Elected Deputy for Dulaim in 1947, he was not returned in the 1948 elections. Re-elected in a by-election in 1950 and again in 1954.

In January 1949 he started the newspaper *Al Ahd*, which was Nuri al Said's mouthpiece. In December 1949 he became a founder-member of Nuri's Constitutional Union Party and was elected to its Central Committee.

Appointed Minister without Portfolio in Taufiq Suwaidi's Government in February 1950 to supervise Press and propaganda affairs.

Appointed Minister of Education under Nuri al Said in September 1950. His success in this post largely re-established his political reputation. Minister of Education under Jamil Madfai, January and May 1953 and again under Nuri al Said, August 1954. Became Minister of Finance after December 1955, retaining the portfolio of Education in an acting capacity. Left the Cabinet with Nuri June 1957.

As Minister of Education and leader of Nuri al Said's Constitutional Union Party in the Chamber of Deputies during the Government of Dr. Jamali, earned the latter's undying hatred, added to which he is a fervent Sunni and deeply distrusted by the Shias.

He is a not very approachable personality, cold with strangers and slightly abrupt; in recent years he has mellowed considerably and can on occasion be a pleasant and humorous conversationalist. But he still has a reputation for being very hard with his officials and quarrelsome with his colleagues.

Khalil Kanna is undoubtedly one of Iraq's most competent administrators. He has co-operated well with the Embassy and British Council in matters of common interest. He speaks good English. His wife speaks some English.

85. Mahmud Baban

Born 1920. Sunni Kurd of Kifri. Formerly a judge, he was at one time a member of Nuri al Said's Constitutional Union Party. Elected Deputy for Khanuqin in 1951, and for Kifri since 1953. Visited Turkey with a parliamentary delegation in 1955, and is active in the Iraqi Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. He attended the London Conference of the I.P.U. in 1957.

He is serious, intelligent and ambitious, greatly interested in the development of parliamentary institutions in Iraq and a moderate nationalist. He runs his tribe near Kifri with a benevolent but absolute dictatorship and urges political democracy for Iraq. He is a great advocate of village improvement by the Ministry of Development. He speaks English well. His wife does not go out.

86. Majid Mustafa

Kurd of Sulaimaniya, born about 1895. An officer in the Turkish Army during the First World War, he remained pro-Turkish for some time and later became an active supporter of Shaikh Mahmud (q.v.).

Appointed Mudir Nahiya 1927; Qasimmaqam 1928-35; Mutasarrif 1935-41; he was an able administrator.

His attitude during Rashid Ali's rebellion in 1941 was equivocal, and he forfeited the trust of both sides. On the Regent's return to Baghdad he was suspended for four years for having complied with Rashid Ali's orders.

Nevertheless in December 1943 the Regent reluctantly agreed to his appointment as Minister without Portfolio to advise on Kurdish affairs in Nuri al Said's Government. He achieved a peaceful settlement with Mulla Mustafa of Barzan in January 1944, but resigned with the whole Cabinet in June 1944.

Appointed Minister of Social Affairs under Nuri al Said in September 1950 and elected Deputy for Erbil in November 1950. Minister of Social Affairs under Mustafa al Umari July 1952 and under Nuruddin Mahmud November 1952. Resigned in December 1952. Deputy for Sulaimaniya January 1953. Re-elected June 1954 largely through Government intervention in the elections, but not in September 1954. Minister of Social Affairs under Jamil Madfai, January and May 1953.

Although he is a Kurd first and an Iraqi afterwards, Majid proved an able Minister. In the summer of 1951 he was given a tour of social services in the United Kingdom by the British Council and returned an enthusiastic admirer of Britain and with a much improved knowledge of English. Subsequently, however, the apathy of other members of the Cabinet to his ideas of social reform discouraged him, and, with the resignation of Jamil Madfai's Government, returned to his large and successful business interests which include a marble quarry in Rowanduz. He has had trouble with his sons, one at least of whom is a professing Communist. His wife does not go out in society.

87. Mar Shimun (His Beatitude)

Eshai Mar Shimun XXIIIrd, Patriarch of the Assyrians. Born about 1909, he succeeded to the patriarchate in 1920 when a child. Educated in England at a seminary in Canterbury.

After his return to Iraq he inspired the mutiny of the Assyrian Levies in 1932 and the exodus of the Assyrians to Syria in 1933 which precipitated the massacres in Mosul liwa of that year. He was deported in 1933 and given asylum in Cyprus. He spent the next seven years in Europe, mostly in England and Geneva, trying to obtain assistance for his people. Granted British naturalisation in 1939 and went to Cyprus, but in 1940 he went to America and has since been living in Chicago, taking a full part in intrigues which split the Assyrians both inside and outside Iraq.

Mar Shimun's aim was to establish the whole Assyrian community in a compact enclave under his own spiritual and temporal authority. His political inexperience and overweening ambitions caused his people much needless suffering.

88. Matti Aqrawi, Dr.

Born 1901 of a prominent Assyrian Orthodox Christian family. Joined Government Service in 1924 and has specialised in education. Dean of the Higher Teachers' Training College 1939, Director-General of Higher Education 1945. From 1950 to 1957 was Deputy Director in UNESCO of the Education Division responsible for school education and published in collaboration a work on schools which has been translated into Arabic. Appointed President of the new Baghdad University 1957. His appointment was criticised on the grounds that he had been out of Iraq for some years and had no experience of a university other than as an undergraduate. His absence from Iraq, however, also meant that he was free from the intrigues and jealousies of the Ministry of Education and had

acquired something of an international name, together with the reputation of a good administrator and educationalist. He is, therefore, popular. He speaks excellent English and is well-disposed.

89. Muhammad Ali al Chalabi

Shia of Kadhmain, born about 1910. Brother of Abdul Hadi al Chalabi (q.v.). In 1933, after studying at the American University of Beirut, he went to London to study economics. In 1938, was given a post in the Agricultural and Industrial Bank. In 1941 he was transferred to the newly-opened Rafidain Bank in Baghdad, of which he was appointed director in 1945. Is reported to have amassed a large personal fortune from his banking activities.

He speaks good English and is married to a Syrian who speaks good French. They are keen social climbers and have lately shown a marked preference for the American community in Baghdad.

An able but unscrupulous banker with his eye firmly fixed on his own interests; an unattractive character.

90. Muhammad Ali Mahmud

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1895. Educated Baghdad Law School and employed in the Ministry of Justice, in which he rose to become Director-General. He also held post of Director-General Tapu and in 1935 was a member of the Court of Cassation.

Deputy for Diyala in the Parliament of 1935 and for Erbil in those of 1936 and 1937. Minister of Finance in Hikmat Sulaiman's re-formed Cabinet of 1937.

He was Minister of Communications and Works in Rashid Ali's unconstitutional Cabinet of April 1941. On its collapse he fled to Persia but was handed over to the British in September 1941. He was interned in Rhodesia and sent back to Iraq in 1944, where he was tried and sentenced to five years' imprisonment, but released in 1947. He was elected Deputy for Koy Sanjaq in November 1950.

His daughter is married to a son of Ja'far al Askari and probably because of this connection he joined Nuri Pasha's constitutional party in 1949. Elected to the Central Committee of the Party in November 1950. Minister of Justice under Jamil Madfai May 1953. Appointed Deputy Prime Minister in Dr. Jamali's first Government September 1953 and Minister of Justice in his second, March 1954. He was appointed a Senator in March 1954. Appointed Minister of Justice under Nuri in August 1954 and has served as Acting Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Defence in Nuri's absence. Acting Minister of Development from May-December 1955 when, resenting Nuri's proposal to deprive him of the Ministry of Justice and make him substantive Minister of Development, he resigned.

A pleasant man with moderate ability and drive, but his friends say that the iron has entered his soul as a result of his internment. He is a nationalist and a stubborn defender in negotiations of what he believes to be Iraqi interests. Speaks Turkish and more English than he admits to.

91. Muhammad Hassan Salman (Dr.)

Shia of Baghdad, born 1908. Was a teacher in Government primary schools. Entered the Iraqi Medical College, graduated as a doctor in 1934 and joined the Iraqi Medical Service. Member of the Muthanna Club. Appointed Chief Medical Officer of Health at the Ministry of Education in Rashid Ali's rebel Government, but after only one day in office he left for Turkey to undergo medical treatment. Returned to Baghdad after the war and re-joined the Iraqi Health Service as a Chief Medical

Officer. Appointed Director of Amir Abdul Ilah Hospital for Chest Diseases at Tuwaita in April 1951. Elected Deputy for Amara in January 1953 and again in June and September 1954. Became Minister of Health under Jamil al Madfai in January 1953. Remained Minister of Health on re-formation of Jamil al Madfai's Cabinet in May 1953, and was again appointed Minister of Health under Nuri al Said in August 1954, but was dropped in favour of Abdul Amir Ailawi in December 1955. When in office, he brought back many doctors who supported Rashid Ali. He is reported to be corrupt. He speaks quite good English. His wife speaks a little English.

92. Muhammad Hadid

Sunni, born 1906 of a merchant family of Mosul. Educated at American University, Beirut, 1924 to 1928, and London School of Economics 1928 to 1931.

Employed in the Ministry of Finance 1931 to 1937; Deputy for Mosul 1937; Minister of Supply under Nuri Pasha in 1946, he resigned from this Government in protest against Government interference in the elections.

He was a prominent member of the so-called Ahali Group in the first half of the 1930's. This group advocated a mild form of Socialism. Some of its members later became Communists. In the later '30s he was associated with Kamil al Chadirchi's Democratic Party and was one of the founder members of the National Democratic Party in 1946. He was Vice-President of this party which suspended activity in 1948 but resumed in 1950. He resigned his seat in the Chamber in 1950 with the rest of the Opposition Deputies in protest against the intolerance of the Government and of Nuri al Said's majority party. Visited the United Kingdom in 1951, 1952 and 1953. He was in London at the time of the 1952 disorders. Letters of his criticising the "Old Guard" at that time were published in *The Times* and the *Manchester Guardian*. Re-elected Vice-President of the National Democratic Party November 1953. Elected Deputy for Mosul in the National Front June 1954.

Not elected in September 1954 when the National Democratic Party boycotted the elections.

Apart from his political activities, he has large business interests and is a partner with Kamil Khadairi in a flourishing soap business which exports to India and Egypt.

Muhammad Hadid is an intelligent and sincere democrat, an effective speaker and a persuasive writer, but he has not made the intellectual effort required to transform the ideas he learned at the London School of Economics into a suitable policy for Iraq. Although a nationalist and a critic of British influence in Iraq, he is friendly to us and has a number of British friends. He dislikes Americans. He speaks excellent English. His wife does not appear in society.

93. Muhammad Ja'far al Shabibi, C.B.E.

Born circa 1900. Shia. A merchant who has built up from small beginnings a leading textile import business. President of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce since 1950. Awarded C.B.E. in 1955 for his collaboration in arrangements for the British Trade Fair. In business as in politics he maintains a narrow and biased nationalist outlook. Was noticeably unfriendly to the United Kingdom during the Suez crisis and was taken into custody for a few days for his attempts to organise a protest strike of the merchant community. Represents Iraq in the Permanent Bureau of Arab Chambers of Commerce and at meetings of the Internal Chamber of Commerce where he pursues a strong anti-Israeli line. A man of limited intelligence. Speaks no English.

94. Muhammad Mahdi al Jawahiri

A Shia born at Nejal in 1901. Employed in Ministry of Education but dismissed in about 1936. He has won wide recognition in the Arab world as a poet. Jawahiri is a man of pronounced Leftish views and has been connected with the "Peace" movement in Iraq, attending World Peace Councils in Warsaw, 1950, and Vienna, 1951. He owned and published a succession of Left-wing newspapers, *Thabat*, *Jihad*, *Jadid* and *Al Rai al Am*, each of which in turn was suppressed by the Government, *Al Rai al Am* lasting from 1953 to November 1954. He was arrested after the riots of 1952. His early release and subsequent inactivity together with the fact that he has at times received subventions from the Ministry of Education for his poetry and been given a plot of land by the Jamali Government, have led to his being regarded as lukewarm by thorough-paced Leftists.

95. Muhammad Mahdi Kubba

Born about 1900 of the well-known Baghdad Shia family of Kubba, he was educated in the religious seminary at Nejal in grammar, Persian and theology.

After the First World War he engaged in quite a humble way in the textile trade in common with other members of his family. He never held Government office of any kind until 1948, although he was once a Deputy for Baghdad in 1937.

He was a member of the Nationalist Muthanna Club from its foundation and was helped into politics by a fellow member, Dr. Jamali (q.v.). He developed pro-Axis sympathies during a visit to Germany in the late 30's but took no active part in the Rashid Ali movement.

He was made president of the Istiqlal Party on its formation in 1946, probably owing to his Shia origin, well-known name, and clean record. His voice in its councils is less effective than those of Faiq Samarra'i and Siddiq Shanshal. Re-elected president of the Istiqlal Party in November 1950, he strongly supported the Persian Government in their efforts to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951.

Minister of Supply in the Sadr Cabinet of January 1948, he resigned in June over the conduct of the elections. However, he became Deputy for Baghdad in these elections, but resigned his seat in protest, in common with the rest of the opposition, in March 1950. He was re-elected in the by-elections in June. Resigned with the other Istiqlal Deputies from the Chamber of Deputies in February 1952. He took a prominent part in the agitation which led to the riots in November 1952, after which he was interned.

In November 1953 re-elected President of Istiqlal Party, and in June 1954 was returned unopposed for Baghdad. He took his party into the National Front in the elections of June 1954, collaborating with the National Democratic Party and the Peace Partisans. Though this manoeuvre obtained a measure of success there were indications that he was not altogether happy with all the policies of his associates, particularly the Communist line on "Peace with Israel."

Elected again for Baghdad in September 1954 as an Independent, he later resigned his seat in favour of a nephew.

An untidy looking man, he has a reputation for sobriety and honesty. His enemies accuse him of folly rather than knavery. Intelligent, but not politically astute, he only speaks Arabic and Persian. He is a strong opponent of British "imperialism." His wife does not appear in society.

96. Muhammad Ridha Shabibi (Saiyid)

Shia of Nejal, born 1889. Educated in the religious schools of Nejal. In 1908 he began to publish poetry

in the Egyptian periodical Press and acquired a reputation as a literary man. He played some part in the nationalist disturbances in Nejal during the occupation. In 1919 he was sent to the Hejaz by some Iraqi nationalists to offer the Iraqi throne to the Amir Abdullah; thence he went to Syria and did not return to Baghdad until 1921.

He was a member of the Constituent Assembly and was Deputy for Baghdad in most Iraqi Parliaments until 1935. Senator from 1935 to 1943 and President of the Senate for a few months in 1937. He returned to the Lower House in 1943 and was its President in 1943-44. He resigned from Parliament with the Opposition Deputies in March 1950. Deputy for Baghdad, January 1953.

Minister for Education under Yasin al Hashimi in 1924, he resigned from this Government with Rashid Ali Gailani over the Turkish Petroleum Company concession. Again Minister for Education in 1935 under Yasin al Hashimi, under Jamil Madfai in 1937 and 1941, and under Mohammed al Sadr in 1948.

In 1951 he played a prominent part in the formation of the United Popular Front and was elected Chairman of the Front's Political Committee. He was offered the Deputy Premiership by Nasrat al Farisi during his abortive attempt to form a Cabinet in January 1953. In November 1953 elected President, United Popular Front, succeeding Taha al Hashimi. Appointed Senator in February 1954.

A genial old bigot whose views on education are strongly reactionary. He is a strong critic of British influence in Iraq, and with advancing age is becoming increasingly more virulent in his criticisms of the West. He is in contact with the Istiqlal and National Democrat Parties and has been used on occasions as their spokesman. He frequently writes in the newspaper *Al Zaman*.

97. Muhammad Shafiq al 'Ani

Sunni of Ana. Born 1908. Graduate of the Baghdad Law College. Joined Government service in 1933. Served as a judge and in July 1946 became a Judge of a Court of First Instance. In October 1947 became President of the Sunni Sharia Bench of Cassation and in August 1952 Director-General of Auqaf. Minister of State in September 1953 and in temporary charge of the Ministry of Social Affairs in January 1954. Appointed to the Court of Cassation, March 1954. Director-General of Auqaf (religious trusts) in November 1954, reverting to the Court of Cassation a year later.

98. Muhammad Siddiq Shanshal

Sunni, born in Mosul about 1908. Studied law at Baghdad and Damascus. He subsequently studied at the Sorbonne, returning to Iraq in 1939.

After serving as a Legal Adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs he became Director of Propaganda under Rashid Ali in 1941. Although acquitted of the charges brought against him he was interned. In 1946 he took a leading part in the formation of the Istiqlal Party. Resigned with the other Istiqlal Deputies from the Chamber of Deputies in February 1952. Did not contest the 1953 elections. In November 1953 elected Secretary-General of the Istiqlal Party and in June 1954 Deputy for Mosul. He was not re-elected in September 1954. Was exiled to Penjwin for his part in the disturbances following the Suez intervention, November 1956.

Siddiq Shanshal is violently anti-British and he keeps up a flow of invective against the British connection in Parliament and in the Press. He is married to a sister of Yunis Sab'awi who was executed for the part he played in the Rashid Ali revolt. Is sometimes called the Iraqi Goebbels.

99. Muhammad Salim al Radhi

Sunni, born Baghdad 1899. He was educated in Baghdad, the American University of Beirut and the Universities of California and Texas, from which he obtained doctorates in Agriculture and Science. Returning to Iraq in 1926 he joined the Department of Agriculture, in which he eventually became, and remained for several years, Director-General.

Director-General of Labour in the Ministry of Social Affairs, 1946. Iraqi Minister in Tehran, 1947-49. Appointed first Iraqi Minister to India, July 1949. Ambassador there, 1953. Ambassador to Lebanon in 1954, and in 1955 returned to Baghdad to serve at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Reappointed to Delhi as Ambassador, June 1956.

He is a landowner and is connected with the wealthy Shabandar family. His reputation in the Department of Agriculture was good, but as Minister in Tehran he was not popular with the Iranians. Iraqi Shias accuse him of being a fanatical Sunni. He and his attractive wife both speak English well.

100. Mulla Mustafa

Kurdish chieftain of Barzan, born about 1898. Younger brother of Ahmad of Barzan. Mulla is a name not a title.

He was the fighting leader of the Barzanis in the troubles of 1931-32, surrendered with Shaikh Ahmad in 1933, and was banished to Sulaimaniya, where he lived for ten years in poverty on a small allowance from the Government.

In 1943 he escaped to Barzan, where he soon became involved in skirmishes with the Iraqi police. At first concerned only with his own position, he later began to pose as a champion of Kurdish nationalism and won much Kurdish sympathy and support. He resisted successfully the forces of police and troops sent against him. In January 1944, a settlement was arranged, and he visited Baghdad to make submission to the Regent. Returning to Barzan, he remained restless, but was formally pardoned in April 1945, when the Iraqi Government announced a programme for improving security and developing agriculture in the Barzan area.

Becoming impatient, he again took up arms against the Government in August 1945. Large Iraqi forces and clever bribery administered by Mustafa al Umari (q.v.) eventually defeated the Barzanis, and he and his brother Ahmad fled to Persia, where they were well received by the Russian authorities.

After the collapse of the Persian Kurdish independence movement led by Qazi Muhammad, Mulla Mustafa and his brother retired before the Persian forces and entered Iraq in May 1947. Shaikh Ahmad surrendered to the Iraqi Government but Mulla Mustafa refused unconditional surrender and managed to escape with a few hundred men through Turkey and Azerbaijan into the Soviet Union.

At first welcomed eagerly by the Russians Mulla Mustafa later went into obscurity. More recently a sustained effort has been made to revive the glamour of his name. His memory remains alive in Iraq both for fear of his eventual return, and for a certain clique of hero-worship among Kurds with Leftist inclinations.

101. Muntaz Akram al-Umari

Born 1913. Sunni Muslim of Mosul. Educated Baghdad and American University of Beirut. Joined Government service in 1937 and was Assistant Director-General of the Interior in 1943, having previously held posts in the provinces. In 1950 was appointed Director-General of the Baghdad Municipal Passenger Transport Service and President of the Board of Administration of that Service. In that capacity he showed considerable drive and

ability and, using British buses, organised a first-class bus service in Baghdad, together with maintenance workshops and social amenities for employees. In 1953 was chosen as Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior by Said Qazzaz under the Government of Dr. Jamali. In this capacity was invited on a sponsored tour of the United States for four months in 1955 and 1956. In 1957 visited India with a party of administrators to inspect rural administration there.

Muntaz al-Umari is a vigorous man, sharing the administrative ability which characterises many of the Umari family. He holds strong (but not unreasonable) nationalist views, which are shared by his wife, Suad, daughter of Arshad al-Umari (q.v.), who takes a leading part in the Iraqi Red Crescent Society and other charitable activities. Both Muntaz and his wife can hold their own in any society and speak good English.

102. Musa Shabandar (Dr.)

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1899, the son of a wealthy landowner. His brother Ibrahim is a prominent Baghdad merchant. Educated in Baghdad and in Switzerland, he was in Europe from 1918 to 1932, mostly in Switzerland and Germany.

Joined the Iraqi Foreign Service, 1932; Secretary of Iraqi delegation to the League of Nations, 1933; First Secretary, Berlin, 1935. In 1937 he was accused of giving certificates of export to Iraq for munitions destined for Spain. He was recalled and arrested, but proceedings against him were dropped. Deputy for Amara 1937 to 1939.

Reappointed to the Foreign Service 1939 and sent to Berlin as Chargé d'Affaires. Assistant Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, October 1939. Minister for Foreign Affairs in the unconstitutional Government of Rashid Ali in April 1941. He fled to Persia after Rashid Ali's collapse, but was caught and interned in Rhodesia and later sent back to Iraq for trial. He was sentenced in 1944 to five years' imprisonment and sequestration of property. Owing to ill-health he did not serve all his sentence.

He has been free since 1947 and in 1949 he joined Nuri al Said's Constitutional Union Party and was appointed Minister at Damascus. Appointed Ambassador in Washington in June 1953. In March 1954 was named as Minister for Foreign Affairs in Jamali's second Cabinet but succeeded in staying in Washington. Returned to Iraq in October 1954 as Minister for Foreign Affairs under Nuri but was again appointed Ambassador to Washington in May 1955.

Musa Shabandar is not a strong personality. He is intelligent and accommodating, an official rather than a politician. He was not a success as Foreign Minister and his failure to take a clear-cut line got the Iraq Government into difficulties with the other Arab Governments on various occasions. He is married to a Lebanese and speaks English, French and German.

103. Mustafa al Umari

Sunni of the Umari family of Mosul. Born in 1893 and educated at the Baghdad Law School, he served as an officer in the Turkish forces in Mesopotamia in the first world war and was taken prisoner.

He entered Government service at the end of the war, served as Qaimmaqam and Mutasarrif in several districts and also held the posts of Accountant-General and Director-General of Interior.

He was Minister of Interior under Hikmat Sulaiman in 1937; under Jamil Madfai, 1937-38 and in 1941; under Hamdi Pachachi, 1944-46 and under Muzahim Pachachi in 1948. He has also been Minister of Justice under Madfai in late 1938, of Economics under Muhammad al Sadr, January-June 1948 (Acting Interior from March 1948 onwards), and

without Portfolio under Muzahim at the end of 1948 and under Nuri al Said from December 1950. He has been a Senator since 1937. Acting Prime Minister during Nuri al Said's absences from Iraq in the first half of 1952. In July he became Prime Minister. He resigned when rioting broke out in November. His term as a Senator expired in 1954 and despite his wire-pulling was not renewed until the end of 1955. He tried to organise a bloc of young Deputies critical of the Government in the 1953 Parliament, but it came to nothing.

Of all Iraqi politicians and officials Mustafa is probably the most notorious for corruption. He is also one of the most capable administrators in the country. He may be said to exhibit the best and the worst features of the Ottoman idea of Government. His administration during 1945 and his conduct of the 1948 elections aroused severe criticism, but he served his country well during the Barzani troubles of 1945, when his well-directed bribery was of great assistance to the Iraqi forces operating against Mulla Mustafa. His term as Prime Minister was almost disastrous, however. His unimaginative handling of the Opposition parties' demand for direct elections was one of the causes of the riots in November 1952, and his resignation at the height of the disorders was almost criminally irresponsible. Is slowly on his way out. He speaks only a little English. His wife does not appear in society.

104. Muzahim Amin al Pachachi

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1888. Educated at the Law School in Baghdad and graduated in 1912. Before the 1914 war he was a strong Arab nationalist. He wrote for Arab nationalist papers and had to flee to Basra in 1913 to escape arrest. After the war he was employed as a magistrate by the occupation authorities in Basra and returned to Baghdad in 1922.

He joined Government service in March 1923 and became Minister of Communications and Works under Yasin al Hashimi in 1924. In 1927 he was sent to London as Iraqi Diplomatic Agent, returning in 1928. Minister of Economics and Communications under Nuri Pasha, January 1931, and almost immediately after Minister of Interior in the same Government. He resigned in October 1931 because of differences with his colleagues over his dismissal of the Amin al Asima, Mahmud Subhi Daftari. In May 1932 he was charged with complicity in the circulation of scurrilous letters about the King. He was tried and acquitted in October 1932.

Iraqi Minister at Rome and Permanent Iraqi Delegate at Geneva, 1934; Minister at Paris, 1939; he remained there as Minister to the Vichy Government and did not return when Iraq broke off relations in November 1941 but went instead to Rome. In 1944 he went to Geneva and sought facilities to return to Iraq, which were refused. He eventually returned in November 1945.

Prime Minister, June 1948 to January 1949; deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs under Ali Jaudat, December 1949 to February 1950. He was appointed Senator in 1948 but the appointment was held to be constitutionally invalid by a High Court in 1950. He left Iraq for Egypt and Saudi Arabia just before the issue of this decision. He returned to Iraq in November 1950 and took a leading part in the formation of the United Popular Front in May 1951. Resigned from the Front in May 1952.

Muzahim's character presents some contradiction. He is a strong nationalist and resents "imperialism" deeply, but he has been much influenced by the Social Democratic ideas which he has encountered during his prolonged residence in Western Europe. He is often reasonable, but can be stupidly obstinate.

Politically courageous at times, at others he gives up without a struggle. His ideas on general policy are sensible, but as a political tactician he is inept. He hates Nuri Pasha and strongly resents his influence with the Crown Prince. This has led him to criticise the latter indiscreetly on occasion, and to support the policies of King Saud, who is known to have made a monetary gift to him on at least one occasion. In particular he opposed the methods by which Nuri carried out his rapprochement with Turkey in 1954 and United Kingdom accession to the Iraqi-Turkish Pact in 1955 as policies contrary to Arab unity. He is very deaf. He speaks English. His son Adnan is in the Iraqi Foreign Service and is married to the daughter of Ali Jaudat (q.v.).

He has kept in the background during the past years and is still not reconciled with the Crown Prince. His wife does not appear in society.

105. Nadhir al Umari

Born 1917 of the well-known Sunni family of Mosul. Educated in Baghdad and at Liverpool University. Joined Government Service on January 16, 1945, having spent most of the war in the United Kingdom. Served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then as Attaché at the Iraqi Embassy in Washington. Transferred to Amman in December 1950. Attached to the Iraqi Delegation to the United Nations in 1952. Concentrated on economic matters and was a delegate at successive General Assembly Sessions as well as at meetings of the Economic and Social Council. Returned to Iraq and appointed President of the Grain Board in 1956.

His many travels and many years in the United Kingdom and in America have given him a breadth of vision not widely found in Iraqis. Quiet-spoken and intelligent, he is nevertheless an ardent nationalist. He is somewhat overshadowed by his older brother, Muntaz (q.v.); like him, he is a good administrator. Has an artistic side and is good company. Speaks good English. Is married to a cousin who also speaks English. Both go about quite a lot.

106. Nadim Shakir al Pachachi (Dr.)

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1914. Nephew of the late Hamdi Pachachi and of Muzahim Pachachi (q.v.). Educated at Victoria College, Alexandria and London University.

Returned to Baghdad in 1938 and was appointed to the Ministry of Economics in which he rose to be Director-General by 1944.

He was a member of the Iraqi Delegation to the United Nations in 1946 and visited London and America in 1948 to try to obtain support for the proposed Iraqi Oil Refinery at Baiji. Early in 1950 he quarrelled with his Minister, Dhia Jaifar, and tendered his resignation. His resignation was not accepted and he was appointed Director-General of Oil Affairs in June 1950. In this capacity he was a member of the Iraqi Delegation to the negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum Company in the summer and autumn of 1950. In March 1951 he again became Director-General of Economics. He again visited the United Kingdom in connection with tenders for the oil refinery and the Iraq Government's gold case against the Iraq Petroleum Company. Played a leading part in the negotiations of 1951.

In July 1952 he became Minister of Economics under Mustafa al Umari. Joined Nuruddin Mahmud's Cabinet in the same capacity in December 1952. Minister of State under Jamil Madfai in May 1953. Elected Deputy for Baghdad in January 1953. In July 1953 was appointed Minister of Development in Jamil Madfai's Government. In June and September 1954 was re-elected Deputy for Baghdad running in double harness with Abdul Karim al Uzri

(q.v.). Minister of Economics under Nuri, August 1954 to June 1957. Minister of Economics and Acting Minister of Development under Ali Jaudat, June 1957.

Nadim has not a very strong personality but is ambitious and pertinacious in pursuit of any idea he gets into his head, until he generally gets his way. He was an exceptionally intelligent and competent official whose rapid rise was not entirely due to the influence of his family. He is friendly, co-operative and Western-minded, but takes great care not to offend Arab nationalist opinion on any issue, since he fears that to do so would frustrate his political ambitions. In addition to his official position he is a landowner and farmer on a large scale. He divorced his first wife (a Pachachi) in 1947 in order to marry a cabaret artiste. He divorced his second wife in 1950 and married an American girl in 1952. He speaks excellent English.

107. Naji al Asli (Dr.)

Baghdad Sunni, born about 1895. A graduate of the Constantinople Medical School in Ottoman times, he first became prominent in 1922 as semi-official Hashimite representative in London. After Ibn Saud's conquest of the Hejaz he became destitute and was deported to Iraq in 1925.

Employed in the Iraqi Military Medical Service from 1926, he was appointed Iraqi Consul-General and chargé d'affaires in Jidda in 1931 and transferred to Muzahim in 1932. Acting Director-General of Foreign Affairs 1933-34; Counsellor in Tehran 1935; Master of Ceremonies at the Palace 1936.

Minister for Foreign Affairs under Hikmat Sulaiman 1936-37, he went into retirement after that Cabinet's resignation until 1944, when he was appointed Director-General of Antiquities. Appointed permanent Iraqi delegate to the United Nations Organisation by the Sadr Cabinet in February 1948, he was recalled in June 1948 and returned to the Antiquities Department. Appointed an Active Member of the Iraq Academy in November 1949. He organised the Avicenna Festival in Iraq in March 1952. October 1953 was elected President of Iraq Academy, in addition to his post as Director-General of Antiquities.

A polished and intelligent but ponderous man, he is a close friend of Hikmat Sulaiman (q.v.), but is not now on close terms with the active politicians. He speaks English well.

108. Najib al Rawi

Sunni of Baghdad, born about 1898; brother of Ahmed al Rawi (q.v.). Educated at the Baghdad Law School, he worked for a short time as a clerk in the Revenue Department under the British Administration. He has a large practice as a lawyer and was President of the Lawyers' Association in 1942 and again in 1947.

He entered politics as a protégé of Nuri al Said in 1930 and was Deputy for Dulaim in the Parliaments of 1930, 1934, 1937, 1943, 1947 and 1948. He resigned his seat with the Opposition Deputies in March 1950.

Minister of Education under Taufiq Suwaidi 1946; Minister of Justice under Mohammed al Sadr in 1948; Minister of Education in the succeeding Governments of Muzahim al Pachachi, Nuri al Said and Ali Jaudat, June 1948 to February 1950. He represented Iraq at the Paris Session of U.N.O. in September 1948. Appointed Iraqi Minister in Cairo in August 1950, and Ambassador in November 1952. He got on well in Cairo with Her Majesty's Embassy and the Egyptian Government but was not trusted by Nuri al Said, partly because of an old dislike and partly for his friendly relations with Nasser. Transferred to Paris in August 1956 and then to Ankara, December 1956, after the breaking off of diplomatic

relations between Iraq and France. Was invited by Ali Jaudat to be Minister of Education in his Government in June 1957, but insisted on being Minister for Foreign Affairs. When this was refused he returned to his post at Ankara, somewhat disgruntled.

Politically he is a trimmer and has a foot in several camps, though he is generally regarded as primarily a Palace man. He is friendly to the British connection but is not altogether trustworthy, and the kind of Arab nationalism which drove him to leave the Chamber of Deputies is liable to make him unreliable as a Government servant when broader Arab issues, as he sees them, clash with purely Iraqi interests. He is married to one of the Daghestani sisters and speaks a little English.

109. Najib al Rubaii (Major-General)

A Sunni Muslim of the influential Rubaii family. Admitted Sandhurst in 1928. As Major-General commanded the 3rd Cadre Division. Appointed Ambassador to Saudi Arabia September 1957. If he had not been made an Ambassador he would have been made a Lieutenant-General this year, on length of service basis. Thus an embarrassment to Rafiq Arif (q.v.).

Is a very well-educated man, with considerable academic leanings, which he prefers to soldiering. His English is good, though he is too much an Arab to enjoy speaking anything but Arabic. He is very religious and is capable of interfering in politics if his conscience directed such a course. His wife does not appear in society.

110. Nasrat al Farisi

Sunni of Baghdad, born about 1890. Educated Baghdad Law School.

He was conscripted for the Turkish Army before he had graduated, and served as a warrant officer during the 1914-18 war in which he saw service against the Russians at Hamadan and against the British at Kut.

After the war he completed his legal studies in Istanbul and returned to Baghdad about 1922.

He served for several years in the twenties as legal draughtsman in the Ministry of Justice.

First Deputy for Baghdad in 1926 and again in 1932, and in most of the Iraqi Parliaments since then. He resigned his seat with the Opposition Deputies in March 1950.

Director-General of Foreign Affairs 1935. Iraqi delegate at Geneva 1937 to 1938. He was appointed Iraqi Minister at Ankara in April 1943 but did not proceed. In 1945 he was a member of the Iraqi delegation at San Francisco.

Minister of Finance under Naji Shaukat 1932 and again under Jamil Madfai 1933. Minister of Economics under Jamil Madfai, June to October 1941. Minister for Foreign Affairs under Nuri al Said June to October 1943. In the Cabinet of Muhammad al Sadr of 1948 he was first Minister without Portfolio, then Minister of Interior and finally Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was closely associated with the formation of the United Popular Front in May 1951. Resigned from the Front in May 1952. Appointed a Senator in April 1953.

After the election in January 1953 he was asked to form a Cabinet. He first invited former members of the Istiqlal and National Democratic Parties to join but, when they refused, tried to form a coalition consisting of former members of the United Popular Front and the Constitutional Union Party and a few Independentss. At the last moment Nuri's supporters withdrew and he abandoned his attempts to form a Government. His name is still occasionally mentioned as the next Prime Minister, but somehow it never comes off and age makes his

chances less likely. In the intervals of his political career, he practices as a lawyer in which capacity he is held in universal respect and commands substantial fees.

Nasrat is more of a Turk than an Arab, although he was known as an Arab nationalist in the twenties when he was a member of the Sha'ab party of Yasin al Hashimi. He is honest, intelligent and cautious. His approach to political questions is legalistic and theoretical. His friend Hikmat Sulaiman calls him "Confucius." When considering any course of action he sees the difficulties more clearly than the advantages and is inclined to be obstructive. This characteristic made him one of Iraq's worst Ministers of the Interior. He is a sincere reformer who believes in parliamentary democracy and resents the abuses of it which are normal in Iraq. He resigned from Nuri's Cabinet in 1943 as a protest against the Regent's interference in the elections. The nationalist views of his younger days have been modified by experience, but he is still a firm opponent of what he regards as undue British influence exercised through Nuri and the Palace. His wife is prominent in Ladies' Red Crescent activities, and both speak good English. He is personally friendly to the British.

111. Nuri al-Qaraghuli

Born 1911. Sunni of Baghdad. Joined Government service in 1929 and held various administrative posts. Assistant Master of Ceremonies at the Palace 1948. Deputy Master of Ceremonies 1951. Minister of Communications and Works in Arshad al Umari's Government for three months in 1954. Appointed Minister Plenipotentiary at the Iraqi Foreign Ministry in 1955, apparently destined for appointment to Amman, but he refused to proceed and remained in Baghdad, drawing his salary, but without any official post. Acting Chief of the Royal Diwan for a short time in 1955 in the absence of the holder of the post. Mutasarrif of Basra, June 1957. Director-General of Ports Administration, September 1957.

Nuri al-Qaraghuli is a superficially cultivated person, but without much force of character. He is a hanger-on of the Palace. He is unmarried. He speaks English.

112. Nuri al Said, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., D.S.O.

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1888, son of an accountant of Mosul descent. Educated at Military College, Istanbul and served in the Balkan war.

He was one of the founders of the Arab Nationalist Society, Al Ahd, in 1913 and joined the Arab army in the Hejaz in 1916. He served in this army as C.G.S. under his brother-in-law, Jafar al Askari. At that time he was described as a good strategist, clever and hard working, but rash and hot-headed under fire. He won the D.S.O. in 1917 and was appointed an honorary C.M.G. in 1919. Honorary G.C.M.G. May 1955.

After the 1914 war he remained with Faisal in Syria and accompanied him to London and Paris in 1919 and 1920. He was opposed to Faisal's break with the French.

He returned to Baghdad in February 1921 and soon after became C.G.S. and Director-General of Police, retaining these appointments until 1922.

He has been eleven times Minister of Defence, in 1922 (Acting), 1923, 1925, 1926, 1928, 1929 (twice), 1933, 1941 (Acting) and 1953 (twice) in Cabinets headed by Jafar al Askari, Abdul Muhsin Sa'adun, Rashid Ali Gailani, himself and Jamil Madfai. Nine times Minister for Foreign Affairs, in 1930, 1933 (twice), 1934, 1938 (Acting), 1940 (Acting), 1942 (Acting), in Cabinets headed by Rashid Ali Gailani,

Jamil Madfai, Ali Jaudat and himself. He has also been Prime Minister in 1930, 1931, 1938, 1939, 1941-43, 1946, 1949, 1950, 1951 and 1954-57.

His achievements in diplomacy are also impressive. He negotiated and signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930; he negotiated the Bon Voisinage Agreement with Nejd and the Hejaz, 1931. He signed the Extradition Treaty and a Treaty of Commerce with Turkey in 1932 and negotiated and signed the Economic and Commercial Treaty with Turkey in 1946. He represented Iraq at the London conversations in January 1939, which eventually resulted in the issue of the 1939 White Paper on Palestine, and he led the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations General Assembly which decided the partition of Palestine in 1947. He was a member of the Iraqi delegation which signed the unratified Portsmouth Treaty with the United Kingdom in 1948. He negotiated the Iraqi-Turkish Pact of February 1955 and the Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement of April 1955.

After the Bekr Sidqi military coup of October 1936, during which Jafar al Askari was murdered, Nuri retired with his family to Egypt. He returned a year later after Bekr Sidqi had been murdered and Hikmat Sulaiman's Government had fallen, but left again soon after and spent most of 1938 in Syria, Egypt and London, where he held a number of inconclusive conversations with politicians on the Palestine problem. In December 1938 he returned to Iraq and became Prime Minister as a result of a military demonstration organised on his behalf by Taha al Hashimi and Hussain Fawzi, against the Government of Jamil Madfai. In January 1941 he resigned from Rashid Ali's Government, in which he was Minister for Foreign Affairs, because of Rashid Ali's increasing inclination towards the Axis Powers. In April 1941, shortly before the army overthrew Taha al Hashimi and set up the unconstitutional Government of Rashid Ali, Nuri withdrew to Transjordan, where he remained until he was able to return with the Regent in June. He became Prime Minister in the autumn of the same year and remained in power until June 1944. It was due to his initiative that Iraq declared war on the Axis Powers in January 1943.

Nuri collaborated with Saleh Jabr in the negotiation of the Portsmouth Treaty during 1947 and shared with him the nationalist resentment which was fermented against it in January 1948. Within a year, however, he demonstrated his mastery of the Iraqi political scene by returning to power as Prime Minister in January 1949. He succeeded in improving public security and in withdrawing the army from Palestine without incident. He took a very firm line with the organising committees of the Communist Party, five members of which were hanged. But he failed to do much to improve the financial position of the Government in spite of a personal visit to London. He was much disappointed by his failure to obtain an advance of royalties from the Iraq Petroleum Company. During the troubled period which followed Colonel Zaim's coup d'Etat in Syria in the spring of 1949, Nuri worked hard, but unsuccessfully, for Iraqi-Syrian union. He resigned in December 1949.

In the summer of 1950 he went to London where he negotiated a temporary increase in oil royalties with the Iraq Petroleum Company. He attended the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth in June 1953. In March 1954 he accompanied the King to Pakistan and visited Delhi as delegate of Iraq Government to discuss Middle East defence. In August 1954, when the authority of the Government was at a low ebb, he was called upon to form a new Government, although he was still recovering from a serious operation. By a series of restrictive ordinances and by his personal authority he restored the prestige of

the Government and called for fresh elections which he rigged shamelessly. With the Chamber which resulted from these elections he prosecuted his policy of an alliance with Turkey and a revised agreement with the United Kingdom. Thanks to his personal courage and firmness, his Government was able to weather the major crisis which accompanied the Anglo-French Suez intervention in October 1956, the only concession which he made to popular clamour being the breaking-off of diplomatic relations with France. He surmounted the budgetary crisis consequent upon the destruction of the oil pipelines in Syria by negotiating a loan agreement with the I.P.C. in March 1957.

At 69 and after a major operation in 1954, Nuri is still remarkably active. With the exception of rare moments of fatigue and depression, he has an inexhaustible fund of ideas to meet every situation. His chief interest is in foreign affairs and the Army. In internal affairs he believes in strong government and on the whole a slow evolution of the social scene by the introduction of new land for the settlement of the peasantry and new opportunities in commerce and State service by the use of development funds. This is logical enough since he derives his support largely from the tribal Deputies. It is also where he parts company with many younger Iraqis who are anxious not only for a more rapid change, but also in many cases for a shake-up of the internal and foreign policies of Iraq including the break-up of the large estates and a lessening of relations with the United Kingdom which are the cornerstone of Nuri's foreign policy. He has only a moderate knowledge of English, but can always convey his meaning. His wife speaks a little English and occasionally appears in society.

113. Nuruddin Mahmud

Kurd, born in Mosul in 1899. Educated in Ottoman military schools, he was commissioned in the Turkish army in 1917 and in the Iraqi army in 1921.

A graduate of Camberley and Quetta, he was Iraqi Military Attaché in London in 1935 and became Lieutenant-Colonel in 1937. Promoted Colonel in 1939, he was appointed Ministry of Defence member of the Iraqi State Railways Board, and in 1940 he became Director of Military Operations.

In 1941 he opposed Rashid Ali's rebellion and after its collapse he took over command and initiated the Anglo-Iraqi armistice. Commander 2nd Division (Kirkuk), 1941-43; Assistant C.G.S., 1943; promoted Major-General and appointed Commander 1st Division (Diwaniya), 1944. In 1948 he was promoted Lieutenant-General and commanded the Iraqi forces in Palestine, where he was involved in the inter-Arab jealousies which prevented the establishment of an effective Arab High Command. In 1949 he returned to command the 1st Division. Appointed C.G.S. in July 1951. In November 1952 the Regent called on him to form a Government at the height of the riots. He quickly restored order and made a sincere attempt to improve the conditions of the lower classes. He held the portfolios of Defence and Interior in his own Cabinet. He resigned after conducting the elections in January 1953, and, to the disappointment of many officers, was prevented by the Regent from returning to the army. Promoted general in November 1952 and appointed to the Senate in January 1953. A member of the Iraqi delegation to United Nations General Assembly 1955 and 1956. He has also been called in with other former Prime Ministers on occasion to advise the Palace on policy.

He was probably the best Iraqi general officer and the army misses him. Many Iraqis sympathise with him for the ungrateful treatment he received after saving the country. He speaks English and Turkish

well and his sympathies are steadily pro-British. Not unnaturally he is slightly disgruntled. His wife occasionally appears at small functions.

114. Rafiq 'Arif al Qaimaqchi, K.B.E. (Lieutenant-General)

Sunni Kurd. Born 1907. An artillery officer who qualified at the Staff Colleges of Baghdad and Quetta. He was commandant of the former in 1947 and 1949. He has also commanded the Mechanised Force in Palestine 1948-49, the Iraqi troops (strength two brigades) left in Jordan after the Iraqi evacuation of Palestine, and the 2nd Division from 1951 to 1953. Promoted to Major-General and appointed C.G.S. 1953, a position which he still holds. Lieutenant-General in 1957.

An outstanding personality with qualities of leadership and a special aptitude for picking other people's brains. His chief characteristics are his energy and heartiness and considerable shrewdness. He is very pro-British and will try to keep the army on British lines in spite of outside influence, provided he gets support from us. He has been decorated with the Order of Rafidain, the American Legion of Merit and in May 1955 was appointed an honorary K.B.E. for his part in the negotiations for the Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement of April 1955. His wife occasionally appears in society, but does not speak English.

115. Rashid Ali al Gailani

Baghdad Sunni, born 1892. A distant relation of the Naqib. A Waqf clerk in Ottoman times, he fled to Mosul with the Turks after the capture of Baghdad and practised as a lawyer after the fall of Mosul.

Appointed judge, 1921, he soon showed his ability. Minister of Justice under Yassin al Hashimi, 1924-25, he resigned over the signing of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession. President of the Chamber of Deputies, 1925-26. Minister of Interior under Jafar al Askari, 1926-28.

Again elected Deputy in 1930, he resigned (with others) in 1931 in protest against the conduct of Nuri al Said's Government, and became a prominent member of the nationalist Hizb al Ikha al Watani. Chief Private Secretary to the King 1932-33.

Prime Minister from March to October 1933 he was appointed Senator in 1934. He helped to organise the Euphrates disturbances which forced Ali Jundat to resign in spring 1935, and became Minister of Interior in the Cabinet then formed by Yasin al Hashimi.

In 1936 he fled to Istanbul after Bekr Sidqi's *coup d'Etat*. Returning to Iraq in 1937, he opposed Jamil Madfai's Government and was deported to Anah for a short time in 1938.

Prime Minister from March 1940 to January 1941, he moved steadily towards a closer understanding with the Axis. He kept close contact with the Italian Legation in Baghdad, supported the intrigues of the Mufti of Jerusalem, sponsored the overtures made by Naji Shaukat to the German Minister in Turkey, and encouraged the pro-Nazis Press. Forced to resign by British pressure in January 1941, he returned to office through a *coup d'Etat* in April, installed Sharif Sharaf in place of the Regent and, backed by the Iraqi Army, refused to allow more than one brigade of British troops in Iraq.

In May 1941, when hostilities broke out between the Iraqi Army and the British forces in Habbaniya, he tried to unite the country against Britain but failed to get substantial tribal support. After the defeat of the Iraqi forces he fled to Persia, Turkey, and finally to Germany.

He was tried *in absentia* by court martial and sentenced to death in 1942. Recognised by the Axis

as legitimate Prime Minister of Iraq, he conducted an anti-British campaign by radio throughout the war.

In 1945 he escaped through the German lines to Prague and thence, with a false passport and the unwitting assistance of Allied military transport, to Marseilles, from where he sailed to Beirut. He arrived at Riyadh in September 1945, declared himself to Ibn Saud and was granted asylum.

In about 1955 he took up residence in Cairo as a Saudi pensioner. He is said to be in poor health and there are seasonal rumours that he will be allowed to return to Iraq to end his days. This has not so far happened, though since 1953 his wife has been allowed to visit Baghdad and various of his daughters are married here. At the time of the Suez crisis, he broke silence to join in the attack on Nuri and Anglo-Iraqi friendship, but otherwise little has been heard of him. He still has admirers in Iraq, particularly in the Istiqlal Party.

116. Rashid Najib

Sunni. A Kurd of Sulaimaniya, born in 1906. He joined Government service in 1925, entered the Press and Propaganda Department of the Ministry of the Interior in 1947 and became Assistant Director-General in the Ministry in 1949. In 1952 he was appointed Mutasarrif of Kirkuk, and in 1953 of Erbil, returning to Kirkuk in the same year, became Mutasarrif of Mosul in 1955 and Mutasarrif of Basra in September 1957. In 1951 he visited the United States and in 1955 the United Kingdom. In 1956 he spent three weeks in the United Kingdom as guest of Her Majesty's Government as one of a small party of senior officials. In 1957 he visited Pakistan and India as an official guest inspecting rural administration.

He is an able and conscientious administrator, taking a keen interest in local government, which he has studied abroad with intelligence and goodwill. A frank, friendly and kindly personality, he speaks English well. He is well disposed towards Britain and was very helpful in restoring Anglo-Iraqi activities in Mosul after the blackout caused by the Suez intervention. His wife took a lead in going out in society in Mosul.

117. Rauf al Bahrani

Baghdad Shia, born 1897. Educated at the Baghdad Law School, he was appointed to a clerical post in the Ministry of Finance in 1922 and rose—it is said not entirely by merit—to be Director-General of Customs and Excise in 1935.

Minister of Finance under Yasin al Hashimi 1935-36. Again Director General of Customs and Excise 1938-40. Minister of Finance under Nuri al Said 1940; of Social Affairs under Rashid Ali 1940-41; and again of Social Affairs in Rashid Ali's rebel Government in April-May 1941.

After Rashid Ali's overthrow he fled to Persia, where he was arrested by British forces in autumn 1941 and sent for internment to Southern Rhodesia. Sent back to Iraq for trial in 1944, he was condemned to three years' hard labour and sequestration of his property.

After his release he engaged in business and gradually reinstated himself until in May 1950 he was appointed Director-General of Income Tax. In July 1952 he was appointed a member of the Government Oil Refineries Administration. The appointment was terminated in 1955.

Although he talks the conventional Arab nationalist language, he was a tool rather than an associate of Rashid Ali. Early in 1950 he made himself known to a member of this Embassy and since then has regained his position in Baghdad society.

He speaks no English.

118. Rauf al Chadirchi

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1884. Educated at Istanbul and at Berlin and Geneva Universities. Before the war he was successively a clerk in the legal drafting department of the Turkish Ministry of Justice, a professor of law at the Turkish Law College, Qaimmaqam of Diyala, and adviser on foreign affairs to the Turkish Governor of Baghdad. Immediately before its fall he was the Mayor of Baghdad. He went to Berlin shortly before the occupation, and later to Switzerland. He was not permitted to return to Baghdad until 1920.

In Baghdad he practised as a lawyer and took no part in Nationalist agitation, but was asked to go with his father when the latter was deported to Istanbul in August 1920. He returned in 1921 and took up his law practice, obtaining much of the business of foreign firms owing to his knowledge of languages. Professor at the Baghdad Law School 1922, Dean 1923.

Deputy for Hilla 1924, he opposed the 1922 Treaty. Minister of Finance under Abdul Muhsin al Sa'adun, Minister of Justice under Jafar al Askari 1926. Iraqi Minister to Ankara 1929. He resigned in 1930 and returned to Baghdad as legal adviser to the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Iraqi Minister in London from 1936 to 1939 when he resigned. He generally spends the summer months in Eiggland.

Rauf has a charming and kindly personality and looks on the intrigues and enthusiasms of Iraqi politics with an indulgent contempt. He is universally popular and consequently well informed, but will not often talk about politics. He speaks English, French, German and Turkish. Is badly crippled with arthritis. In April 1952 he surprised Baghdad society by marrying Majda, the stepdaughter of Daud al Haidari (q.v.), who is at least thirty years younger than he is. He is a brother of Kamil al Chadirchi (q.v.) by a different mother but the two are not on speaking terms.

119. Rayih al Atiyah (Haji)

Shia. Sheikh of the Bani Hassan tribe of Diwaniya. Born about 1890. Deputy for Diwaniya five times between 1933 and 1939. At that time he was a fervent nationalist. A Senator from 1944 to June 1952. In November 1952 he became Minister of Agriculture in Nuruddin Mahmud's Cabinet. Re-appointed to the Senate in April 1953. He is not of much political importance. He speaks Arabic only.

120. Rushdi al Chalabi

Born about 1914, son of Abdul Hadi al Chalabi (q.v.) of a prominent and wealthy Shia family in Kadhimain.

Associated with his father in various commercial and industrial enterprises including large-scale grain exports, jute manufacture and vegetable oil extraction.

Politically a supporter of Nuri Pasha and in 1950 elected to the Central Committee of Nuri's Constitutional Union Party. Elected as one of the Deputies for Kadhimain in 1948 and returned unopposed to the present Parliament in September 1954. Appointed Minister without Portfolio in the Government of Nuri al Said in August 1954. Subsequently appointed as Minister of Agriculture. Although he showed some signs of activity at the outset, it was soon apparent that he was too stupid, lazy and conceited to be a good Minister. His father's position kept him in office until Nuri al Said resigned in June 1957. Somewhat surly in manner and possessed of only fair knowledge of English. He is married to a member of the wealthy Agha Jafar family of Basra who speaks a little English.

121. Sa'ad Umar

Born in Karbala in 1917. Shia. Son of Umar Haj Alwan, one of the Karbala representatives on the Constituent Assembly. Educated at Karbala and Baghdad. Graduated in the Law College about 1941. Thereafter he practised as a lawyer in Karbala until 1947, when he became Deputy for Karbala. He was not re-elected in 1948, but was put in in a bye-election later in the year. Minister for Social Affairs in Ali Jaudat's Government of December 1949, and of Education in Taulik Suwaidi's Cabinet in February 1950. A member of Nuri Pasha's Constitutional Union Party November 1949.

In the Chamber of Deputies after he had failed to substantiate allegations of corruption which he had made against four Cabinet Ministers, he was suspended for the remainder of the parliamentary session.

A protégé of the late Saleh Jabr, who was a friend of his father. He owns a little property in Karbala. He is full of large ideas but very inexperienced and unintelligent.

122. Sabih Mumtaz al Daftari

Born 1910. Sunni of Baghdad and brother of Ali Mumtaz (q.v.). In Iraq Government Service since 1928 in junior posts. Director-General of Justice 1948. Deputy for Baghdad 1950. He was among the Nationalist members who walked out of Parliament in February 1952. Re-appointed to the Civil Service October 1952 as Director-General of Communications and Works. Inspector-General in the Ministry of Agriculture 1954. Director-General of Justice 1955, in which capacity he also served on the Boards of the Rafidain Bank and the Tobacco Company. Appointed a member of the Public Service Board (Civil Service Commission) September 1957.

Sabih Mumtaz is a highly-strung individual with strong Nationalist sentiments and is thoroughly suspicious of Western policies. This has not prevented him being friendly with Europeans, though he is invariably very critical of their Governments. He speaks some English.

123. Sadiq al Bassam

Baghdad Shia, born about 1895. Educated at the Baghdad Law School, he practised as a lawyer for several years.

Elected Deputy for Kut in 1930, he supported Yasin al Hashimi and was a member of the Ikha al Watani Party. Minister of Education under Yasin al Hashimi 1935-36. Minister of Economics under Nuri al Said 1939-40 and of Education under Rashid Ali in 1941.

Remaining inactive during the 1941 disturbances, he was Minister of Justice 1941-42 and of Communications and Works December 1943 to June 1944 under Nuri al Said; of Finance under Muhammad al Sadr, January to June 1948; and of Defence under Muzahim al Pachachi from June to October 1948. A Senator from 1941, his appointment was not renewed in 1949. A founder member of the United Popular Front, May 1951. He left the Front in June 1952 and was elected Deputy for Baghdad in January 1953. Re-elected 1954. He owned and edited the influential newspaper *al Difaa* which was banned by Dr. Jamali's Government but reappeared under the title *al Hiyad*, only to be suppressed again by Nuri al Said in 1954.

Sadiq is a xenophobe with violent prejudices and ill-concealed fanaticism. As Minister of Defence in 1948 he was mainly responsible for the fierce sentences passed on Jews by the courts martial and for encouraging anti-Jewish feeling. He does not like the British, and his policy is often indistinguishable from that of the Istiqlal Party. Only Deputy to speak against the Special Agreement between Iraq

and the United Kingdom when debated in the Chamber in March 1954. He speaks Arabic only. His private life is disreputable. He suffers badly from diabetes and from nerves which his addiction to whisky does nothing to improve. Despite all this, is an amusing, not unsympathetic personality and is tolerated if not liked by his political opponents.

124. Said Qazzaz

Kurd of Sulaimaniya, born about 1903. Largely self-educated. He began his career as a clerk in the Mutasarrifiya in Sulaimaniya in 1924. Appointed Qaimmaqam of Halebjia in 1934. Transferred in 1939 to Zakho and in 1941 to Kifri. From 1941 to 1944 he served in the Ministry of the Interior. In 1944 he was appointed Mutasarrif at Kut. Transferred to Erbil in 1945 and to Kirkuk in 1947, after a short spell as an Administrative Inspector. Appointed Mutasarrif of Mosul in 1949. Was offered an appointment with the Basra Petroleum Company in the spring of 1952, but at Nuri al Said's request agreed to remain at Mosul until the general elections.

Minister of Social Affairs under Nuruddin Mahmud, December 1952. Appointed Director-General of Iraqi Ports in February 1953 but resigned after a quarrel over the appointment of Finance Officer with Abdul Wahab Murjan (q.v.) in March. Reappointed in June 1953. In September 1953 was appointed Minister of the Interior in Dr. Jamali's Government and retained that post when Dr. Jamali reformed the Government in March 1954. In October 1953 by agreement with the Talibani family was elected Deputy for Kirkuk at a bye-election. In April 1954 was Minister of the Interior in Arshad al Unuri's Cabinet and responsible for the conduct of elections. Although he did not escape the accusation of interference, especially from the Left, he conducted the elections well and did not allow a difficult security situation to get out of hand. He resigned directly the elections were over. Minister of Interior under Nuri al Said August 1954 to June 1957. His participation in these Governments was not entirely in accordance with his desires, since he would much rather have retained the post of Director-General of Ports and he felt himself entitled to criticise Dr. Jamali's weaknesses, particularly the decision to allow students expelled for Communist tendencies to re-enter the Government schools and colleges. He therefore felt more at home in Nuri al Said's more authoritarian Government, though he complained of lack of access to the Prime Minister.

He succeeded in his terms of office in building up the morale of the police which had remained at a low ebb since the events of 1952.

He has visited England and in the summer of 1950 he toured America as a guest of the United States Government.

Hard-working, honest and fearless, Said Qazzaz is generally regarded as one of the best administrators in the country. He speaks good English.

125. Saleh Mahdi Haidar (Dr.)

Shia of Baghdad born in 1914. After completing his secondary school education in Baghdad, he went for a year to the American University of Beirut and from 1933-36 to the London School of Economics where he took a degree in economics. Assistant Collector of Customs, 1936-37. In 1937 he returned for a year to the London School of Economics for further study. On his return to Iraq he studied land problems and went back again to the London School of Economics from 1939-42. Ph.D. of London University, 1942. In 1943-46 he held various appointments in the Ministry of Supply, and in 1946-48 in the Ministry of Finance.

Member of the Iraqi Delegation to the San Francisco Conference 1945. Acting Director-General of State Domains, 1948. In the same year he was seconded from the Ministry of Finance and made Deputy Governor of the National Bank of Iraq. In 1950 he went to Washington and London in connexion with the negotiations for the International Bank loan to Iraq and the Scarce Currency Agreements. His appointment as Deputy Governor of the National Bank was suddenly though not unexpectedly terminated in June 1952. Appointed Assistant Director-General of State Domains August 1953 and Director-General of Revenues by Dr. Jamali in October 1953. As such was an Iraqi member of the Standing Committee set up to work out details of the Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement of 1955. Appointed Director-General of Budgets 1955. Given a Research Studentship at Colombia University 1957. Appointed a member of the Public Service Board in August 1957.

Salih Haidar is honest, intelligent, but conceited, and he does not get on well with his colleagues. He is more of a terrorist than a practical administrator. His service in the Standing Committee and his more frequent contacts with British people have disabused him of the idea that the British were running Iraq for their own purposes. As a result he has been much more frank and friendly in his dealings with this Embassy.

He speaks excellent English. His wife is the sister of the wife of Abdul Karim al Uzri (q.v.); her English is poor.

126. Saleh Saib al Jubhuri

Sunni of the Juhur tribe of Mosul, born in 1898. Commissioned in the Turkish army in 1916 and in the Iraqi army in 1921, he was appointed instructor in the newly formed Small Arms School in Baghdad. During this appointment he attended a small arms course at Hythe, and later attended courses at the Iraqi Staff College and the Staff College, Camberley. A personal friend of Bekr Sidqi and a supporter of the 1936 *coup d'Etat*, he was retired after the assassination of Bekr Sidqi and appointed Assistant Director-General of the Iraqi State Railways. In 1941, after Rashid Ali's flight, he was invited to rejoin the army and was appointed G.O.C. 3rd Division. In 1944 he succeeded Ismail Namiq as Chief of the General Staff. He was promoted to lieutenant-general in 1945 and general in 1950. On handing over the office of Chief of General Staff in 1951 to General Nuruddin Mahmud (q.v.), he became a Senator. He was offered the Ministry of Defence by Nusrat-al-Farisi during his abortive attempt to form a Cabinet in January 1953. Appointed Minister of Communications and Works under Nuri in August 1954-June 1957.

He neither drinks, smokes nor gambles, and is said to be just and honest; but he had neither the ability nor the personality to be a good Chief of General Staff or Minister, and his impotence as a leader was displayed in the 1948 Palestine campaign. He speaks English. His wife does not appear in society.

127. Saleh Zakki Taufiq (Major-General)

Sunni Muslim, born in Baghdad in 1908 of mixed Turkish and Arab parents. Attended Senior Officers' School, Enderbost Park, in 1948. He was appointed to command the 2nd Division as a Brigadier in June 1954, having held the command since October 1953.

He is pro-British in outlook. His English is only fair. He is genuinely very interested in his profession. A live personality with drive and enthusiasm, who makes his presence felt in the formation he commands. His wife appears in public but does not speak English.

128. Sami Paffah

A native of Mosul of Kurdish origin, born in 1905. Educated at the Teachers' Training College in Baghdad, he taught in Iraqi schools from 1922 to 1925.

In 1925 he joined the Iraqi Army and was sent to Sandhurst in 1926. Commissioned in the Iraqi Army in 1928, he was attached to the newly-formed Royal Iraqi Air Force and returned to England for training with the R.A.F. When he came back to Iraq he was appointed to the Royal Iraqi Air Force.

He graduated from the Iraqi Staff College in 1937 and in 1941, after the Rashid Ali rebellion, he was appointed Commander of the R.I.A.F. He held this appointment until 1954 (with the rank of Brigadier until 1952 when he was made a Major-General), except for a short interlude in 1948 when he was sent to Europe on a secret arms purchasing mission which was a complete failure. Appointed Minister of Social Affairs in April 1954 and placed on pension from that date. Transferred to the Ministry of Development June 1954 and to the Director-General of Ports in August 1954. Minister of Interior under Ali Jaudat June 1957.

He is an energetic and jovial man, a good disciplinarian, and one of the Iraqi army's best leaders. He made every effort to improve the training and equipment of the R.I.A.F.

He tries to carry over into civil life the comparative efficiency of the armed forces, but has an uphill task faced with the incompetence of the Iraqi Civil Service. Nevertheless, both in the Port of Basra and during a brief interlude as Mutasarrif of Basra and again as Minister of Interior, has shown that he was capable and firm.

He speaks English well and his sympathies are pro-British. Has latterly suffered from ill-health.

He is related by marriage to the influential Hazim Beg family of Zakho. His wife, who speaks fair English, goes out in society.

129. Shakir Maher

Born about 1915. A lawyer and prominent member of the Istiqlal Party until 1951, when he resigned. Elected as an Independent Deputy for Baghdad (Sumarra) in 1953 and again in 1954. He has spoken consistently against the Governments in office and is regarded as one of the younger and more ambitious Opposition Deputies. His ideas are still very much those of the Istiqlal Party, though he has toed the line dutifully in Nuri's Parliament as the price of his election, but has shown signs of breaking out again, largely because of the dismissal of one brother from the army and another from the post of Mutasarrif of Basra, as he considers, unjustly.

He speaks some English.

130. Shawkat al Zahawi (Dr.)

Kurd, born about 1898, the son of a colonel in the Ottoman army. Educated in Baghdad and at the Military Medical College in Constantinople he joined the Iraqi Health Service in 1922.

He has specialised in pathology, on which he has written a number of articles. He is now Director of the Central Pathological Institute and Professor of Pathology in the Royal Medical College.

He was Minister of Social Affairs under Taufiq Suwaidi for a short time in 1946.

In the Royal Medical College he is an incompetent intriguer, but since he is married to a daughter of the late Mohammed Fadhil Pasha al Daghestani, and therefore has connections with Najib al Rawi (q.v.) and Hikmat Suliman (q.v.), he cannot easily be unseated. He speaks English.

131. Sheet Na'man

Born 1907. Christian. Educated American University, Beirut, and in the United States. Joined Government Service 1928. Appointed Director-General of Institute for Industrial Research 1947. Director-General of Industries in Ministry of Economics 1950, and a member of the Board of Administration of the Industrial Bank in the same year. Represented Iraq in the Economic Committee of the Arab League in Cairo 1955. Visited the United Kingdom as Iraqi representative at the opening of Calder Hall October 1956. Represented Iraq at the meeting of the Indian Atomic Energy Organisation 1957.

He is an able administrator rather than a practising scientist. He is Iraq's representative on the Scientific Council of the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre and a member of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Committee.

Friendly towards the West and receptive of new ideas he is sometimes embarrassingly critical of Arab abilities and achievements. His wife, who speaks French, is a Syrian.

132. Taha al Hashimi

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1888. Educated at Istanbul and served in the Turkish army in Arabia and the Yemen during the First World War. Appointed to the Turkish General Staff 1920.

He returned to Baghdad in 1922, joined the Iraq army and was given command of the troops in Mosul, C.G.S. 1923. He was on the staff of the High Commissioner for the frontier negotiations with Turkey after the Treaty of Lausanne 1924. When the post of C.G.S. was abolished he became tutor to the then Crown Prince Ghazi 1924; Chief of the Census Department 1926; and Director of Education 1928. In 1930 he again became C.G.S. In 1931 he visited the Imam Yahya and concluded the Iraq-Yemen Treaty of Friendship. He was in Turkey in October 1936 when the Bekr Sidqi *coup d'Etat* forced the resignation of the Prime Minister (Taha's brother, the late Yasin al Hashimi), and he did not return to Iraq until September 1937, after the murder of Bekr Sidqi.

Elected Deputy for Bagdad December 1937 and again in 1939. In December 1938, in collaboration with the C.G.S., Husain Fawzi, he organised the military demonstration which caused the resignation of Jamil Madfai (q.v.) and replaced him as Prime Minister by Nuri al Said. Taha became Minister of Defence in Nuri's Government and retained this portfolio in the succeeding Government of Rashid Ali in 1940. He resigned in January 1941 and himself became Prime Minister in February. He failed to break the influence of the pro-Axis military clique, who overthrew him and set up the unconstitutional Government of Rashid Ali a month later. He then retired to Turkey, where he remained for the rest of the war, because Nuri al Said was unwilling to allow him to return.

He spent much of the time after the war in Syria, but in May 1951 he played the leading part in the formation of the United Popular Front. He was elected President of the Front's Supreme Committee, but in the spring of 1953 showed signs of losing interest in domestic politics and when in August 1953 he was appointed Vice-President of the Development Board, he gave up all political activity. He knows no English but speaks French, Turkish and Arabic.

He is no friend of the British, nor for that matter of the Crown Prince with whom he engaged in a slanging match in 1952, before a gathering of ex-Prime Ministers. In the Development Board shows a distinct partiality for the Germans and collaborates closely with Abdul Rahman al Jalili.

His wife does not appear in public.

133. Tahsin Qadri, G.C.V.O., O.B.E.

Sunni of Damascus, born 1893. He was with King Faisal in Damascus and accompanied him to Europe in 1920. Came to Baghdad with the King and was appointed A.D.C. in 1921.

Master of Ceremonies at the Palace 1932, he accompanied King Faisal on his State visit to England in 1933. He resigned in 1936 owing to Princess Azza's scandalous marriage. Counsellor to Iraqi Legation, Tehran, 1936. Consul-General, Bombay, 1937. Director of Protocol in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in February and Consul-General, Beirut, in July 1939. He became, in addition, Chargé d'Affaires at Damascus when the Iraqi Government recognised the new Syrian Government in 1943. Accredited as Minister to Syria and the Lebanon in 1944. Acting Director-General, Foreign Affairs, 1945, Minister at Paris 1946. Master of Ceremonies at the Palace 1947. In June 1949 he was temporarily appointed Minister at Tehran when the Regent visited Persia in that year, but returned to his post at the Palace a few months later. In June 1952 he accompanied the Amir Abdul Ilah to Amman. He was responsible for arranging King Faisal II's Accession celebrations in May 1953 and was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth the following month. Accompanied His Majesty to Pakistan March 1954 and to Jordan and Turkey in 1955, and on his State Visit to the United Kingdom in 1956, when he was made G.C.V.O.

Tahsin is sociable and clever and makes a not very efficient but agreeable Master of Ceremonies. Though well-intentioned, it is very questionable whether his influence at the Palace is to the ultimate advantage of the monarchy. He much enjoys his whisky and the company of European ladies. Politically he is a lightweight. He is married to the heiress of Abdul Wahhab Pasha Qartas of Basra, who speaks French and some English but of her own choice does not appear in society.

He speaks Turkish, French and English. His ambition is to succeed the Amir Zaid as Ambassador in London.

134. Talib Abdul Majid Jamil

Sunni of leading Baghdad family. Born 1919. Advocate, brother of Hussain Jamil (q.v.). Joined Government Service 1953 and after service as Registrar of Companies and Assistant Director-General in Ministry of Development was appointed, in 1954, Director of Foreign Trade in the Ministry of Economics, and in 1957 Director-General of Commerce.

Although an ardent Nationalist with pronounced leanings to the Left, he has made efforts to improve his connection with Western diplomatic missions. Visited United Kingdom under Her Majesty's Government's auspices in 1956, but any beneficial results from this visit were largely nullified by the Suez crisis which occurred immediately after his return to Iraq. Is pleasant company and works hard to improve his recently acquired command of English and French.

As Director-General of Commerce he inclines to woolly measures of State control. His wife also speaks some English and goes out in society.

135. Tariq al Askari

Sunni, born in Aleppo in 1914. Son of the late Jaafar Pasha al Askari. Nuri al Said is his uncle. Educated at King's College, Cambridge, from 1932-35 and took a degree in engineering. In 1936-37 worked as engineer with the Grampian Electricity Supply Company in Scotland. Engineer in the Directorate-General of Irrigation, 1937-42. Deputy for Kut, 1943-48. From May to October

1948 served with the Arab Legion in Jerusalem and held the rank of captain. Appointed Director of the Agricultural Section of the Development Board in April 1952. He resigned in the autumn and was elected Deputy for Qalaa Salih in January 1953. Re-elected 1954. Was chosen Second Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies December 1953. Appointed Minister at the Embassy in London, June 1955.

Tariq was a member of the Higher Committee of Nuri's Constitutional Union Party. Intelligent, wealthy, able and witty, he is one of the few younger Iraqis with a balanced judgment. Although a sincere Nationalist he regards the shortcomings of his own countrymen with amused cynicism which, as with many Iraqis educated in the West, has made of him a passive rather than a dynamic force in his own country.

He is a genuine friend and admirer of Britain and a believer in the British connection, though he has been known to criticise it publicly. He is no less friendly towards the United States Embassy.

Tariq speaks excellent English, Turkish and some French. His wife, a daughter of the late Jaafar al Pachachi, also speaks good English and appears in mixed society. They entertain frequently and well.

136. Taufiq al Mukhtar

Born about 1900. A former officer of Iraqi army. Elected Deputy for Baghdad in 1950, 1953 and again in 1954. Chairman of Military Affairs Committee in the Chamber. Member of the so-called Nationalist *bloc* in the 1950 Parliament and always in opposition to the Government of the day. A vociferous critic of the British connection. He stands for Parliament as an independent. Speaks no English.

137. Taufiq al Naib

Sunni, born about 1895. A student at the Law School in Baghdad at the outbreak of the First World War, he completed his studies after the British occupation and was appointed to a post in the Department of Justice in 1923.

From 1926 to 1943 he was a judge and served in many parts of the country, though the bulk of his service was in Baghdad. He gained the reputation of a strong and just judge without political ambitions.

Appointed Mutasarrif of Kut 1943, and transferred to Diwaniya 1944. Minister of Economics under Saleh Jabr from September 1947 to January 1948, and of Interior under Nuri al Said from March to September 1949. Appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts in November 1949.

He is a quiet, retiring man who neither smokes nor drinks.

He was a good judge, but a poor administrator. He is impassive and unimaginative, and needs always the letter of the law to support a decision that others may enforce. He speaks no English.

138. Taufiq Suwaidi

Sunni, of a well-established Baghdad family, born about 1889. Educated at Baghdad, Istanbul and Paris, where he studied International Law, he was appointed interpreter to the Ministry of Education at Istanbul in 1913. In the same year he represented Iraq at the Arab Conference in Paris. During the First World War he was in Istanbul. After the armistice he joined the Arab Government in Syria and was appointed a judge at Damascus. He returned to Baghdad in 1921 and was appointed Assistant Government Counsellor and Director of the Law School.

Deputy from 1924. President of the Chamber 1929, he has held the following Cabinet posts:

Education under Abdul Musin Sa'adun 1928; Foreign Affairs under Jamil Madfai in 1934; Justice in Jamil Madfai's twelve-day Cabinet of 1935; Foreign Affairs again under Madfai 1937; Foreign Affairs under Taha al Hashimi 1941. He was Deputy Prime Minister under Nuri Pasha for a short time in 1943 but resigned the following year when the constitutional validity of this office was called in question. He was Prime Minister in 1929, 1946 and 1950 and joined Nuri al Said's Cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in February 1951. Resigned from the Cabinet in July 1951. Foreign Minister under Jamil Madfai in January 1953.

Taufiq was Iraqi Minister at Tehran in 1931 and has had considerable diplomatic experience. As Minister for Foreign Affairs he headed the Iraqi Delegation to Geneva in 1937, where he is said to have handled the Palestine and Assyrian questions with tact and moderation. He again represented Iraq at Geneva in 1938 and afterwards visited London to discuss the Palestine problem with the British Foreign and Colonial Secretaries. He was a member of the Iraqi Delegation to the San Francisco Conference in 1945, and in 1948 he was one of the signatories of the unratified Portsmouth Treaty. He has been used by various Governments to represent Iraq on conferences and special missions, e.g., to the Arab League and Baghdad Pact. Chairman of the Arab League Economic Committee 1956.

His elder brother Naji Suwaidi was a prominent member of Rashid Ali's Government but Taufiq escaped implication.

Taufiq is intelligent, subtle and not altogether honest, either politically or financially. In Arab affairs he generally follows the Egyptian lead and in Iraqi politics he is normally opposed to Nuri al Said but has co-operated with him on occasion, as he did over the Agreements with Turkey and the United Kingdom in the spring of 1955. He is popularly supposed to be a Liberal. It was he who permitted the operation of political parties in 1946 after they had been banned for many years, and for a short time in 1946 he was president of the Liberal Party. He also has some reputation as a nationalist, but it is doubtful if any of his political convictions are strongly held. He is a rich man, a landed proprietor, who has also wide business interests, in many cases in partnership with Iraqi Jews. He is known to have used his political influence in favour of his business interests. He has a keen sense of humour, is excellent company and speaks French and English fluently but incorrectly. His wife does not go out in society.

139. Taufiq Wahbi Ma'raf, C.R.E.

Kurd of Sulaimaniya, born in 1887. Graduating from the Turkish Military College in 1904, he served in European Turkey and was a regimental commander and later a staff officer in the Ottoman army during the 1914-18 war.

After the war he joined the Iraqi army and was appointed Military Adviser to Shaikh Mahmud (q.v.) in 1923. Leaving Shaikh Mahmud when the latter's conduct became impossible, he was appointed Commandant of the Baghdad Military College with the rank of Colonel. In 1929 he was sent on the Senior Officers' School course to the United Kingdom.

Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniya for a short time in 1930, he remained unemployed for several years afterwards but was ultimately appointed Director-General of Surveys. He resigned from Government service in 1941 and made a comfortable fortune as a contractor.

Minister of Economics under Hamdi Pachachi 1944-46, of Education under Saleh Jabr in 1947, and of Social Affairs under Taufiq Suwaidi in 1950. Made a Senator in 1948. When his term expired in 1956, he was not reappointed.

Appointed Honorary C.B.E. for war services in 1946. Elected second vice-president of Saleh Jabr's Popular Socialist Party in July 1951. Re-elected second vice-president in 1954. Although at first an enthusiastic supporter of Saleh Jabr, his faith in the party weakened and he was not upset when all political parties were abolished in November 1952. Again second vice-president in the revived party in 1953, but has largely abandoned politics after breaking with Saleh Jabr and being expelled from his party in the summer of 1954, when he tried unsuccessfully to lead the party to co-operation with Nuri. He is now engaged in the publication of a Kurdish grammar book.

He is a kind man, frank, affable and an Anglophile being honorary vice-president of the British Institute Club and chairman of the Board of Governors of the British Council-sponsored Preparatory School in Baghdad. His achievements in office fall short of his excellent intentions, and he is not a man to sway his colleagues. He speaks English, Persian and Turkish as well as Kurdish and Arabic. His wife, though a woman of little education, is very active in good works and ran the early stages of flood relief in 1954. She has established herself as the leading spirit in this field among the women of her generation. She speaks a little Turkish and some English.

140. Umar Nadhmi

Kurd, born Kifri 1893. Educated at the Baghdad Law School, he was a civil judge before the 1914-18 war and Public Prosecutor to the Baghdad Military Court during the war.

He served as a judge again from 1921 to 1927, and from then to 1937 he was Mutasarrif in a number of provinces. Director-General of Revenues 1937-38.

Minister of Economics and Communications and later of Interior under Nuri al Said 1939-40; of Communications and Works under Rashid Ali in 1940; of Interior under Taha al Hashimi in 1941 and under Nuri al Said 1943-44; of Justice under Taufiq Suwaidi in 1946, under Nuri al Said November 1946 to March 1947 and under Mohammed al Sadr January to March 1948; and of Interior under Muzahim Pachachi 1948-49. Deputy Prime Minister under Nuri al Said 1949. Again Minister of Interior under Ali Imdad December 1949 to February 1950 and again in February 1951 under Nuri al Said, whose Cabinet he joined as Minister without Portfolio in December 1950. He has been a Senator since 1939.

He probably owes his rise to eminence to the friends he made in the provinces (especially in the North) where he served as Mutasarrif, to the support of Nuri al Said, and to a cautious and dignified demeanour.

He speaks no English. He enjoys the Regent's confidence. He is disillusioned and in poor health and says he will take no further part in politics, but pushes the interests of his son Jamal (q.v.).

His wife does not go out in society.

141. Yahya Qassim

Sunni of Mosul, born 1913. Educated Baghdad Law College.

He joined Government service in 1936. Was appointed Superintendent in the Council of Ministers'

Office in 1937 and later transferred to the Iraqi State Railways.

He was at that time an active Left-winger, and was reported to have a hand in the publication of the clandestine newspaper *Al Sharara*. In 1943 he was arrested for the distribution of Leftish literature and was discharged from the Iraqi State Railways. In 1944 he started the newspaper *Al Sha'ab* as the organ of the now defunct Leftist party of that name. He now owns and edits this paper himself, and it is no longer connected with any party. By the middle of 1953 it had become the best and most popular newspaper in Baghdad. He visited England with a party of journalists in 1945 and became a convinced and outspoken admirer of the British people. In 1946 he joined the National Democratic Party but soon resigned owing to personal differences. He was taken up by Saleh Jabr in 1947 and accompanied him to London in January 1948 for the signature of the unratified Portsmouth Treaty. In addition to journalism he practises as a lawyer and is paid a retainer by the Iraq Petroleum Company. Elected for Telafar in June 1954, displacing the paramount Shaikh of the Shammar, but he was not re-elected in September 1954. He has visited England every summer since 1949. In 1954 he went for the second time as a member of a sponsored Press delegation. Visited Germany in 1955.

Yahya is a clever man with a frank and friendly manner and a pronounced stammer. His newspaper is above the low level of the Baghdad Press, and he has the courage on occasion to express unpopular opinions. He has not abandoned his Socialist leanings and is a sincere advocate of reforms, but he is now no revolutionary. He is married to a niece of the late Amin Zaki Sulaiman and speaks good English.

142. Yusuf Abdullah al Gailani (Saiyid)

Sunni, born 1907 of the family of the Naqibs of Baghdad. Educated at Baghdad and Balliol College, Oxford.

He returned to Iraq in 1934 and was appointed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in which he became Director of the Political Section in 1945. Director-General in 1949, Acting Under-Secretary in January 1951 and Under-Secretary in 1952. He became a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Iraqi Foreign Service in November 1950. He was a member of the Iraqi Delegations to Arab League meetings in 1949 and 1950. Member of the Iraqi Delegation to the United Nations Assembly, 1951.

Yusuf is intelligent and friendly, cautious and a little shy. He takes no part in politics and is a firm believer in the alignment of Iraqi foreign policy with the West. Is a competent negotiator and conducts himself well at meetings of the Baghdad Pact Council at Deputy level. He complains of the amateurish and emotional conduct of Iraq's foreign relations by his successive political chiefs, and is occasionally critical of the intervention of the Crown Prince in the detailed conduct of foreign affairs. He is, however, a loyal, discreet and competent official. He speaks excellent English, and his wife, who is also a Gailani, appears in mixed society and speaks good English. They are sending their son to Haileybury.